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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Money is a veil, but when the veil utters, real output sputters. Gurley
(1961)
It has become by now conventional wisdom that nancial development is critically
important for economic growth.1 Hence, nance is not just a pure veil in which real
transactions are shrouded, but a well-developed and smoothly operating nancial system
rather performs essential functions for the real economy to ourish. Finance helps
overcome frictions in the real sector arising from information and transaction costs,
thereby inuencing economic agents savings and investment behaviour and therefore
long-run economic growth (Beck 2014).
However, the causal relationship between nance and growth which actually can
run both ways holds true for good and bad times alike. As the recent crisis vividly
reminded us, nancial development may also become the root cause of a deep nancial
and economic crisis. This ambiguous role of nance reects the fact that the nancial
sector itself is prone to market failures resulting from informational frictions (e.g., moral
hazard and adverse selection). When such nancial frictions become dominant and
widespread, as it is the case in a systemic crisis, they tend to have severe repercussions
for the real economy.
Against this background, policy makers have an essential interest in measuring the
stress level in the nancial system caused by nancial frictions in order to assess its
macroeconomic risks, and to consider appropriate timely counteractions.
1See Levine 2005 for an extensive overview of the theoretical and empirical literature on the nance-
growth nexus.
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There exists a great variety of standard indicators measuring the level of stress in
individual market segments, each capturing certain symptoms of the underlying nan-
cial friction. For instance, option-implied volatilities provide information about market
participantsdegree of risk aversion and uncertainty (Bekaert and Hoerova 2014); they
can be computed for many important assets such as government bonds, interest rate
derivatives, interbank deposits, equities, foreign exchange and many more. The VIX
has received particular attention in this context, since the nancial press often refers
to it as investorsfear gauge (Carr and Lee 2009).2 Other stress indicators are, for
instance, CDS and other credit risk spreads, liquidity measures like bid-ask spreads,
equity valuation losses but also quantity-based indicators measuring activity in certain
primary and secondary markets, for instance. Such indicators have long been used by
policy institutions engaged in nancial stability surveillance, such as the IMF, the BIS,
central banks and other national supervisory authorities. These standard indicators
form the backbone of any nancial stability report produced by these institutions.
While all these individual indicators are useful for partial analysis, the sheer amount
of existing stress measures complicates the task of inferring, for instance, whether stress
observed in one particular market segment is either mainly idiosyncratic or instead a
more widespread and thus systemic phenomenon. Sometimes you cant see the wood
for the trees.
One way to synthesise the information coming from many individual indicators is
the computation of a composite indicator of nancial stress, or nancial stress index
as it has become known in the literature. Financial stress indexes quantify the current
stress level in the nancial system by compressing a certain number of individual stress
indicators into a single statistic. While this appears quite obvious, and despite the fact
2The VIX is the Volatility Index of the Chicago Board of Options Exchange, constructed from a
portfolio of options on the S&P 500 index.
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that composite indicators have been used for other purposes for a long time (e.g., mon-
etary and nancial conditions indexes), nancial stress indexes have become a popular
tool only in recent years. This trend has been spurred by the nancial crisis, reecting
the increasing demand from policy authorities to systematically measure, monitor and
assess systemic stress and the risks it entails for the economy as a whole.
This dissertation is about a novel nancial stress index, an indicator which explicitly
aims to emphasise the systemic dimension of nancial stress, and how this indicator
can be used to assess empirically the dynamic interactions between nancial instability,
the macroeconomy, and monetary policy as a means of public intervention. Within
this context, the estimated impact of nancial stress on real economic activity receives
particular attention and runs like a common thread through all the three papers forming
part of this dissertation.
The real e¤ects of nancial instability, and the other macroeconomic relationships
I am interested in, are estimated using certain variants of vector autoregression (VAR)
models, comprising standard linear, but also non-linear VARs. The linear VAR frame-
work captures, by construction, the average dynamic relationships between the model
variables estimated over the entire data sample, thereby ignoring, on the one hand,
potential non-linearities associated with subperiods of severe nancial instability. On
the other hand, linear VARs provide a convenient analytical framework if one is mainly
interested in testing many di¤erent model variations (involving tests of coe¢ cient re-
strictions) of higher-dimensional VARs based on rather small samples, as it is the case
when dealing with pure euro area data.
The non-linear VARs which I apply are particularly suited, a priori, to deal with
usually short-lived, extraordinary but still potentially recurrent situations in which the
dynamics of the economy changes suddenly and markedly. Such phase transitions (Ace-
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moglu, Ozdaglar and Tahbaz-Salehi 2015) typically mark the tipping points at which
systemic nancial stress starts disrupting the regular functioning of the nancial system
and the economy as a whole. They can be explained, for instance, as switches between
multiple equilibria, brought about by certain mechanisms which propagate and/or am-
plify an adverse stability shock to an extent that it alters the fundamental patterns
of behaviour of economic agents and their interactions in an abrupt fashion. For an
overview of such theoretical mechanisms e.g. occasionally binding credit constraints
see Hartmann, Hubrich and Kremer (2013). Since linear VARs tend to wash out any
unusual dynamics which may prevail over limited periods of time, certain non-linear
methods are required to identify and characterise the specic economic dynamics ob-
served during episodes of nancial instability.
The relevance of the general topic of this dissertation derives from the recent nancial
and economic crisis. In particular, the recent crisis by now, alluding to the Great
Depression in the 1930s,3 generally referred to as the Great Recession has brought to
the fore the issue of systemic risk. It can be described (...) as the risk that nancial
instability becomes so widespread that it impairs the functioning of a nancial system
to the point where economic growth and welfare su¤er materially (ECB 2010a). In
fact, all major nancial crises can be traced back to certain forms of systemic risk, be
it large macro shocks, the unravelling of large-scale nancial imbalances, contagion or a
combination between them (de Bandt and Hartmann 2000). Once nancial stress has
become widespread and thus systemic, the regular process of nancial intermediation
becomes impaired or may even collapse. In the latter case, the large-scale failure of the
system to provide nancial services to the economy forces severe economic contractions,
and the resulting adverse welfare e¤ects may even put political stability at risk.
3The Great Depression of the 1930s, was the longest, deepest, and most widespread depression of
the 20th century. To date the Great Depression is commonly used as an example of how far the worlds
economy can decline, and it still serves as the Holy Grailof macroeconomics (Bernanke 1995).
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Notwithstanding the long established insight that nancial crises are extremely costly,
our knowledge of systemic risk still is rather imperfect and incomplete. The Great Reces-
sion put this decit to the spotlight, and as a consequence policymakers and researchers
all around the world stepped up e¤orts to increase our theoretical and empirical under-
standing of systemic risk, how it a¤ects the real economy (and vice versa), and which
policy tools may be most appropriate to address systemic risk both in advance (crisis
prevention) and when it has played out (crisis management). The three papers compiled
in this dissertation are supposed to make a modest contribution to close some of the
related knowledge gaps.4
The rst paper, Chapter 2 of this dissertation, tackles systemic risk from a measure-
ment point of view. It thereby contributes to an active research agenda that develops
measures of systemic risk viewed from a broad range of di¤erent perspectives.5 In that
paper I present and discuss a new nancial stress index called Composite Indicator of
Systemic Stress, CISS (pronounced /kIS/), whereby the term systemic stress is un-
derstood as systemic risk that has materialised. Its distinctive design highlights the
systemic dimension of nancial stress by applying basic portfolio-theoretic principles to
the aggregation of individual stress indicators into the composite indicator. In anal-
ogy to the computation of portfolio risk, the CISS aggregates the information from its
constituent individual stress indicators by taking into account time-varying correlations
4Much research progress in the mentioned areas has been made since the onset of the recent crisis.
For recent overviews see, e.g., Freixas, Laeven and Peydró (2015), Schularick and Taylor (2012), Taylor
(2015), ECB (2010b) and ESCB Heads of Research (2014).
5For instance, a recent survey article by Bisias, Flood, Lo and Valavanis (2012) on measures of
systemic risk distinguishes between macroeconomic measures, network measures, stress tests, forward-
looking measures, cross-sectional measures, as well as measures of illiquidity and insolvency. In fact,
most measures do not try to measure the level of systemic risk prevailing in the nancial system as
a whole, but instead focus on core market segments, predominantly the banking sector. For instance,
many network and cross-sectional measures of systemic risk such as the popular concepts of Co-
VaR and systemic expected shortfall are applied to identify the systemically most important nancial
institutions. According to the taxonomy of that survey paper, the CISS would fall under the category of
forward-looking measures along with alternative measures of nancial stress like the index of nancial
turbulence proposed by Kritzman and Li (2010).
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between them. The CISS is found to peak at all well-known nancial stress events in
the euro area since 1987. In addition, its information content proves robust to sample
variations. In my view, this is an important property of a nancial stress index that is
supposed to be updated on a regular basis, and one which so far has not yet received
su¢ cient attention in the relevant literature. By now the CISS has become a widely
known and used index since its rst publication in ECB (2010a).6 The paper further-
more proposes a parsimonous approach to estimate a critical level of the CISS, i.e. a
level at which nancial stress strongly a¤ects the real economy and thus becomes fully
systemic. For this purpose, I apply a threshold-VAR, where the estimated threshold for
the CISS introduces a non-linearity into a bivariate VAR for the CISS and growth in
industrial production.
The second paper, Chapter 3 of this dissertation, puts the CISS into a broader macro-
model perspective in order to investigate the transmission of nancial stress to the real
economy in some more detail, as well as to assess the relationship between nancial stress
and monetary policy which often acts as a rst line of defense to combat an emerging
nancial crisis. For this purpose, I include the CISS in a set of macro variables used
in a typical monetary policy VAR. Such a small-scale VAR model includes at least
a short-term interest rate to capture the instrument setting of conventional monetary
6For instance, the CISS regularly appears as Chart 1 in the Overview Section of the ECBs Financial
Stability Review. It is also shown as the rst chart in the Risk Dashboard published by the European
Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) (https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/rd/html/index.en.html). In addition,
several central banks applied the CISS concept to the computation of a nancial stress index for the
nancial system of their respective country (see, e.g., Johansson and Bonthron 2013; Banco de España
2013; and Braga, Pereira and Balcão Reis 2014). As an example of an application of the CISS for
macro-prudential policy purposes, the CISS has proven useful in the evaluation of a set of indicators
that can be used to calibrate the release of counter-cyclical capital bu¤ers in Europe (see Detken et al.
2014). The nancial press has been using the CISS on repeated occasions to provide evidence of the
overall state of nancial stability in the eurozone (e.g., see http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/bbf89f04-
e8d8-11e4-87fe-00144feab7de.html#axzz3fwf2dIQB). Last but not least, the CISS has also become part
of a standard set of nancial stability indicators applied in the academic world (see, e.g., Bekaert and
Hoerova 2014, or Boeckx, Dossche and Peersman 2014). Weekly updates of the euro area CISS are
available via the ECBs Statistical Data Warehouse (SDW), Thomson Financial Datastream and Haver
Analytics.
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policy, a measure of aggegate economic activity and a measure of aggregate ination.
In my model, I use the ECBs interest rate on the main renancing operations (MRO
rate), the annual growth in real GDP and the annual consumer price ination as the core
variables of the system. To these four variables I further add the growth rate of the ECB
balance sheet to capture the ECBs stance of unconventional monetary policy measures,
as well as the spread between the overnight market interest rate and the MRO rate
to better di¤erentiate between liquidity demand and supply shocks. Within this simple
linear VAR framework, I rst assess the role played by the CISS for the overall dynamics
of the system. The CISS turns out to be a major driver behind the dynamics of almost
all model variables, including economic growth. Moreover, the strong explanatory power
of the CISS also proves robust to the inclusion of alternative variables with known or
presumed predictive power in particular for economic activity and ination. I also nd
that the CISS impacts real GDP growth and the ECB balance sheet growth rate directly,
while its inuence on the ECB policy rate occurs only indirectly through its e¤ects on the
other model variables, predominantly on economic activity. In contrast to its important
role for the dynamics of the system, the other variables are found to have only moderate
(MRO rate) or no signicant e¤ects on the CISS itself.
The third paper, Chapter 4 of this dissertation, adopts a similar model setup but
allows for regime switches in coe¢ cients and error variances, where coe¢ cients and vari-
ances can switch regime independently from one another. The regime shifts are driven by
exogenous Markov processes. We estimate a ve-dimensional Markov-Switching VAR
with ination, industrial production growth, a three-month money market rate, bank
lending growth and the CISS as the endogenous variables with Bayesian methods and
nd results which are qualitatively consistent, but quantitatively rather di¤erent from
those found in the previous chapter. In particular, the CISS shows up as a very strong
driver for economic activity in what we call a systemic crisis regime that combines the
7
highest variances of nancial stress shocks with a strong transmission of nancial shocks
to the real economy. In fact, the dynamic e¤ects of CISS shocks on industrial production
growth in this regime look rather similar to the corresponding pattern of responses from
the crisis regime determined by the bivariate threshold-VAR. In contrast, in regimes
capturing normal times, the e¤ects of the CISS on economic growth appear much more
muted.
The nal Chapter 5 of this dissertation discusses some policy conclusions which can
be derived from the ndings of the three previous chapters.
8
CHAPTER 2
CISS A PORTFOLIO-THEORETIC FRAMEWORK FOR THE
CONSTRUCTION OF COMPOSITE FINANCIAL STRESS INDEXES
Abstract: This paper introduces a novel indicator of current stress in the
nancial system as a whole named Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress
(CISS). Its specic statistical design is shaped in accordance with standard
denitions of systemic risk. The main innovative feature of the CISS is
the application of portfolio theory to the aggregation of individual stress
indicators into the composite index. Along the lines of how portfolio risk
is computed from the risks of individual assets, we propose to compute the
level of stress in the system as a whole by aggregating ve market-specic
subindices of stress - comprising a total of 15 individual stress indicators - on
the basis of a time-varying measure of the cross-correlations between them.
The CISS thus puts relatively more weight on situations in which stress
prevails in several market segments at the same time, capturing the idea
that nancial stress is more systemic and hence more hazardous for the real
economy if instability spreads more widely across the whole nancial system.
Applied to data for the euro area as a whole, we determine within a threshold
VAR model a critical (crisis) level of the CISS at or above which adverse
shocks to nancial stress tend to depress real economic activity materially.
This chapter builds on initial joint work on the CISS project with Daniel Holló and Marco Lo
Duca (see Holló, D., M. Kremer and M. Lo Duca, CISS - A Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress
in the Financial System,ECB Working Paper No. 1426, March 2012). I thank Tommy Kostka for
outstanding research assistance and for several good ideas which helped improving the CISS. Very
helpful comments from Philipp Hartmann, Geert Bekaert, Hans Degreyse, Wolfgang Lemke, Simone
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2.1 Introduction
The recent global nancial crisis erupted when growing and increasingly visible strains
in the US subprime mortgage market caused liquidity conditions to largely dry up in
the markets for securities backed by pools of such mortgages. This eventually forced
a European bank, BNP Paribas, to halt redemptions on three of its investment funds
with large exposures to such asset-backed securities. That very moment in August 2007
turned local strains in certain US asset markets into an open systemic crisis a¤ecting
large parts of the nancial system in particular in advanced economies. Financial stress
further intensied in September 2008 when Lehman Brothers failed, an event which
shifted the crisis into a higher gear. Financial frictions now started to seriously damage
the global economy which, in turn, further aggravated the level of strains in the nancial
system, and so forth. This vicious cycle also widened the scope of the turmoil, now
spilling over into emerging markets and precipitating the sovereign crisis in Europe in
early 2010. In general, the crisis unfolded erratically, with catalytic events triggering
new stress peaks followed by periods of gradual and partial recovery.
While it makes sense to associate nancial crises with its main identifying events in
such narrative accounts, quantied information about the degree of nancial instability
prevailing at each point in time arguably allows for a more profound characterisation
of crisis episodes. One popular tool to tackle this measurement problem is what has
become known as a nancial stress index (FSI). FSIs aim to quantify the current state of
instability - i.e., the current strength of frictions and strains (stress) - in the nancial
system (or certain parts of it) by aggregating a certain number of individual stress
Financial Stability Analysis: Using the Tools, Finding the Data, the University of Kent, the Bank
of England, Boston University, the BIS, the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, the University
of Duisburg-Essen, the University of Wuppertal, and the Bank of Finland for fruitful discussions and
comments. However, the views expressed in this paper are mine and do not necessarily reect those of
the European Central Bank or the Eurosystem.
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indicators into a single composite index. In their property as a coincident indicator
of overall nancial stability conditions, FSIs serve several purposes. For example, since
FSIs usually rely on input data which is recorded at relatively high frequency (e.g.,
daily or weekly) and available without much delay, they provide information in more
or less real time and have thus become a standard tool for those in charge of regularly
monitoring nancial stability. FSIs also help to better describe, analyse and compare
historical crisis episodes. For instance, FSIs provide a framework to delineate the start
and end points of crises in a meaningful way and at higher frequencies of observation
than what is current practice (see Reinhart and Rogo¤ 2009, Chapters 1 and 16). They
might also improve the information content and the statistical power of early warning
models which typically rely on binary crisis indicators as dependent variables (e.g., Illing
and Liu 2006; for recent applications of FSIs in early warning models see Misina and
Tkacz 2009, and Lo Duca and Peltonen 2013). Last but not least, FSIs may o¤er a quick
summary gauge of the overall impact of policy measures aimed at alleviating nancial
instability.
In this paper we introduce an innovative nancial stress index named Composite
Indicator of Systemic Stress (CISS). The main innovative features of the CISS vis-à-vis
alternative FSIs rest in its economic foundation on the notion of systemic risk. Systemic
risk can be dened as the risk that instability becomes so widespread within the nancial
system that it impairs its functioning to the point where economic growth and welfare
su¤er materially (de Bandt and Hartmann 2000). We interpret systemic stress - which
is what the CISS aims to measure - as an ex post measure of systemic risk, i.e. systemic
risk which has materialised.
Against this conceptual background, the CISS is designed in such a way that it
operationalises both the idea of widespread nancial instability and the importance of
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nancial stress for the real economy. At the level of individual nancial stress indica-
tors, the CISS selects 15 mostly market-based stress measures which are categorised into
ve market segments arguably representing the largest and systemically most important
parts of a modern nancial system. In order to homogenise the set of raw stress indica-
tors in terms of scale and the underlying unconditional distribution, we transform each of
them by applying the probability integral transform, i.e. by replacing each observation
of an indicator with its corresponding value from the empirical cumulative distribution
function. A separate nancial stress subindex is computed for each of the ve market
segments as the arithmetic mean of in each case three constituent transformed indica-
tors. The resulting subindices are then aggregated into the composite indicator based
on portfolio-theoretic principles. We see the application of portfolio theory at the ag-
gregation step as the main conceptual innovation of the CISS compared to alternative
FSIs. The portfolio-theoretic framework o¤ers two elementary avenues to incorporate
systemic risk aspects. First, analogously to the computation of portfolio risk from the
risk of individual assets, the ve subindices of segment-specic stress are aggregated by
taking into account a time-varying measure of the cross-correlations between them. In
this way the CISS puts relatively more weight on situations in which stress prevails in
several market segments at the same time, i.e. on situations in which nancial instability
spreads widely across the whole nancial system. Second, the portfolio weights (shares)
assigned to each subindex can be calibrated in proportion to their systemic importance.
In the empirical application of the present paper to data for the euro area as a whole,
the weights are determined on the basis of the estimated impact of each subindex of
nancial stress on economic activity.
The proposed design of the euro area CISS possesses two further idiosyncratic fea-
tures vis-à-vis most other FSIs, namely its recursive (real-time) computation over ex-
panding data samples, and its enhanced robustness to the addition of new information.
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The latter feature is achieved by applying the probability integral transform to the raw
stress indicators, thereby relying on the known robustness of order statistics to extreme
observations. Both features help to mitigate the risk of reclassifying crisis regimes/events
ex post, a risk which may a¤ect in particular those FSIs whose statistical design relies
strongly on stable distribution properties of the raw input series in typically small sam-
ples. The empirical evaluation of the euro area CISS conrms the robustness of its
information content. Furthermore, all peaks in the CISS can be associated to well-
known periods of nancial stress, and the recent nancial crisis clearly stands out as a
unique systemic event in the past two and a half decades.
The paper makes a further contribution to the literature on FSIs by proposing the
use of econometric approaches to endogenously identify di¤erent stress regimes. We
demonstrate it on the basis of a parsimoneous threshold vector autoregressive (TVAR)
model that identies a systemic crisis level of the CISS at or above which nancial stress
becomes very costly in terms of reduced real economic activity. The results from the
TVAR suggest that while shocks in the CISS exert only small output reactions dur-
ing low-stress regimes, industrial production truly collapses during high-stress regimes
in response to a typical adverse shock in nancial stress. Similarly, it is only in the
high-stress regime that a negative output shock triggers increases in nancial stress,
supporting the idea that output and nancial shocks might reinforce each other in a
truly systemic crisis.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides a very brief
summary of the related literature. Section 3 motivates and describes the statistical
design of the CISS and presents an empirical application to data for the euro area
economy as a whole. The euro area CISS is assessed in Section 4 in terms of its robustness
properties and its ability to identify well-known periods of nancial stress; in addition,
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it presents results from the TVAR model to determine endogenously di¤erent regimes
in the CISS. Section 5 concludes.
2.2 Related literature
The paper relates mainly to two strands of literature, the rst one discussing di¤erent
options to construct nancial stress indices, and the second one studying the impact of
nancial distress on aggregate economic activity.
As to the rst eld, the development of FSIs has become a very active business in
recent years, spurred by the analytical demands created by the crisis. For the sake of
brevity the following literature review is neither very detailed nor exhaustive but tries
to illustrate the broad range of existing methodologies. The ECB working paper version
of this article (Holló, Kremer and Lo Duca 2012) provides a more detailed account of
the recent literature. The seminal paper is Illing and Liu (2006). They develop a daily
nancial stress index for the Canadian nancial system and propose several approaches
to the aggregation of individual stress indicators into a composite stress index. The
specication of their preferred FSI was chosen according to which variant performs best
in capturing crisis events in the Canadian nancial system identied on the basis of a
survey among Bank of Canada policy-makers and sta¤. The preferred FSI comprises 11
nancial market variables aggregated on the basis of weights determined by the relative
size of the market to which each of the indicators pertains. Caldarelli, Elekdag and Lall
(2011) present a monthly nancial stress index for 17 advanced economies computed as
the arithmetic mean of twelve standardised market-based nancial stress indicators, an
aggregation method also known as variance-equal weighting. Nelson and Perli (2007) and
Carlson, Lewis and Nelson (2012) present a weekly nancial fragility indicator for the
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United States computed in two steps from twelve market-based nancial stress measures.
The standardised input series are rst reduced to three summary indicators, namely a
level factor, a rate-of-change factor and a correlation factor. In the second step, the
nancial fragility indicator is computed as the tted probability from a logit model with
the three summary indicators as explanatory variables and a binary pre-dened crisis
indicator as the dependent variable. Rening the last step of the approach by Nelson
and Perli (2007), Blix Grimaldi (2010) computes a weekly FSI for the euro area, where
the binary crisis indicator is systematically derived from crisis events identied on the
basis of a keyword-search algorithm applied to relevant parts of the ECB Monthly Bul-
letin. Hakkio and Keeton (2009) construct a monthly FSI applying principal components
analysis to US data. The idea is that nancial stress is the factor most responsible for
the observed correlation between the indicators, and this factor is identied by the rst
principal component of the sample correlation matrix computed from the standardised
indicators. The weights of each input series is computed from its loading to the rst
principal component. The weekly nancial conditions index developed by Brave and
Butters (2011a, 2011b) also builds on factor analysis but is more complex and sophis-
ticated than its competitors in terms of the number and the heterogeneity of the input
data and the statistical indicator design. The computation of the FCI is cast into a
dynamic factor model in state-space form which includes a maximum of 100 indicators,
where Kalman ltering takes account of the missing data problem resulting from the
di¤erent sample lengths and frequencies of the input data. The FSI developed by Oet et
al. (2011) integrates 11 daily nancial market indicators grouped into four sectors. The
raw indicators are normalised by applying the probability integral transform similar to
what we are doing in the present paper. The transformed indicators are then aggregated
into the composite indicator by computing a weighted average with time-varying credit
weights which are proportional to the quarterly nancing ows in the four markets.
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Second, the present paper also relates to the general literature examining empirically
the real impacts of nancial stress (e.g., Hakkio and Keeton 2009; Cardarelli, Elekdag
and Lall 2011; Hatzius et al. 2010; Li and St-Amant 2010; Mallick and Sousa 2011;
Carlson, King and Lewis 2011; and van Roye 2011). The regime-dependence of the
impact of nancial stress on economic activity found in our study broadly corroborates
the ndings of Davig and Hakkio (2010) from a bivariate Markov-switching model with
the FSI developed by Hakkio and Keeton (2009) and a monthly measure of US economic
activity as endogenous variables. Hubrich and Tetlow (2015) for the US and Hartmann,
Hubrich, Kremer and Tetlow (2015) (which is also Chapter 4 of this dissertation) for the
euro area provide qualitatively similar evidence on much stronger impacts of nancial
stress on economic activity in high-stress regimes within more richly specied small-
scale macro-econometric Bayesian VAR models with Markov-switching in coe¢ cients
and residual variances, where the latter study uses the CISS to measure nancial stress.
2.3 Statistical design of the CISS
The CISS aims to measure the current level of systemic stress in the nancial system as a
whole. Ideally, the indicator should capture strains in each part of the nancial system,
weighted by its systemic importance. However, a real-world nancial system constitutes
a highly complex and complicated network of a multitude of nancial markets, nancial
intermediaries and nancial infrastructures, and it is practically impossible to measure
the level of stress in each and every of its elements. In order to reduce the level of
complexity, it seems to make sense to limit attention to those parts of the nancial system
- subject to data availability - which can be regarded as both systemically important
and su¢ ciently representative for the system as a whole.
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Against this background, the design of the CISS can be viewed as a three-stage
aggregation framework, with each stage featuring particular characteristics of systemic
risk.1
We start with the intermediate level, i.e. the second stage, at which ve highly
aggregated market segments shall represent the main elements of a nancial system.
These segments capture, in a stylised fashion, the main ows of funds from ultimate
lenders/savers to borrowers/spenders, channeling funds either indirectly through nan-
cial intermediaries or directly via short-term and long-term security markets. The ve
segments are: 1. the nancial intermediaries sector (comprising banks, insurance com-
panies, pension funds and other nancial services providers); 2. the bond market (only
sovereign and non-nancial corporate issuers); 3. the equity market (only non-nancial
corporations); 4. the money market (broadly dened as including in principle all forms
of short-term wholesale nancing in the economy, e.g., interbank and commercial paper
markets); and 5. the foreign exchange market (capturing potential stresses a¤ecting
cross-border nancing activities). The choice of these ve market segments can be jus-
tied on grounds of their systemic importance. Size, substitutability and interconnect-
edness are three of the main criteria usually applied to identify systemically important
nancial institutions and markets. According to the size criterion, it is probably fair to
say that the ve identied market segments collectively represent the core of any nan-
cial system. In addition, the markets and sectors included in the CISS are aggregated
to such an extent that in case nancial stress disrupts all of them at the same time, no
major substitute forms of unimpaired nance presumably exist in the economy.
The interconnectedness criterion brings us to the top stage of our aggregation frame-
work where the heart of the paper rests, namely the application of portfolio-theoretical
principles to the aggregation of the ve market segment-specic indices of nancial stress
1For a graphical representation see Figure 1 in Hollo, Kremer and Lo Duca (2012).
17
into the CISS. The aggregation of the subindices of stress by way of their time-varying
cross-correlations operationalises the idea of widespread nancial instability in a novel
fashion. In addition, the variation in the cross-correlations may also capture state-
dependent changes in the degree of interconnectedness between the market segments,
which are likely to be relatively strongly interconnected in general but in particular so
during times of stress. The calibration of segment-specic portfolio weights for each
subindex of stress o¤ers another route to bring in features of systemic risk.
The population of the ve subindices with individual indicators of nancial stress
takes place at the lower stage of the aggregation framework. Each selected indicator
captures typical symptoms of nancial stress in the market segment it is associated with.
Details on each of the three stages of the statistical indicator design are provided
in the subsequent subsections. The empirical implementation of the CISS concept is
demonstrated on the basis of data for the aggregate euro area economy.
2.3.1 Raw stress indicators
Financial stress is a rather elusive concept. It is usually operationalised by drawing
on the main features associated with nancial crises dened as situations in which the
normal functioning of a nancial system is impaired. The list of typical crisis features
includes (see, e.g., Hakkio and Keeton 2009; Fostel and Geneakoplos 2008): increased
uncertainty (e.g., about asset valuations and the behaviour of other investors); increased
di¤erences of opinion among investors; increased asymmetry of information between
borrowers and lenders (intensifying problems of adverse selection and moral hazard);
and lower preferences for holding risky assets (ight-to-quality) or illiquid assets (ight-
to-liquidity) resulting from stronger risk or uncertainty aversion, for instance (Caballero
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and Krishnamurthy 2008).
Although the various stress features are not directly observable, they can be captured
by observable stress symptoms like increased asset price volatility, large revaluations for
risky assets, wider default and liquidity risk premia, as well as sharp reversals in nanc-
ing ows linked to nancial instruments or institutions perceived as being more risky.
However, such symptoms measure the underlying stress characteristics only imperfectly,
as the former typically also reect the impact of other factors than the mentioned crisis
features. The identication of individual stress features is further complicated by the
fact they are often closely interrelated, with a tendency to reinforce each other as in the
case of re sales and liquidity spirals (Brunnermeier and Pedersen 2009; Krishnamurthy
2010). As a consequence, it is likely that certain nancial market indicators - henceforth
called raw stress indicators - capture several stress features at the same time.
The literature o¤ers a vast variety of nancial quantity and price variables reecting
characteristics of nancial stress. Which ones to pick for the construction of a nancial
stress index appears to be a greatly arbitrary choice. For our purposes, we narrow down
the list of candidate raw stress indicators to be included in the CISS by imposing several
restrictions:
1. Each of the ve segment-specic subindices of stress includes (not more than)
three raw stress indicators. The composite indicator thus comprises a total of (at
most) 15 individual indicators of nancial stress. The same number of indicators
per subindex shall ensure that the subindices do not possess di¤erent statistical
properties by construction. In addition, the three raw indicators in each subindex
should convey complementary information on the level of strains in the respective
market segment; ideally, the information content of all three indicators should be
perfectly correlated only under conditions of extreme stress.
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2. To ensure representativeness, the raw stress indicators should cover market-wide
developments. We therefore prefer indicators based on broad market indices, but
sometimes revert also to certain assets with benchmark status (e.g., government
bonds) for the pricing of a wider range of closely related nancial instruments.
3. To make the CISS t for real-time monitoring purposes, all raw stress indicators
should be available at a daily/weekly frequency and with a publication lag of a
one day at most.
4. Raw stress indicators should carry su¢ ciently long data histories to comprise at
least a few episodes of nancial disstress.
These restrictions jointly imply that the CISS includes mainly fairly standard price-
based nancial market indicators available for many countries and over relatively long
data samples. We mostly rely on risk spreads and a measure of realised asset return
volatility included in all ve subindices. Table 2.1 provides details on the computation
and the data sources of all individual stress indicators included in the euro area CISS.
As to their information content, asset return volatilities tend to increase with in-
vestorsuncertainty about future fundamentals and/or the behaviour and sentiment of
other investors (Pastor and Veronesi 2009; Veronesi 2004). Chordia, Sarkar and Sub-
rahmanyam (2005) present evidence that volatility shocks in bond and stock markets
tend to predict shifts in liquidity condition in both markets. Stress in the money market
is also captured by a euro area equivalent of the US TED spread, i.e. by the yield
di¤erential between a three-month unsecured inter-bank market rate and a comparable
essentially risk-free Treasury bill rate. This spread reects liquidity and counterparty
risk in the inter-bank market (Heider, Hoerova and Holthausen 2015; Acharya and Skeie
2011) as well as the convenience premium on short-term Treasury paper, and thus cap-
tures stress features like ight-to-quality, ight-to-liquidity as well as the price impacts
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of enhanced adverse selection problems in times of stress in the banking system. An-
other variable measuring stress in the inter-bank money market is banksrecourse to the
marginal lending facility at national central banks of the Eurosystem. The yield spread
between long-term A-rated bonds of non-nancial corporations and governments, respec-
tively, measures bond market stress. Drawing on the empirical ndings of Feldhütter
and Lando (2009) for the US, the ten-year swap spread is arguably a relatively clean
measure of the convenience premium embedded in the prices of German government
bonds - the presumably safest and most liquid sovereign bonds in the euro area - which,
in turn, captures ight-to-liquidity and ight-to-quality e¤ects in this market segment
(on the convenience yield in US Treasuries see Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen
2012, and Krishnamurthy 2010). Stress in the equity market is captured by the so-called
CMAX measuring the maximum cumulated loss in a stock price index over a moving
two-year window. It was originally developed to identify crisis periods in international
stock markets (Patel and Sarkar 1998). Stress in the equity market is furthermore
measured by a time-varying correlation coe¢ cient between stock and government bond
returns capturing, amongst others, ight-to-liquidity and ight-to-quality phenomena
(Baele, Bekaert and Inghelbrecht 2010). For instance, in times of heightened systemic
stress, investors try to shift funds out of more risky stocks into safer government bonds,
thereby driving the return correlation between these two asset classes into negative ter-
ritory. Since our stress measures shall increase with higher levels of stress, we take the
negative of the short-term stock-bond correlation (measured as the deviation from a
longer trend-correlation). Stress in the nancial intermediaries sector is measured by
idiosyncratic stock return volatility of the banking sector and the yield di¤erential be-
tween A-rated nancial and non-nancial corporations. A partly novel stress measure
of the nancial intermediaries segment is obtained by interacting the CMAX of this
sector with its inverse price-book ratio. The idea behind this indicator is that any given
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large stock market loss puts nancial intermediaries the more under stress the lower
their current valuation levels as measured by the price-book ratio. Stress in the foreign
exchange market is exclusively represented by the realised volatility of three bilateral
euro exchange rates.
2.3.2 Transformation of raw indicators
Building a composite indicator of nancial stress faces the challenge that prior to ag-
gregation, the rather diverse set of individual nancial stress indicators has to be ho-
mogenised in terms of their units of measurement and, ideally, distributional properties,
by way of statistical transformation. In the vast majority of cases, the literature puts
the raw stress indicators on a common scale by standardisation, i.e. by subtracting
the sample mean from the raw score and dividing this di¤erence by the sample stan-
dard deviation. Standardisation, however, implicitly assumes that the raw variables are
normally distributed. The fact that many standard stress indicators violate this as-
sumption (e.g. asset volatilities)2, enhances the risk that the results obtained from the
use of standardised variables are particularly sensitive to aberrant observations. In that
case, updates of the conditional means and the conditional standard deviations when
calculated, for instance, over expanding data samples can be subject to large revisions
if more and more outliers (from the viewpoint of a standard normal distribution) are
added to the data set (Hakkio and Keeton 2009), a situation which tends to occur dur-
ing a new period of severe and protracted nancial stress. Such robustness problems
related to standardisation can distort the information content of nancial stress indica-
tors over time. In an extreme case it might happen that an identied nancial stress
event dating back several years has to be called o¤ (event reclassication) due to the
2For instance, if an asset return is standard normal distributed, its square or averages of its square
an often used measure of asset volatility would follow a chi squared distribution.
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Table 2.1: Individual nancial stress indicators included in the CISS
Money market
1. Realised volatility of 3-month Euribor rate.
2. Interest rate spread between 3-month Euribor and 3-month French T-bills.
3. Monetary Financial Institutions (MFI) recourse to the marginal lending facility at Eu-
rosystem central banks, divided by total reserve requirements; MFIs can use the marginal
lending facility to obtain overnight liquidity from national central banks against eligible assets
and, typically, at an interest rate higher than the prevailing overnight market interest rate.
Bond market
4. Realised volatility of German 10-year benchmark government bond index.
5. Yield spread between A-rated non-nancial corporations and government bonds (7-year
maturity).
6. 10-year interest rate swap spread.
Equity market
7. Realised volatility of Datastream non-nancial sector stock price index.
8. Maximum cumulated loss (CMAX) of Datastream non-nancial sector stock price index
(xt) over a moving 2-year window: CMAXt = 1   xt=max[x 2 (xt jjj = 0; 1; :::; T )]
with T = 104 for weekly data.
9. Stock-bond correlation; weekly average of the di¤erence between the 4-year (1040 business
days) and the 4-week (20 business days) correlation coe¢ cients between daily log returns of
Datastream total stock price index and the 10-year German government benchmark bond
price index; nal indicator is assigned a value of zero for negative di¤erences.
Financial intermediaries
10. Realised volatility of idiosyncratic equity return of Datastream bank sector stock price
index over the total market index; idiosyncratic return calculated as residual from OLS
regression of daily log bank return on log market return over a moving 2-year window.
11. Yield spread between A-rated nancial and non-nancial corporations (7-year maturity).
12. CMAX of Datastream nancial sector stock price index interacted with the sectors book-
price ratio; both indicators transformed by their recursive sample CDF prior to multiplication;
nal indicator obtained by taking the square root of this product.
Foreign exchange market
13. Realised volatility of euro exchange rate vis-à-vis US dollar.
14. Realised volatility of euro exchange rate vis-à-vis Japanese Yen.
15. Realised volatility of euro exchange rate vis-à-vis British Pound.
Notes: Realised volatilities computed as weekly averages of absolute daily log return or
interest rate changes; all other series, except indicator 8, computed as weekly averages of
daily data. All raw equity market data start 4/1/1980 (indicators 7 to 10 and 12); all money
market data (indicators 1 to 3) start 8/1/1999; all corporate bond data (indicators 5 and 11)
start 3/4/1998; bond market indicators 4 and 6 start 5/1/1990 and 4/3/1987, respectively;
all exchange rate data start 6/7/1990.
Sources: All input series, except those of indicator no. 3, are from Thomson Financial
Datastream; input data of indicator no. 3 are from the ECB.
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smoothing e¤ect brought about by the impact of additional extreme observations from
a more recent nancial crisis on the conditional means and standard deviations of the
raw stress indicators considered. Applying principal components analysis (PCA) in or-
der to aggregate the standardised indicators into a composite indicator may aggravate
the problem of sub-sample robustness, since PCA itself is sensitive to outliers (as it
minimises squared distances from the multidimensional mean). These problems of ro-
bustness are closely related to the fact that standardisation of the raw indicators only
rescales their underlying empirical distribution function but does not change their basic
shape. Accordingly, standardisation does not deliver a set of homogenously distributed
transformed indicators, a fact which may bring about other undesired properties of the
composite indicator apart from the increased sensitivity to outliers just mentioned; for
instance, the dynamics of the composite indicator may be dominated by those compo-
nents which tend to produce more observations far away from the sample mean by the
very nature of their true underlying distribution function.
We address the various inherent challenges of transformation i.e. the di¤erent scales
and distributional heterogeneity among the raw indicators, as well as the robustness
issue by applying the probability integral transformation (PIT) to each raw indicator
of nancial stress. The theorem of the PIT states that for any continuous random
variable X with cumulative distribution function (CDF) FX(x), the random variable
dened by Y = FX(X) has a uniform distribution over the range (0; 1) regardless of the
form of the original distribution FX(x), i.e.:3
Y = FX(X)  U(0; 1):
In the empirical implementation of the PIT, we have to work with the discrete sample
3See, e.g., Spanos (1999) or Cassela and Berger (2002). The term probability integral transform
refers to the relationship between the continuous cumulative distribution function FX(:) and its corre-
sponding density function fx(:): FX(x) =
R x
 1fx(u)du., where FX(x) equals the probability that the
random variable X does not exceed the value x.
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analogue of the CDF, the empirical CDF, which we henceforth denote as bFn(x); with n
the number of observations included in a given data set of a raw nancial stress indicator
x = fx1; x2; :::; xng. As the rst step of the PIT, the observations are ranked in ascending
order, giving rise to the ordered set fx[r]; r = 1; :::; ng with x[1]  x[2]  :::  x[n], and
r referred to as the ranking number assigned to each element of x. The order statistic
x[n] accordingly represents the sample maximum and x[1] the sample minimum. Each
original observation of the raw indicator, xt, is now replaced by its corresponding value of
the empirical CDF, bFn(xt):The transformed data are collected in y = fyt; t = 1; :::; ng =
f bFn(xt); t = 1; :::; ng which denotes the data set of the transformed stress indicator which
we may henceforth call a stress factor. The transformation value yt of any observation
xt is computed as the ranking number r of observations not exceeding that particular
value xt, divided by the total number of observations n (Spanos 1999, p. 230f.):
yt = bFn(xt) :=
8><>:
r
n
for x[r]  xt < x[r+1], r = 1; 2; :::; n  1
1 for xt = x[n]
:
In the case of tied observations, that is when m of them have the same value and rank r,
the functional value assigned to each of them is computed as ((r+ 1) + (r m))=n):The
empirical CDF is hence a function which is non-decreasing and piecewise constant with
jumps being 1=n (or m=n in the case of tied observations) at the observed points.
Equation 2.3.2 does not yet feature the intended real-time character of the CISS.
The real-time character implies that past values of the CISS are not revised when new
data on the raw indicators becomes available. This situation arises when the composite
indicator shall be regularly updated. This property is introduced by applying the PIT
recursively over expanding samples. Precisely, the non-recursive transformation as de-
ned in Equation 2.3.2 applies to all observations from the pre-recursion period running
from 8 January 1999 to 4 January 2002. All subsequent observations are transformed
recursively on the basis of ordered samples recalculated with one new observation added
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at a time:
yn+T = Fn+T (xn+T ) =
8><>:
r
n+T
for x[r]  xn+T < x[r+1], r = 1; 2; :::; n; n+ 1; :::; n+ T   1
1 for xn+T = x[n+T ]
(2.1)
for T = 1; 2; : : : ; N , with N indicting the end of the full data sample (in the present
application, N represents 24 June 2011).4 ;5
I conclude this section with a brief discussion of some statistical properties of the
probablility-integral-transformed data. The PIT projects raw stress indicators into stress
factors which are unit-free and (approximately) uniform distributed over the range (0; 1].
This transformation thus has the distinct advantage that, whatever is the original dis-
tribution of the raw indicators, the transformed indicators are homogenous in terms of
scale and their underlying unconditional distribution function.
In addition, the PIT relies on order statistics which are known to be less a¤ected by
extreme observations (Stuart and Ord 1994; Cassela and Berger 2002). This presumed
robustness feature of the PIT appears particularly relevant in the present context due
to the recursive computation (and updating) of the CISS. Figure 2.1, which displays the
transformation for all 15 raw stress indicators computed both recursively and based on
the full data sample, broadly corroborates our presumption of robustness. In most cases
the di¤erences between the empirical CDFs calculated in real-time and those computed
from the full data sample are relatively small. While in a few cases the di¤erences become
somewhat more pronounced, they do not a¤ect the strong robustness of the composite
indicator against variations of the sample length both in absolute terms and compared
4In fact, the euro area CISS is updated on a weekly basis, and the updates are published on the
ECBs homepage (https://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=9551138).
5The total number of observations included in the ordered samples varies from indicator to indicator
depending on the availability of historical data. The longest sample starts in 4 January 1980 (see Table
2.1) with the total number of observations included in the pre-recursion sample amounting to 1149,
while the shortest pre-recursion sample starting in 8 January 1999 is left with 157 observations.
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to an alternative, conventional indicator design that involves the standardisation of
indicators (see Section 2.4.1).
However, the PIT also comes with a disadvantage. This method of transformation
implies the loss of that part of the information which is only contained in the cardinal
scale of the original data but not in the ordinal scale of the transformed series. For
instance, after standardisation, the distances between two observations of a transformed
stress indicators still matter (i.e., it matters how many times one observation exceeds
another observation), while this is not the case for the probability integral transformed
indicators (i.e., the PIT only pays attention to the relative ranking of two observation
within a given data sample). The probability integral transformation therefore trades o¤
gains in indicator homogeneity and statistical robustness against some loss of information
when moving from a cardinal to an ordinal measurement scale.
2.3.3 Aggregation
Subindices.We are now equipped with a set of 15 homogenised stress factors yi;j;t,
with i = 1; 2; : : : 5 indicating the respective market segment and j = 1; 2; 3 denoting
the stress factors within each subindex i. The ve subindices of nancial stress are
calculated as the arithmetic mean of the three constituent stress factors:
si;t =
1
3
P3
j=1 yi;j;t: (2.2)
We postpone the discussion of this presumably inconsistent choice of intra-subindex
aggregation to the next section, as it requires an understanding of the portfolio-theoretic
approach to the aggregation across subindices.
Composite index. The main innovative element of the CISS compared to alter-
native nancial stress indicators is the application of standard portfolio theory to the
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Figure 2.1: Recursive versus full-sample transformation of raw stress indicators
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aggregation of subindices. The portfolio-theoretic framework o¤ers two elementary av-
enues to incorporate systemic risk aspects. First, analogously to the computation of
portfolio risk from the risk of individual assets, the ve subindices of segment-specic
stress are aggregated by taking into account the cross-correlations between them. It is
essential for our purpose that we allow for time-variation in the cross-correlations. In
this way the CISS puts relatively more weight on situations in which stress prevails in
several market segments at the same time, i.e. on situations in which nancial insta-
bility spreads more widely across the nancial system. The correlations thus focus on
capturing the systemic dimension of stress within the nancial system (the horizontal
view on systemic risk as dened by de Bandt and Hartmann 2000). Second, the weights
assigned to each subindex in the composite indicator can be calibrated in proportion to
their systemic importance which in turn may be gauged in di¤erent ways. For instance,
the weights may mirror the relative size of the nancial market segment covered by each
subindex (size weights) as in Illing and Liu (2006) and Oet et al. (2011). Alternatively,
the weights may be determined on the basis of some estimate of the relative impact
of nancial stress in the di¤erent market segments for economic activity (real-impact
weights), which is a novel route to address this issue taken in the present paper. In
both cases, the calibration of weights provides an opportunity to account for country
di¤erences in the structure of nancial systems and the associated di¤erences in the
transmission of nancial stress to the real economy, thereby capturing the vertical view
on systemic risk which gives an idea about the potential real costs of a nancial crisis
(de Bandt and Hartmann 2000). Since such structural features of an economy are not
set in stone, the weights can in principle also vary over time.
Against this background, the CISS is computed in two variants according to the
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following formulas:
CISSt = (wt  st)0
t(wt  st) or (2.3)
=
p
(wt  st)0
t(wt  st); (2.4)
with w0t = (wi;t)
0 a 1  5 vector of subindex weights, and s0t = (si;t)0 a 1  5 vector of
subindices with i = 1; :::; 5; wt  st the element-wise product of both vectors; and 
t
the symmetric 5 5 matrix collecting the time-varying cross-correlation coe¢ cients ij;t
between subindices i and j as dened below in Equation 2.5. Due to the quadratic form
of Equation 2.3, and alluding to the return variance as a measure of portfolio risk, the
rst variant may be called the variance-equivalent CISS; it is the variant of the CISS
which is used in the empirical application in the subsequent sections. The second version
of the CISS (Equation 2.4), which simply takes the square root of the right-hand side of
Equation 2.3, may accordingly be called the volatility-equivalent CISS. Assuming that
 1  ij;t  1, both variants of the CISS are unit-free indicators bounded by the interval
(0; 1], just as their constituent stress factors yij;t.
Estimation of cross-correlations. For the present purpose the time-varying
cross-correlations ij;t are recursively computed as exponentially-weighted moving av-
erages (EWMA) of subindex covariances ij;t and variances 2i;t, specied in the form of
IGARCH-type models which are asymptotically equivalent to EWMA (Bauwens, Lau-
rent and Rombouts 2006; Engle 2002):
ij;t = ij;t 1 + (1  )esi;tesj;t
2i;t = 
2
i;t 1 + (1  )es2i;t
ij;t = ij;t=(i;tj;t)
(2.5)
for i = 1; : : : ; 5 , j = 1; : : : ; 5, i 6= j , t = 1; : : : ; N with esi;t = (si;t   0:5) denoting
demeaned subindices (obtained by subtracting the unconditional population mean of
0.5 rather than the sample-dependent conditional mean). EWMA or IGARCH models
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Figure 2.2: Cross-correlations between CISS subindices
are used by practitioners to forecast daily or weekly conditional asset price volatilities
and correlations (Cuthbertson and Nitzsche 2004; González-Rivera, Lee and Yoldas
2007). The decay factor or smoothing parameter is held constant through time at a
value of 0.93 which is similar to the value used by RiskMetrics for weekly data (Engle
2002). This value equals the rounded average smoothing parameter estimated recursively
over expanding samples within a ve-dimensional IGARCH model for the demeaned
subindices.6 The covariances and variances are initialised (at t = 0, i.e. 1 January 1999)
at their average values over the pre-recursion period 8 January 1999 to 4 January 2002.
Figure 2.2 displays the EWMA-estimates of all the cross-correlations between the ve
subindices of the euro area CISS.
Since the raw stress indicators are transformed by applying the probability integral
transform, the estimated cross-correlations represent a time-varying variant of Spear-
mans rank correlation coe¢ cient. The cross-correlations thus indicate whether the
6The multivariate IGARCH model includes only the constant terms in the conditional mean equa-
tions.
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historical ranking of the level of stress in two market segments is relatively similar or
not at any point in time.
Calibration of the subindex weights. For the present purpose, the weights
attached to each stress subindex are calibrated in proportion to their relative impact
on real economic activity in the euro area. The real impacts are estimated using two
di¤erent econometric approaches, where the results from in each case four di¤erent
model specication are combined to achieve some degree of robustness. We also hold
the weights constant over time, implicitly assuming that the structural features of the
euro area nancial system, which determine the way nancial stress is transmitted to
the real economy, have not undergone major changes over the relatively short sample
considered.
We rst run conventional bivariate VARs with industrial production and one of the
subindices of stress as endogenous variables. The models are estimated on the basis of
monthly data (monthly averages for stress indices) with a uniform optimal lag order of
two as suggested by standard selection criteria. Two model variants di¤er only in their
respective sample length, with one starting in January 1987 (i.e., including pre-EMU
data) and the other one in January 1999 (when the euro was introduced). The two
remaining VAR specications di¤er in the transformation of the industrial production
data (log level and its 12th di¤erence, respectively). We compute cumulated 24-month
structural impulse responses of the respective measure of industrial production to a unit
shock in each stress subindex. Structural identication of shocks is obtained by applying
the usual Cholesky decomposition to the variance-covariance matrix of reduced-form
residuals, with the stress subindex ordered rst and industrial production second (for a
justication of this ordering see Section 2.4.3). The subindex weights associated with
each model variant are then determined as each subindexs share in the sum of cumulated
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impulse responses across the ve subindices.
Linear VARs, however, only measure the mean impact of nancial stress on industrial
production, since the impulse response functions are computed from the modelsleast
squares estimate of the conditional mean functions. While this can make perfect sense
under many circumstances, it might be less suitable in the present context. For instance,
nancial crises are rare events often associated with unusually severe output losses. This
may recommend focussing more on the dependence structure in the lower tails of the
conditional distributions when calibrating the subindex weights. Least squares regres-
sions may also provide biased coe¢ cient estimates because of the inuence from ex-
treme values in the data brought about by episodes of severe nancial stress. Against
this background, we also perform single-equation quantile regressions as introduced by
Koenker and Bassett (1978). Quantile regressions are based on minimising asymmetri-
cally weighted absolute residuals and are more robust to extreme values and other forms
of non-normality in the residual distributions than least squares. Resembling the set up
of the VARs, we regress the annual growth in industrial production (yt = 12 log IPt)
on each one of the subindices of nancial stress (with lags 0 to 2) along with the lagged
endogenous variable (lags 1 and 2). This gives rise to the following linear conditional
quantile functions estimated for all stress subindices si;t , i = 1; : : : ; 5; and for the full
range of regression quintiles  = 0:05; 0:10; :::; 0:95:
Qyt( jIt) = 0() + 1()yt 1 + 2()yt 2 + 3()si;t + 4()si;t 1 + 5()si;t 2 (2.6)
with It = (yt 1;yt 2;si;t; si;t 1; si;t 2) being the conditioning information set available at
time t; and t = 3; :::; T . Estimating Equation 2.6 for all  yields a set of coe¢ cients char-
acterising the entire distribution of industrial production conditional on each subindex of
nancial stress. Figure 2.3 plots the coe¢ cient sums () = 3()+4()+5() for the
ve subindices against the whole range of  -values. The coe¢ cient sums summarise the
long-term impact of subindex stress on economic activity. Some notable features emerge
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from the coe¢ cient plots: i) In a textbook-style fashion, all estimated impact functions
are upward sloping, i.e. the coe¢ cient sums tend to increase for higher quantiles. The
strongest negative impacts - in all cases statistically signicant - accordingly materialise
in the lowest quantiles, in line with what one would expect from a nancial crisis point
of view. ii) Around median quantiles the estimated coe¢ cient sums become uniformly
very small in absolute terms and lose their statistical signicance. This indicates that
economic activity becomes unrelated to our measures of segment-specic nancial stress
during periods of normal growth. iii) The coe¢ cient sums turn positive but in only one
case statistically signcant at the 95% condence level at the highest quantiles. This
may suggest that economic boom periods tend to be associated with somewhat higher
uncertainty and risk aversion among nancial market participants, possibly reecting
investorsgrowing concerns about the nature and duration of the boom and the even-
tual responses of (monetary) policy makers. iv) The impact functions look rather similar
across subindices. This notwithstanding, each subindex still possesses some independent
predictive power for economic activity. For this purpose we also run quantile regressions
pooling all ve subindices (with lags 0 to 2) as regressors. It turns out that all of them
retain independent and statistically signicant explanatory power in particular at the
lower quantiles (results not shown).
The real-impact weights are determined from two sets of quantile regressions which
di¤er in the specication of the dependent variable as in the case of the VARs, namely
industrial production in log levels and in annual log growth rates. Moreover, in line with
the notion of systemic stress, we focus attention on the lower regression quantiles. More
precisely, we compute the real-impact weights for both specications in two ways: we
rst calculate the average coe¢ cient sums from the 5th to the 30th regression quantiles
and determine the relative share of each subindex in the overall sum; the second method
computes the weights from each subindexmaximum absolute impact within the same
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Figure 2.3: Quantile regressions for industrial production growth on CISS subindices
range of lower quantiles.
The VARs and the quantile regressions thus provide eight di¤erent measures of the
subindex weights.7 Averaging across this set of weights leads to the following (rounded)
subindex weights applied in the empirical part of this paper: 19 % money market,
22% bond market, 14% equity market, 25% nancial intermediaries, and 20% foreign
exchange market (w0t = w
0 = (0:19; 0:22; 0:14; 0:25; 0:20) in Equations 2.3 and 2.4).
However, it turns out that the di¤erences in the CISS when computed with real-impact
weights or with equal weights are generally minor (see Figure A.2 in Holló, Kremer and
Lo Duca 2012).
7Detailed results from the VARs and the quantile regressions are available upon request.
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2.3.4 The euro area CISS
We have now compiled all the ingredients necessary to compute the CISS for the euro
area economy according to Equation 2.3. The resulting time series of weekly data from
January 1999 is plotted in Figure 2.4 as the black line. Within the portfolio-theoretic
aggregation framework, the square of the simple weighted average of the ve subindices,
i.e.
 P5
i=1wisi;t
2
, emerges as a special case. If all subindices were perfectly correlated
all the times, the CISS and the squared weighted average would coincide. The weighted
average (the grey line in Figure 2.4) thus actually serves as an upper bound of the
CISS. The CISS and its perfect-correlation counterpart indeed almost overlap when
correlations are generally very high. This happened, for instance, in the run-up to the
crisis around 2005 at very low levels of the CISS, as well as in the aftermath of the
Lehman bankruptcy at very high levels of nancial stress (see Figure 2.2). Most of the
time, however, correlations are quite diverse and relatively moderate such that the CISS
assumes much lower levels in normal times than the simple-average composite indicator.
This, in turn, suggests that the CISS helps to better identify periods of collectively
high and thus systemic stress by reducing the importance of situations in which higher
levels of stress remained conned within a smaller subset of the nancial system. For
instance, the burst of the equity market boom in early 2000 led to a protracted period
of heightened stress levels in the equity markets, but it did not a¤ect much the other
system segments as evidenced by the high dispersion of the cross-subindex correlations
around that time (see Figure 2.2).
The di¤erence between the weighted average of subindices and the CISS can also
be used to derive a decomposition of the CISS into the contributions coming from each
of the subindices and the overall contribution from all the cross-correlations. Such
a decomposition may appear particularly attractive for regular monitoring exercises
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Figure 2.4: CISS versus the squared weighted-average of subindexes (perfect-correlation
case)
as part of the nancial stability surveillance functions performed by macro-prudential
authorities (see European Central Bank 2011).
We still owe a discussion of the choice to take arithmetic means of three stress fac-
tors to compute the subindices of nancial stress. It can be argued that within the
portfolio-theoretic framework of the CISS, the arithmetic means imply perfect correla-
tion between all three subindex components and thus run counter to our idea of stress
factors providing complementary information. This inconsistency notwithstanding, the
arithmetic mean also has its respective merits for our purposes. For instance, within
our three-stage aggregation framework, applying EWMA-based correlation-weights also
within subindices would further smooth out the CISS because of the double-smoothing
entailed by applying correlation-weights also between subindices at the nal stage.8 In
addition, data limitations would in many cases obviate the application of portfolio-
8The problem of the double-smoothing can be avoided by computing the CISS with a two-stage
framework instead of the three-stage setup chosen in the present paper. The "two-stage CISS" merges
the second and the third stage by computing the full 15 15 matrix of correlations between all trans-
formed individual stress indicators, thereby avoiding the need to compute subindices of stress for the
di¤erent market segments before computing the correlations. The two-stage CISS will be presented in
currently ongoing research conducted by me.
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weighting or PCA within subindices; it often happens, for example, that one only nds
one or two constituent stress factors to populate a certain subindex when composing a
CISS for economies with less developed nancial systems, but also for advanced countries
in the more distant past when data coverage was thinner.
2.4 Assessment of the euro area CISS
Assessing the performance of FSIs is an inherently complicated task. First of all, the
CISS, just as any other existing FSI, is far from being an ideal composite indicator in
the sense that neither the selection of raw stress indicators, their transformation, nor
their weighting are determined on the basis of an underlying structural model. The
measurement problem is further aggravated by the fuzziness of the concepts of systemic
risk and nancial (in)stability, the complexity of modern-world nancial systems, and the
di¢ culties in empirically identifying certain features of nancial stress. The construction
of composite stress indicators thus involves many arbitrary and subjective choices. Any
FSI therefore limits attention to only a few segments of the nancial system, and draws
on a broad array of largely imperfect measures of nancial stress. In addition, reecting
the fact that nancial crises are rare events (according to Reinhart and Rogo¤ 2009,
crises occur on average about once every ve years or so world wide), the data samples
of FSIs are typically rather short, covering merely a few crisis episodes which severely
impairs the statistical reliability of empirical analyses. The vast discrepancy between the
degrees of freedom available in constructing and in testing FSIs, respectively, makes it
extremely di¢ cult to assess whether a particular indicator performs well both in absolute
terms (What is a good indicator?) and in relative terms (Which indicator is better?).
Against the background of these caveats, this section assesses the performance of the
CISS on the basis of economic plausibility checks as well as a few statistical/econometric
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criteria. In order to enlarge the set of historical crisis-like episodes, we base the analysis
on a version of the euro area CISS extended backward until January 1987, i.e. including
12 years of data from the pre-EMU period (for details see Holló, Kremer and Lo Duca
2012).
2.4.1 Robustness
The signals issued by any FSI should be stable over time in order to avoid the so-
called event reclassication problem. For instance, assume that in a particular point
in time an indicator suggests that the prevailing level of stress is unusually high by
historical standards. It is then desirable that the indicator still classies this period
as a particularly stressful episode say ten years hence, i.e. when ten years of data are
added to the sample. Otherwise no robust historical comparison can be made, and the
calculation of certain threshold levels for the indicator would not make sense either.
In order to limit the event reclassication problem from the outset, we opt for a proce-
dure that transforms the raw indicators based on order statistics as discussed in Section
2.3.2. Figure 2.5 illustrates the robustness of the (backward-extended) CISS when com-
puted recursively over and expanding data window (black line; recursion starting in
January 1990!) and non-recursively (grey line) based on the full sample information.
The two time series track each other remarkably closely. The average absolute di¤er-
ence amounts to only 0.015 (standard deviation: 0.022) with a mean error of 0.010.
The largest deviation between the two di¤erently computed indicators occurs in Feb-
ruary 2008 with a value of 0.076. We therefore conclude that the CISS is a markedly
robust statistic in the time dimension, implying that it is hardly a¤ected by the event
reclassication problem.9
9This conjecture of recursive robustness receives support from ongoing own research based on the
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Figure 2.5: CISS with recursive versus full-sample transformation
As a second statistical robustness check, we compute the CISS for a range of values
of the smoothing parameter  that governs the speed at which the cross-correlations
adjust to latest information. In Holló, Kremer and Lo Duca (2012) we compare the
time series for three -values, namely 0.89, 0.93, and 0.97 (see Figure 7 therein). As
expected, the CISS with the lowest smoothing parameter displays wider swings, and
it spikes somewhat more pronouncedly in response to large stress shocks than our pre-
ferred CISS with an intermediate -value of 0.93. Conversely, setting the smoothing
parameter to a higher level produces a CISS with dampened swings and spikes. All in
all, however, the di¤erences produced by di¤erent smoothing parameters are relatively
low and, importantly, they do not alter the general pattern of behaviour of the CISS.
Its basic information content, namely the broad classication of nancial stress events
euro area two-stage CISS. In this research I demonstrate that the di¤erences between the recursively
and non-recursively computed CISS are statistically insignicant. The opposite result, i.e. statistical
signicance of the sometimes wide gaps between the recursive and non-recursive indicator, holds true for
an alternative nancial stress index computed on the basis of the same set of raw stress indicators, but
transformed by standardisation and merged into a composite indicator by applying principal components
analysis. Results are available upon request.
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or regimes, thus remains robust.
2.4.2 Identication of stress events
The most widely adopted criterion to evaluate nancial stress indicators is their perfor-
mance in identifying well-known past episodes of nancial stress (stress events). Illing
and Liu (2006) developed a probabilistic evaluation framework to determine which -
nancial stress indicator concept performs best among a broader set of candidates. Their
evaluation framework rests on a survey of experts to identify the most critical stress
events for the Canadian economy out of 40 pre-selected potentially stressful events since
the early 1980s. On the basis of the survey results, the authors construct a binary stress
event indicator (crisis dummy) for use in the empirical analysis. Their preferred nan-
cial stress indicator is the one which matches best the survey results balancing Type I
errors (failure to report a high-stress event) against Type II errors (falsely reporting a
high-stress event).
While the event-based criterion appears rather obvious and straight-forward, it also
su¤ers from some conceptual and measurement problems. First, in a certain sense it
relies on knowing a priori what the indicator is supposed to identify in the rst place,
namely episodes of systemic stress. Second, in particular when the data of the stress
index is available at a higher frequency (say monthly or even weekly), the criterion
requires knowing when a stress episode begins and, even more di¢ cult, when it ends.
Third, the mere focus on well-known stress events excludes a priori those episodes which
cannot be associated with specic triggering events, but which rather build up gradually
over time as a result of cumulated smaller pieces of bad news. The so-called dot-com
boom and bust episode around the turn of the millennium may exemplify such a case.
Hence, evaluation approaches relying on crises dened by events are likely to miss such
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more hidden periods of systemic stress, while crises dened by quantitative thresholds
determined on the basis of nancial stress indicators are less prone to such Type I
errors (on these two crises denitions see Reinhart and Rogo¤ 2009). In the light of
these problems, we argue against relying too strongly on a formalised version of the
event-criterion when studying the performance of FSIs.
We rather prefer a narrative approach like in Hakkio and Keeton (2009) to nd out
whether peaks in the CISS can be plausibly associated with well-known crisis events.
Figure 2.6 illustrates that the sharpest spikes in the CISS indeed tend to occur around
very popular events which caused, at least temporarily, severe stress in the global nan-
cial system (for a full account of the most important stress events identied by the CISS
see Holló, Kremer and Lo Duca 2012). The rst major stress event in the sample is the
stock market crash in October 1987. On October 19, the US stock market experienced
its largest one-day loss in market valuations ever, causing extreme stress in the nancial
industry worldwide. However, stress subsided relatively quickly when market partici-
pants realised that nancial rms had been able to remain nancially sound (Cardarelli,
Elekdag and Lall, 2011). About ve years later the European nancial system was
shaken by the collapse of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). Tensions in
the currency markets culminated in the British Pound and the Italian Lira eventually
withdrawing from the ERM on September 16 and 17, 1992, respectively. But the nan-
cial turmoil caused by the ERM crisis again turned out rather short-lived with the CISS
reverting quickly back to pre-crisis levels. It took another six years for nancial stress
to return to Europe in the context of the global market reactions to the Russian debt
moratorium in August 1998 and the subsequent collapse of the hedge fund Long-Term
Capital Management (LTCM) in September 1998.
The next period of elevated stress appears to be closely related to the downturn in
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Figure 2.6: CISS and major nancial stress events in the global and European nancial
markets
high-tech stocks in early 2000. More widespread tensions occurred in the wake of the
strong initial losses in the high-tech segment. The CISS remained relatively high in
general over the subsequent two years fed by the continued crash in instalments in
technology stocks (by October 2002, the NASDAQ had lost about 75% of its peak level
in early March 2000) and recessions in core parts of the global economy. The terrorist
attacks in the US on September 11, 2001, caused a sharp abrupt increase in the CISS
in between. Investors soon realised, though, that their initial fears about the potential
nancial and real economic impacts of the attacks were exaggerated such that the global
nancial system recovered relatively quickly from this severe shock.
However, none of those previous events pushed the CISS towards similarly high levels
reached during the most recent nancial and economic crisis. The CISS rst signalled an
extreme level of stress in August 2007, when BNP Paribas suspended three investment
funds that invested in asset backed securities linked to subprime mortgage debt which
had become virtually illiquid. Spreading announcements of severe losses incurred by
banks, mortgage lenders and other nancial institutions lifted the CISS further up,
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and it peaked again in response to the collapse of Bear Stearns in March 2008. The
CISS experienced its largest jump in September 2008 when Lehman Brothers led for
bankruptcy protection and AIG was rescued to avoid bankruptcy. The index reached
its historical maximum in November 2008 when the US plan to buy toxic assets under
the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) was abandoned, which undermined global
market condence. After November 2008 the CISS signalled a steady decline in nancial
stress until mid-April 2010 when serious concerns about sovereign credit risk in the euro
area emerged.
To sum up, it appears that all extreme peaks in the CISS can be associated with
specic nancial stress events, suggesting that it does not su¤er from type II errors.
It is harder to judge whether it also performs well on the dimension of type I errors,
i.e. whether there are severe crises which it failed to indicate. Potential candidates in
this regard are the global bond market crisis and the Mexican peso crisis both in 1994
and the Asian crisis in 1997, for instance. The CISS suggests that these events did
not trigger signicant systemic stress in the euro area nancial system as a whole, but
rather represented more isolated tensions in specic market segments and other parts of
the world economy. This view is broadly consistent with ndings from the international
contagion literature (e.g., Bekaert, Harvey and Ng 2005). Overall, developments in the
CISS appear in general rather plausible, not least because it singles out very clearly the
recent nancial and economic crisis as the by far most stressful period over the past
quarter of a century of available data for the euro area, comparable probably only to
the Great Depression.
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2.4.3 A threshold VAR to identify systemic crises
Financial stress indices like the CISS may help identify stress levels in the nancial
system which indicate elevated risks of heading towards, or having entered, a systemic
crisis. Since systemic crises are regularly associated with severe contractions in economic
activity, identifying such risks as early as possible is of major interest to policymakers.
The literature suggests several ways to tackle this problem. One approach is to bench-
mark the current level of stress against levels observed during historical crises known to
have caused such serious economic disruptions. An alternative is to identify quantita-
tive thresholds or regimes for the FSI at hand on the basis of statistical or econometric
methods. The most widely used approach is to classify nancial stress as severe if the
index exceeds its historical mean by one or more standard deviations (e.g., Illing and
Liu 2006; Cardarelli, Elekdag and Lall 2011). This approach, however, manifests sev-
eral shortcomings. First, it assumes that the sample means and standard deviations
are stable properties of the stress index. However, this may not be the case in partic-
ular for those FSIs which use standardisation of the input series and data compression
methods like principal components analysis to compute the composite index. Temporal
instability of the rst two moments of the index distribution may give rise to the event
reclassication problem as discussed above. This risk appears particularly pronounced
in the present case since in times of crisis, the new data added to the sample usually
take on extreme values. Second, this approach also su¤ers from the ad hoc nature of the
identied threshold, in the sense that it is not obvious how many standard deviations
the index should exceed its mean in order to signal systemic stress.
To overcome these shortcomings, we propose applying econometric regime-switching
models in order to endogenously identify periods of extreme nancial stress. The basic
idea behind such approaches is that the dynamics of the nancial system and its inter-
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actions with the real sector may be subject to multiple equilibria depending on whether
the economy is in a state of nancial crises and non-crises (Hansen 2000). This may
reect the fact that the interaction between externalities (e.g., contagion), information
problems (e.g., adverse selection) and certain special features of the nancial sector (e.g.,
the existence of maturity mismatches and high leverage) can lead to powerful feedback
and amplication mechanisms driving the system from a state of relative tranquility
to a state of turmoil, also altering the systems normal laws of motion. In order to
identify such regime changes, Holló, Kremer and Lo Duca (2012) identify three di¤erent
level-regimes of the euro area CISS based on an autoregressive Markov-switching model.
In this paper we apply a threshold VAR (TVAR) model that captures, in a stylised
fashion, regime-dependent dynamic interactions between nancial stress and the real
economy. The regimes are identied on the basis of an estimated threshold of the
CISS based on the idea that nancial stress becomes a cause of major concern when
it adversely impacts on the real economy, thereby integrating the vertical view of our
favoured denition of systemic risk. According to this viewpoint, we would expect that
economic activity drops sharply whenever the CISS reaches a certain critical level. One
major advantage of such an estimated threshold level of the CISS and the corresponding
regime classication consists in its direct economic interpretation.
In general, threshold regression models represent a class of regime-switching which
assumes that state transitions are triggered any time an observable variable crosses a
certain threshold level (Franses and van Dijk 2000). We assume a priori that the CISS
is the relevant threshold variable and that at most two regimes and therefore one single
threshold exists. We follow Tsay (1998) and identify potential threshold e¤ects within
a bivariate TVAR with the CISS (Ct) and annual growth in industrial production (yt)
as the endogenous variables. Anticipating a shortage of degrees of freedom in the high-
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stress regime recommends a specication of the TVAR as parsimonious as possible.
Hence, we also opt for the shortest lag-order suggested by standard specication tests.
While information criteria (weakly) prefer a higher lag order (four lags), an exclusion
F-Test suggests that a VAR with two lags may su¢ ce. The basic regression setup is as
follows:
xt = 
H + H1 xt 1 + 
H
2 xt 2 + 
H
t if zt d >  (2.7)
xt = 
L + L1 xt 1 + 
L
2 xt 2 + 
L
t if zt d   (2.8)
with xt = (Ct; yt)0 a two-dimensional vector; sand sj the vector of intercepts and the
two matrices collecting the slope coe¢ cients, respectively, for states s = fH;Lg (with H
and L standing for high-stress and low-stress regimes, respectively) and lags j = f1; 2g.
The threshold variable is denoted zt d with d 2 f1; :::; d0g and d0 = 2 the maximum
threshold lag or delay foreseen. The threshold parameter is labelled  and the vector st
contains the state-dependent regression errors with variance-covariance matrices s. As
mentioned above, the once or twice lagged CISS plays the role of the threshold variable
exciting the switches in regimes any time it crosses the threshold  .
Tsay (1998) proposed a two-step conditional least squares procedure to estimate this
TVAR under the assumption that the lag order, the number of states and the threshold
variable are all known. It is furthermore assumed that zt d is stationary and continuous
with a positive density function on a bounded subset of the real line. As the rst step,
for given d and  , the model parameters s; sj and 
s can be estimated by ordinary
least squares. Given the parameter estimates, Tsay (1998) developed test procedures
to determine d and  simultaneously. The main criterion of the selection procedure is
Tsays C(d)-Statistic testing for statistically signicant threshold e¤ects in the VAR.
The C(d)-Statistic is asymptotically chi-squared distributed, and results for d = 1 and
d = 2 (i.e., the once and twice lagged CISS as the threshold variable) are shown in Table
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Table 2.2: Testing for threshold delay and threshold values
Tsay (1998)-Test Hansen (2000)-Test
d C(d)-Stat p-value  AIC F -Stat p-value 
1 20.03 0.0166 0.2960 -2741 13.46 0.0000 0.2957
2 19.24 0.0402 0.3233 -2766 12.59 0.0000 0.2747
d denotes the threshold delay and  the threshold value. AIC is the Akaike
information criterion. The C(d)-Statistic tests for a threshold in the d-lagged
CISS within a bivariate TVAR(2) for the CISS and annual industrial pro-
duction growth. The F -Statistic tests for a threshold e¤ect in the production
growth equation only. Estimation with monthly data Jan. 1987 to June 2011.
2.2. In both cases the C(d)-Statistic clearly rejects the null hypothesis of no-threshold
e¤ects (linear VAR against TVAR) with p-values below the 5%-condence level. The
optimal threshold value for each d is determined by a grid search procedure (over a range
of CISS values) which minimises the Akaike information criterion (AIC). The optimal
specication is found to be a TVAR(2) model with the twice lagged CISS (d = 2) as
the threshold variable and an estimated threshold value of 0.3233 (Figure 2.7 plots the
results of the grid search procedure). This is suggested by the fact that the AIC is lower
for d = 2 than for d = 1 (see the fth column in Table 2.2).
As a robustness check, we also perform Hansens (2000) test for thresholds in a single-
equation regression of output growth on a constant, two of its own lags and the CISS with
the same lag length. This regression can thus be regarded as one equation of the bivariate
TVAR model. Hansen developed an F-Test for the existence of threshold e¤ects. The
test results are shown in the last three columns of Table 2.2, clearly suggesting the
existence of statistically signicant threshold e¤ects with threshold values very similar
to those from the Tsay-procedure.
Equipped with a fully specied and estimated TVAR model we are now in a position
to assess whether the e¤ects of the identied threshold of the CISS are both qualita-
tively and quantitatively consistent with our expectation that particularly high levels
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Figure 2.7: Threshold estimation based on the AIC for the null hypothesis VAR(2) vs
TVAR(2)
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of nancial stress tend to depress economic activity. Visual inspection of a scatter plot
relating output growth to the twice lagged CISS seems to vindicate this expectation
(see Figure A.4 in Holló, Kremer and Lo Duca 2012). While at lower levels of the CISS
(non-crisis times) the scatter plot appears purely random, at higher levels of the CISS a
clear negative relationship emerges between industrial production growth and nancial
stress.
In order to substantiate this claim further we compute the impulse response functions
(IRFs) from the estimated TVAR-coe¢ cients separately for the high-stress and the low-
stress regimes. Of course, computing conventional IRFs in non-linear VARs ignores
their history- and shock-dependence in such setups and are therefore valid only under
certain assumptions (Koop, Pesaran and Potter 1996). Figure 2.8 displays the two state-
dependent IRFs of industrial production growth for a uniform one-standard deviation
structural shock in the CISS from the high-stress regime. The dotted lines around the
IRFs represent analytical one-standard-deviation error bands (Lütkepohl 1990). The
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Figure 2.8: Regime-dependent impulse response functions for output growth to CISS
shocks
structural innovations are obtained from the triangular Cholesky-factorisation of the
variance-covariance matrix of residuals. The endogenous variables are ordered in such
a way (CISS rst, output second) that shocks in the CISS can have a contemporaneous
impact on economic output but not conversely. This structural shock identication
can be justied from an information perspective, for instance. Owing to the lag in
the publication of the euro area industrial production index (released in the second
third of the second month following the reference month), one may argue that the
output innovation of a given month cannot be perfectly predicted by nancial market
participants, in turn implying that they cannot be fully reected in contemporaneous
asset prices either. In addition, it may appear plausible to assume that CISS shocks
tend to originate mainly from within the nancial sector particularly during crisis times,
and that producers react quickly to increased uncertainty with a rapid drop in aggregate
output reecting a (temporary) pause in their investment and labour hiring decisions (as
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in Bloom 2009). However, since our favoured structural identication scheme may not
always properly describe the true causal ordering, the IRFs may be better interpreted
as an upper bound (in absolute terms) of the output reactions to shocks in the CISS.
This notwithstanding, the qualitative results from the impulse-response analysis remain
robust to a reverse ordering of variables.
Figure 2.8 indeed conrms our expectations that the real economic impacts of -
nancial stress are in fact dramatically di¤erent across the two regimes. While shocks in
the CISS do not exert statistically signicant reactions in output over whatever horizon
during low-stress regimes, industrial production virtually collapses in response to a large
positive CISS shock in the high-stress regimes. The maximum impact is reached after
four months, when annual output declines by about 2.7% in response to an initial shock
in the CISS of 0.06. It takes about a year for the marginal e¤ects to taper o¤. Similarly,
it is only during high stress regimes that, for instance, a negative output shock leads to
a subsequent increase in nancial stress (see Table 2.3 and Figure A.5 in Holló, Kremer
and Lo Duca 2012, for the full set of IRFs in the high-stress regime). Taken together,
these mutual reaction patterns seem to suggest that when hit by a su¢ ciently large
(nancial or real) shock, an economy faces the risk of entering a vicious downward spi-
ral with nancial and economic stress reinforcing each other over time, a nding which
could be explained theoretically by some nancial accelerator mechanism (e.g., as in
Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist 1999).
In contrast, during normal times with low nancial stress the CISS may become a
negligible quantity as evidenced by the absence of statistically signicant cross-equation
relationships in this regime according to standard exclusion F-Tests. Accordingly, in
the low-stress regime the bivariate VAR more or less degenerates into a set of two
independent autoregressions. The IRFs point in the same direction.
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Table 2.3: Parameter estimates of the TVAR(2) model
High-stress regime Low-stress regime
Ct yt Ct yt
Constant 0.2171
(2.8863)
0.0650
(3.5790)
0.0161
(3.5123)
0.0019
(1.1221)
Ct 1 0.9296
(5.3965)
-0.0938
(2.2556)
0.9022
(14.7494)
-0.0401
(1.7711)
Ct 2 -0.4106
(1.9639)
-0.0749
(1.4846)
-0.0652
(0.9948)
0.0386
(1.5936)
yt 1 -2.2133
(2.6935)
0.8239
(4.1551)
0.1273
(0.8282)
0.5827
(10.2482)
yt 2 1.8947
(2.7918)
-0.0932
(0.5693)
-0.1073
(0.7051)
0.3510
(6.2343)
 0.0594 0.0126 0.0337 0.0125
Exclusion F-tests (p-value)
lagged C 15.63
(0.0000)
8.49
(0.0014)
336.69
(0.0000)
1.59
(0.2069)
lagged y 3.90
(0.0330)
82.89
(0.0000)
0.34
(0.7093)
553.33
(0.0000)
TVAR(2) denotes bivariate threshold-VAR for the CISS (Ct) and annual growth in
industrial production (yt), with 2 lags and one threshold for the CISS with 2 lags.
High-stress regime occurs when the lagged CISS is at or above the estimated threshold.
Estimation based on monthly data from Jan. 1987 to June 2011.
We conclude this section with adding some words of caution. Any econometric
analysis of nancial stress indicators in the time series dimension must su¤er from the
low number of crisis events and the resulting lack of statistical degrees of freedom.
Financial crises are rare events, and even more so are the truly systemic ones with
e¤ects as devastating as in the case of the present crisis. Hence, the results obtained
from the threshold VAR are clearly dominated by the dynamics observed during the
recent crisis and therefore may not claim generality.
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2.5 Conclusions
The recent nancial and economic crisis revealed considerable gaps in the theoretical un-
derpinning and the empirical toolkits available to analyse and monitor nancial stability
in general and systemic risk in particular. Academics and nancial authorities all around
the globe have been stepping up e¤orts to improve the suit of tools and models in this
eld accordingly. This paper contributes to this branch of literature by proposing a new
composite indicator of systemic nancial stress, called CISS, which aims to measure the
contemporaneous state of instability in the nancial system as a whole; it can therefore
be interpreted as a measure of systemic risk which has materialised already. The main
distinguishing features of the CISS are its explicit foundation on standard denitions of
systemic risk and, as its main methodological innovation, the application of portfolio-
theoretic principles to the aggregation of individual nancial stress indicators into the
composite indicator. We also propose a parsimoneous econometric approach to estimate
a critical level of the indicator as the endogenous outcome of a threshold VAR. Its statis-
tical robustness to computation over expanding samples ensures that past signals issued
by the CISS remain valid also at later points in time. The CISS can be updated quickly
on a weekly basis and is thus particularly suitable for real-time surveillance tasks as
typically conducted in central banks and other macroprudential authorities.
As to the way forward, several companion projects are ongoing or can be envisaged.
For instance, an expansion of the geographical coverage of the CISS promises to lead to
a better understanding and assessment of its indicator properties, for instance through
econometric analysis that also exploits the cross-country dimension. In a single-country
context, the dynamic interactions between nancial stress and the real economy should
be more thoroughly investigated within richer non-linear econometric model setups as
in Hubrich and Tetlow (2015) and Hartmann, Hubrich, Kremer and Tetlow (2015).
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In addition, the development of adequate evaluation criteria for running horse races
between di¤erent nancial stress indices would be highly welcome by the profession.
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CHAPTER 3
MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FINANCIAL STRESS AND THE
ROLE OF MONETARY POLICY: A VAR ANALYSIS FOR THE EURO
AREA
Abstract: This paper analyses a macro-nancial VAR model for the euro
area that includes apart from conventional measures of output, ination
and monetary policy a composite indicator of systemic nancial stress,
namely the CISS index, and total assets of the ECB balance sheet cap-
turing the stance of unconventional monetary policy. I nd that the CISS
contributes signicantly to the dynamics of the macroeconomy, and exerts a
strong inuence on monetary policy when looking at both policy rates and
the ECB balance sheet. The signicance of the CISS appears robust against
the inclusion of a broad set of real and nancial control variables. Based
on tests of direct versus indirect (Granger-)causality patterns proposed in
Hsiao (1982), I also nd that unlike unconventional policy as measured by
ECB balance sheet growth, the policy rate does not seem to react directly
to variations in nancial stress, but rather indirectly through the impact of
nancial stress on macroeconomic conditions. These di¤erent patterns of
reaction are broadly consistent with the ECBs separation principle. The
estimated e¤ects of the ECBs standard and non-standard policy measures
on ination and economic growth are moderate, although an easier stance in
both policy tools helps calm nancial stress.z
zThis chapter is a revised version of the article published under the same ti-
tle in International Economics and Economic Policy, Vol. 13, 2016, pp. 105138
(http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10368-015-0325-z). I thank the journal editor, Paul
J.J. Welfens, my discussant Cillian Ryan (University of Birmingham), and seminar participants at the
joint bdvb Research Institute/EIIW at the University of Wuppertal International Conference 2014
in Düsseldorf, the 35th International Symposium on Forecasting in Riverside, and the 2nd Annual
Conference of the International Association for Applied Econometrics (IAAE) in Thessaloniki for
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3.1 Introduction
Financial systems perform essential functions for an economy to create sustainable
growth, employment and social welfare. This basic matter of fact becomes all too evident
in systemic nancial crises, when nancial instability gets so severe and widespread that
the process of nancial intermediation virtually grinds to a halt, causing major losses
in economic activity, rises in unemployment and, sometimes, even social and political
instability. The recent Great Financial Crisis and the associated Great Recession are
prime examples of such a major systemic event, being generally regarded as second only
to the Great Depression of the 1930s. Systemic crises bear the risk that strains in the
nancial and real sectors reinforce each other without a self-correcting mechanism at
play that could reverse the vicious circle. Stopping such adverse dynamics and stabilis-
ing the nancial system therefore seems to require bold and often unconventional policy
interventions by public authorities including central banks.
Against this background, this paper models empirically the dynamic interactions
between nancial instability and the macroeconomy, and assesses the role played by
standard and non-standard monetary policy measures within this context. To this end,
I estimate an otherwise standard macro-nancial multivariate time series model (a vec-
tor autoregression model (VAR)) applied to euro area data that includes apart from
conventional measures of economic output, ination and monetary policy a compos-
ite indicator measuring the state of systemic nancial stress or instability, namely the
Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress (CISS), as well as the size (total assets) of the
European Central Banks (ECB) balance sheet as endogenous variables. The latter vari-
able shall capture the overall stance of the various forms of unconventional monetary
policy measures taken by the ECB during the crisis in pursuit of its political mandate.
fruitful discussions and comments. However, the views expressed in this paper are mine and do not
necessarily reect those of the European Central Bank or the Eurosystem.
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The structural shocks are identied by applying the recursive Cholesky decomposition
with the conventional ordering of real macro variables before nancial and monetary
policy variables. However, it turns out that all the main results of the model are robust
to di¤erent orderings.
I nd, rst, that the CISS is an important predictor for the core variables in the sys-
tem, namely for output growth, monetary policy interest rates and, but less so, for ina-
tion. This predictive ability is conrmed by standard exclusion tests, impulse-response
functions, forecast error variance decompositions, and by counterfactual simulations.
Block exogeneity tests suggest that the predictive power remains robust to the inclu-
sion of a broad set of real and nancial control variables, thereby ruling out spurious
causality of the CISS for macroeconomic developments, conditional on this specic set
of controls.
Second, the monetary policy rate and the ECB balance sheet growth rate are found
to respond signicantly to CISS shocks with the expected signs, i.e. the policy rate de-
creases and the balance sheet expands in reaction to an unpredicted increase in nancial
stress. Applying the tests of direct and indirect (Granger-)causality put forward in Hsiao
(1982), I furthermore nd that the monetary policy rate responds to variations in the
CISS only indirectly, whereas the ECB balance sheet reacts directly. The indirect lagged
reaction of the policy interest rate seems to reect some genuine information contained
in the CISS about the expected course of the economy. This pattern of direct responses
of the ECB balance sheet in combination with indirect reactions of the policy rate to
variations in nancial stress may lend support to the view that the ECBs standard and
non-standard monetary policies during the crisis were e¤ectively guided by its declared
separation principle.
Third, the cumulated structural policy rate shocks suggest that the stance of con-
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ventional monetary policy may have become constrained by the zero lower bound in
2013.
Fourth, an expansionary stance in the ECBs conventional and unconventional mon-
etary policy tools seems to provide some moderate support to economic activity over
the medium-term, whereas no visible impact on ination is found. In addition, an easier
monetary policy also helps calm nancial stress.
The paper contributes to three main strands of literature. The rst one estimates the
macroeconomic e¤ects, formost the output losses, associated with periods of nancial
instability as captured by specically designed composite nancial stress indices. The
e¤ects are usually estimated within bivariate or higher-dimensional macro-nancial VAR
models. Examples are Davig and Hakkio (2010) and Hubrich and Tetlow (2015) for
the United States; Holló, Kremer and Lo Duca (2012), Mallick and Sousa (2013) and
Hartmann, Hubrich, Kremer and Tetlow (2015) for the euro area; van Roye (2014)
for Germany; Aboura and van Roye (2013) for France; Li and St-Amant (2010) for
Canada; as well as Cardarelli, Elekdagb and Lall (2011), Dovern and van Roye (2014) and
Mittnik and Semmler (2014) in multi-country settings. While some of these papers study
the robustness of the macroeconomic e¤ects of nancial stress over time by applying
regime-switching methods, none assesses the robustness of the respective nancial stress
indexs explanatory power against the inclusion of alternative indicators of nancial
stress, nancial conditions or the business cycle.
Second, the paper adds empirical evidence to the question as to whether central
banks tend to respond to nancial stress by changing monetary policy interest rates
accordingly. From the papers just listed, Hubrich and Tetlow (2015) address this issue
explicitly for the U.S. case. For a short overview of the broader literature see Adrian
and Liang (2014). Some of the most relevant papers cited therein are briey summarised
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in Section 3.5.1. The value added of my paper rests on exploring the robustness of the
estimated impacts of nancial stress on the ECBs setting of monetary policy interest
rates against the addition of competing explanatory variables from the nancial and
real sphere. My paper also distinguishes between potential direct and indirect e¤ects of
nancial stress on the policy rate from the perspective of an implicit reaction function
estimated as part of the VAR.
Third, this paper also complements the literature that estimates the macroeconomic
e¤ects of unconventional monetary policy measures (see, e.g., Lenza, Pill and Reichlin
2010; Peersman 2011; Giannone, Lenza, Pill and Reichlin 2012; Kapetanios, Mumtaz,
Stevens and Theodoridis 2012; Fahr, Motto, Rostagno, Smets and Tristani 2013; Cic-
carelli, Maddaloni and Peydro 2013; Gambacorta, Hofmann and Peersman 2014; and
Boeckx, Dossche and Peersman 2014). In contrast to existing studies, this paper focuses
on the robustness of the central banks balance sheet reaction to nancial stress, as
well as on the potential feedback e¤ects of unconventional monetary policy on nancial
stability conditions.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 3.2 describes the rationale, the design
and some basic features of the CISS as a composite measure of nancial (in-)stability.
Section 3.3 details the specication of the benchmark VAR model for the euro area,
and the identication of the structural shocks. Section 3.4 presents the rst set of
results which focuses on the strength and the robustness of the predictive power of the
CISS. Section 3.5 discusses how the ECB reacts to nancial instability by changing
its conventional and unconventional monetary policy stance, and how the identied
standard and nonstandard monetary policy shocks feed back to nancial stress and the
real economy. Section 3.6 summarises a few caveats to the empirical analysis before
Section 3.7 concludes.
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3.2 Measuring systemic nancial instability
The main contribution of this paper rests, rst, on an adequate empirical representa-
tion of systemic nancial (in-)stability and, second, on a meaningful integration of the
proposed measure of nancial instability into an empirical macro model.
As to the rst point, I employ the CISS recently developed by me and two col-
laborators at the ECB (Holló, Kremer and Lo Duca 2012; see also Chapter 2 of this
dissertation).1 The CISS is part of the family of so-called nancial stress indexes (see
Illing and Liu 2006, and Kliesen, Owyang and Vermann 2012, for overviews). Such
indices aim to quantify the current state of nancial instability, i.e. the prevailing level
of frictions and strains (stresses) in the nancial system, by aggregating a certain
number of individual stress indicators into a single composite indicator.
The design of the CISS concentrates on capturing the systemic dimension of nan-
cial instability. It does so by, rst, covering the main classes of nancial markets and
intermediaries in a systematic fashion and, second, by considering the time-varying de-
pendence of stress between these major segments of the nancial system. First of all,
the scope of the CISS is broad, comprising ve aggregate market segments covering the
main channels by which the funds of savers are reallocated to borrowers, whether those
funds are channeled indirectly through nancial intermediaries or directly via short-term
and long-term markets. These segments include: (1) nancial intermediaries; (2) money
markets; (3) bond markets; (4) equity markets; and (5) foreign exchange markets. Each
of the ve market segments is populated with three representative stress indicators that
tend to capture typical crisis symptoms, such as risk and liquidity spreads, volatili-
1The CISS project formed part of the Macro-prudential Research Network (MaRs) among researchers
of the European System of Central Banks. The network aimed to develop core conceptual frameworks,
models and tools to provide analytical support to macro-prudential supervision in the European Union
(see http://www.ecb.europa.eu/home/html/researcher_mars.en.html).
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ties, and cumulative price losses. Aggregation of each set of three constituent stress
measures after appropriate transformation to harmonise their scale and probability
distribution2 results in ve segment-specc subindices of nancial stress.
The way the subindices are aggregated into a composite indicator is the main dis-
tinguishing feature of the CISS. In the same way that portfolio risk is computed from
individual asset risks, the subindices are aggregated by taking into account the time-
varying (rank)-correlations between them. The time variation in the correlations means
that relatively more weight is applied during periods in which stress prevails in several
market segments at the same time. In this way, the CISS is specically designed to
describe how widespread and severe instability in the nancial system has become at
any one time. It is presumably when stress is widespread that it has implications for
the broader macroeconomy. Indeed, a conventional denition of systemic risk says that
it is (...) the risk that instability becomes so widespread within the nancial system
that it impairs its functioning to the point where economic growth and welfare su¤er
materially (de Bandt and Hartmann 2000).
The nal indicator, as constructed from euro area data, is shown in Section 3.5 as
the grey shaded areas in Figures 3.3 and 3.6. One can easily see that the recent crisis
stands out in comparison with previous stress events in terms of both the levels reached
and the duration of high readings.3
Regarding the second issue, namely the integration of the CISS into an empirical
macro framework, I assume that the dynamics of systemic nancial stress and its in-
teraction with certain macro and monetary policy variables can be modeled as a linear
2Each of the raw indicators is transformed using its empirical cumulative distribution function (ecdf),
that is each observation is replaced by its ecdf value. This transformation is also called the probability
integral transform (see, e.g., Spanos 1999). All transformed indicators are bounded by the interval (0,1]
and uniform distributed. See Hollo, Kremer and Lo Duca (2012) and Chapter 2 of this dissertation for
details.
3See Figure 2.6 for a longer times series of the euro area CISS starting back in 1987.
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multivariate stochastic time series process. I therefore simply add the CISS to the list of
endogeneous variables of an otherwise standard macro-nancial VAR in order to address
the research questions put forward in this paper. Such an approach remains agnostic
when it comes to the origins and specic transmission channels of nancial instability.
However, regardless of the origins, for nancial stress to cause major disruptions in the
economy, it must eventually be widespread. Thus, integrating a composite indicator of
systemic stress into a VAR can have the advantage that it builds on what systemic crises
have in common, namely instability that spreads widely across markets and institutions.
3.3 Specication and identication of the VAR
3.3.1 Specication
The general starting point for the empirical analysis is the reduced-form representation
of a linear VAR with exogenous variables (VARX):
yt = C + A1yt 1 + :::+ Apyt p +B1xt 1 + :::+Bpxt p + "t (3.1)
with t = 1; :::; T and T being the sample size; y is an n  1 vector of endogeneous
variables, x is an m 1 vector of exogenous variables, C is an n 1 vector of regression
constants, Al (with elements aij;l) and Bl (with elements bij;l) are n  n and n  m
matrices respectively of regression coe¢ cients for lags l = 1; :::; p and p the number of
lags included in the model; " is an n  1 vector of reduced-from shocks with assumed
distribution "t s i:i:d: N(0;
). The coe¢ cients C, Al and Bl are estimated by running
ordinary least squares regressions equation by equation, and the variance-covariance
matrix is estimated from the sample residuals as 
 = (1=T )
PT
t=1 "t"
0
t. The VARX
model will be used to perform the block exogeneity tests in Section 3.4.
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The benchmark model from which most of the results presented in this paper are
derived is estimated for euro area data at the monthly frequency, and covers the period
from the introduction of the euro in January 1999 to December 2013. The model has
four lags (p = 4) and contains six endogenous variables (n = 6), but no exogenous
variables (m = 0), yielding a standard linear VAR in reduced form:
yt = C + A1yt 1 + :::+ Apyt p + "t: (3.2)
Three of the endogenous variables represent a block of core variables included in all stan-
dard monetary policy VARs of the literature: a measure of the aggregate price level,
a measure of aggregate economic activity and a short-term interest rate measuring the
stance of conventional monetary policy. Prices are measured by the seasonally adjusted
Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP), economic activity by the seasonally ad-
justed real gross domestic product (GDP), and conventional monetary policy by the
marginal interest rate applied by the ECB in the Eurosystems main renancing opera-
tions (MRO), i.e. its regular open market operations. The original quarterly real GDP
data is interpolated into the monthly frequency by state-space methods, using industrial
production as an interpolator variable and assuming that the interpolation error can be
described as a log-linear ARIMA(1,1,0) process as in Litterman (1983).4
These core model variables are complemented by three additional endogenous vari-
ables which are less common in the literature: (i) the square root of the CISS as the
proposed summary measure of nancial instability5; (ii) total assets of the ECBs bal-
ance sheet as a measure of, among other things, the overall stance of the various forms
of unconventional monetary policy measures taken by the ECB; and (iii) the spread be-
4Estimation is implemented using the procedure DISAGGREGATE.SRC in WinRATS version 8.0.
5I take the square root of the CISS to control for potential nonlinearities arising from the quadratic
form of the formula with which the CISS is computed. The square root of the CISS is what has been
called the volatility-equivalentCISS versus its standard variance-equivalent form as published by
the ECB (see Hollo, Kremer and Lo Duca 2012). However, all the basic messages of the emprical
analysis presented in this paper do not alter when using the standard CISS instead.
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tween the euro overnight index average (EONIA) and the MRO rate, where the EONIA
measures the e¤ective interest rate prevailing in the euro interbank overnight market.
This spread shall help interpret the identied structural monetary policy shocks. All
raw data are taken from the ECBs Statistical Data Warehouse.6
While Boeckx, Dossche and Peersman (2014) use consumer prices, real GDP and
ECB total assets in log levels, I prefer to transform these variables by taking annual log
di¤erences. Annual di¤erences control for potential (remaining) additive seasonality in
the data and, more importantly, remove the upward drift in the log levels of these series.
Although coe¢ cients are consistently estimated for a VAR in non-stationary log levels,
all the standard errors and derived test statistics are not. This would likely pose a more
serious problem in the block exogeneity tests performed in the next section than in the
case of using annual di¤erences.
3.3.2 Identication
The regression residuals are unidentied and generally correlated with each other which
prevents us from giving them a structural economic interpretation. In order to achieve an
economic interpretation of the prediction errors, we have to impose certain identifying
restrictions on them. In this paper, I identify the structural shocks using the well-
known Cholesky decomposition.7 It starts with the unique triangular factorisation of
the variance-covariance matrix of the regression innovations: 
 = ADA, with A being a
lower triangular nn matrix with 1s along the principal diagonal andD a diagonal nn
matrix. The structural shocks ut can be computed from the residuals "t as ut = A 1"t
such that elements dii of D denote the variances of the structural shocks uit. Since D is
6Regular updates of the weekly CISS can be obtained via this link:
http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=9551138.
7For an overview of di¤erent identifying assumptions see Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999).
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diagonal, one set of identifying restrictions assumes that the structural shocks, i.e. the
fundamental economic shocks, are orthogonal to each other.8 The matrix A imposes the
remaining restrictions to just-identify the system of shocks. Its triangular form implies
a recursive shock identication such that the order in which the endogenous variables
enter the VAR becomes relevant.
To illustrate that point, we premultiply both sides of the equation ut = A 1"t by A
to yield Aut = "t. It can be seen that the lower o¤-diagonal coe¢ cients aij measure the
contemporaneous impact of a structural shock in the j-th variable on the reduced-form
shock of the i-th variable. The rst structural shock u1t is identical to the residual
"1t from the rst equation of the VAR. The second structural shock u2t can now be
obtained as the residual of a linear projection of "2t on the rst structural shock u1t = "1t:
E("2tju1t) = a21u1t. Given the recursive structure of the system, the remaining structural
shocks ujt can be estimated from the OLS regressions E("jtju1t; u2t; :::; uj 1t) = aj1u1t+
aj2u2t + :::+ aj;j 1uj 1t (see Hamilton 1994).
The structural shocks for the benchmark VAR are identied largely in line with the
most common practice in the literature (see Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans 1999
for an overview of di¤erent identication approaches and their economic rationale). I
rst assume that the variables in the real economy block (ination and real GDP
growth) do not respond contemporaneously to the nancial variables (but with a lag of
at least one month), where the latter include the CISS and the series forming the mon-
etary policy block(MRO rate, ECB balance sheet growth and the EONIA-MRO rate
spread). By contrast, the monetary policy variables are allowed to react instantaneously
to shocks in ination, output and the CISS, implicitly assuming that current realisa-
tions of these variables are part of the information set available to the ECBs decision
making body, the Governing Council, when it sets its monetary policy instruments in a
8The structural shocks are thus distributed as ut s i:i:d: N(0; D).
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given month. These assumptions imply that the real-block variables are ordered before
all the nancial variables, and that the CISS appears before the policy block. Within
the real sector block, I order ination before real GDP growth.9 Finally, the monetary
policy block follows the order MRO rate, ECB balance sheet and the EONIA-MRO rate
spread according to two main arguments. First, I assume that in each month the MRO
rate is set independently of factors moving the size of the ECB balance sheet, such as
banksliquidity needs or the ECBs acquisition of certain assets. On the one hand, this
assumption implies that conventional monetary policy is determined without regard to
the factors behind the decisions concerning unconventional monetary policy, at least
within a given month. On the other hand, allowing central bank assets to react in-
stantanously to MRO rate shocks caters for any endogenous reaction of banksliquidity
demand to the new interest rate conditions. Second, at any given level of the MRO rate,
changes in central bank liquidity supply as a consequence of ECB non-standard policy
measures would normally induce an inverse reaction in the EONIA rate and its spread
to the MRO rate (see Boeckx, Dossche and Peersman 2014, and Fahr et al. 2013, for
similar lines of reasoning). The nal order of the endogenous variables of the benchmark
VAR is thus: ination (P), real GDP growth (GDP), CISS, MRO rate (MRO), ECB
balance sheet growth rate (BS), and EONIA-MRO rate spread (SP).
The corresponding estimate of the triangular decomposition matrixA which identies
the structural shocks ut is shown in Equation 3.3. It contains the estimated coe¢ cients
aij and, underneath in parantheses, the associated p-values of their statistical signi-
cance. Only six out of 15 coe¢ cients (printed in bold), all pertaining to the monetary
policy block, are statistically di¤erent from zero at a 7% signicance level. While the
MRO rate reacts to independent contemporaneous shocks in ination and output with
the expected positive sign, the innovations in ECB total assets increase with shocks
9Given the low and insignicant correlation between their reduced-form residuals (see the estimate
of coe¢ cient a21 in Equation 3.3), this assumption is inconsequential.
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in the CISS and decrease with structural shocks in the MRO rate, again in line with
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With an estimate of A we can compute the structural form of the VAR:
A 1yt = A 1C + A 1A1yt 1 + :::+ A 1Apyt p + ut: (3.4)
3.4 Results I: The predictive power of the CISS
In this section, I rst present and discuss some general features of the estimated bench-
mark VAR, before studying in greater detail the overall performance, direct versus
indirect transmission channels, and the robustness of the CISS, as a driving force of
macroeconomic dynamics.
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3.4.1 Overall e¤ects within the benchmark VAR
The dynamic interactions between the endogenous variables of a multivariate VAR i.e.
a VAR with more than two variables are generally quite complex. The complexity
arises since the lags of practically all variables can enter the equation of any other vari-
able, creating room for a great variety of potential direct, indirect and feedback e¤ects in
a model as highly dimensioned as the benchmark VAR at hand. The VAR methodology
o¤ers several analytical tools to study the net e¤ects that a certain shock exerts on a
model variable through all potential transmission channels. The most common tools are
impulse response functions (IRFs) and forecast error variance decompositions (FEVDs).
An IRF describes the responses of a variable i at time t + s with s = 0; :::; h (with h
denoting the longest prediction horizon) to a positive one-standard deviation structural
shock in variable j as a one-time impulse at date t.10 An IRF is thus a sequence of
dynamic multipliers. A FEVD tells us the contribution of a structural shock in variable
j to the forecast error variance of a variable i at horizon t + s with s = 0; :::; h. The
IRFs and the FEVDs produce complementary information since both use the same in-
put data, namely the coe¢ cients of the vector moving average (VMA) representation
of a VAR. Since the IRFs and the FEVDs are derived from the stuctural form of the
VAR, they both depend on the particular method applied to identify the shocks. In the
present case, they depend on the particular order in which the model variables enter
the Cholesky decomposition. However, all conclusions derived from the IRFs and the
FEVDs presented in this paper are robust to di¤erent variable orderings thanks to the
generally rather weak contemporaneous correlations between the reduced-form model
10The matrix P = AD1=2 is known as the Cholesky factorisation of 
. Like A, P is lower triangular,
though whereas A has 1s along the principal diagonal, the Cholesky factor has the square roots of the
elements of D, that is the standard deviations of the structural shocks ut, along the principal diagonal.
The structural shocks from the Cholesky decomposition are obtained as vt = P 1"t = D 1=2ut such that
vt s i:i:d: N(0; In). Thus, vjt is just ujt divided by its standard deviation
p
djj . This decomposition
is used to compute impulse response functions to one-standard-deviation shocks rather than one-unit
shocks in ut.
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Figure 3.1: Impulse response functions from the benchmark VAR
residuals as reected in the few signicant coe¢ cients of the A-matrix in Equation 3.3.
Figure 3.1 displays the full set of IRFs from the six-dimensional structural VAR.
The response variables are plotted row-wise and the impulse variables column-wise. The
black lines are the mean responses and the blue lines around them represent the 10th
and the 90th percentile error bands computed by Monte Carlo integration. Concerning
the real sector block, GDP growth declines after a few months in response to a positive
ination shock, while ination gradually increases to a shock in real GDP growth. This
pattern may suggest that the price equation captures predominantly aggregate supply
shocks, while the innovations in the equation for real GDP are driven mainly by aggregate
demand shocks.
The IRF-plots in the third column substantiate the claim that the CISS plays a
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signicant role as a driver of macroeconomic dynamics. While its dynamic e¤ects on
ination are rather muted, real GDP growth responds rather strongly to nancial stress
shocks. For instance, a typical CISS shock of about 0.05 causes a downward revision in
the predicted path of annual growth in real GDP by 0.25% one year hence. Everything
else held constant, the cumulated shocks in the CISS observed in August 2007 (+0.20) as
well as in September and October 2008 (0.08 and 0.10, respectively) would have shaved
o¤ as much as around 2% of predicted output growth over a one-year horizon. All
three variables in the monetary policy block of the VAR likewise respond signicantly
to nancial stability shocks with the expected signs. The MRO policy rate decreases
and the ECBs balance sheet expands in reaction to an unpredicted increase in the CISS.
The responses of the money market spread (SP) indicate that the EONIA rate drops
more strongly than the MRO rate in reaction to an increase in nancial stress. The
concurrent expansion of the ECB balance sheet apparently tends to go along with
ceteris paribus an increase in the supply of central bank liquidity, an interpretation
which is likewise supported by the signicant negative reactions of the spread to positive
balance sheet shocks. In the opposite case, the parallel responses of ECB balance sheet
growth to shocks in the EONIA-MRO spread suggest that the latter capture liquidity
demand shocks, among other things.
The FEVD conrms the powerful contribution of the CISS to the VAR dynamics.
Table 3.1 shows the decomposition for all variables over forecast horizons of one month,
three months, 12 months and 24 months. We can see that the structural innovations
of the CISS contribute by 24% and 26% to the forecast error variance of real GDP
growth over a 12-month and a 24-month horizon respectively, which is stronger than
the contributions of aggregate supply shocks (14% and 22% resp.), and only somewhat
weaker (at least for the longer horizon) than the contributions coming from aggregate
demand shocks (52% and 28% resp.). Regarding monetary policy, the CISS contributes
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by 14% to the 24-month-ahead forecast error variance of the MRO rate, which is quite
substantial given that ve out of six shocks exert material impacts. CISS innovations
are even the dominant factor behind the 24-month-ahead forecast error variances of the
ECB balance sheet growth rate (33%) and the EONIA-MRO rate spread (56%).
Table 3.1: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition for the benchmark VAR
contribution of variable (in %)
variable step std. err. P GDP CISS MRO BS SP
P 1 0.202 100.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
3 0.357 95.120 1.017 0.021 0.671 2.390 0.781
12 0.610 56.883 33.365 2.054 2.481 4.271 0.946
24 0.699 52.797 32.517 3.606 3.076 5.329 2.674
GDP 1 0.345 0.331 99.669 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
3 0.612 0.464 95.666 1.850 1.669 0.112 0.239
12 1.309 14.243 51.818 24.457 4.107 2.554 2.821
24 1.895 22.037 28.359 26.323 8.817 10.796 3.668
CISS 1 0.047 0.334 0.107 99.560 0.000 0.000 0.000
3 0.081 0.326 0.843 97.031 0.903 0.118 0.779
12 0.141 2.038 0.834 82.141 11.739 2.156 1.092
24 0.174 2.120 4.563 69.892 19.538 3.019 0.867
MRO 1 0.086 1.634 0.958 0.363 97.045 0.000 0.000
3 0.205 4.118 0.927 2.292 90.148 0.864 1.651
12 0.564 4.103 18.008 5.175 52.757 1.523 18.434
24 0.901 14.389 14.825 14.137 23.632 5.883 27.135
BS 1 3.934 1.181 0.002 2.423 0.189 96.205 0.000
3 6.921 0.415 2.923 9.945 0.153 86.541 0.022
12 13.637 8.886 13.879 31.901 2.100 38.345 4.889
24 15.772 8.507 19.316 32.747 2.847 30.455 6.129
SP 1 7.958 4.061 0.057 1.889 1.324 2.411 90.257
3 11.055 3.802 5.949 4.955 2.101 4.750 78.443
12 17.824 2.580 3.828 36.751 2.074 5.972 48.795
24 25.170 3.802 2.326 56.186 4.583 4.469 28.635
I also run a counterfactual experiment that simulates the behaviour of the VAR
variables from July 2007 (i.e. the month before the start of the subprime crisis) to
December 2013, under the assumption of zero innovations in nancial stress. Figure 3.2
indicates that if there were no exogeneous variations in the CISS, real GDP growth and
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Figure 3.2: Counterfactual simulation with the benchmark VAR assuming zero CISS
shocks
solid line: actual series; dotted line: simulated series; simulation period: July  2007 to December 2013
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the MRO rate would have been considerably higher, and swings in the ECB balance
sheet growth rate would have been more muted.
3.4.2 Direct versus indirect e¤ects
It is less common in the literature to disentangle the net e¤ects, measured by IRFs
and FEVDs, into the various possible direct and indirect dynamic relationships between
certain variables of a VAR. I argue that in the present context such a perspective of-
fers interesting insights. For this purpose, I apply the denitions of di¤erent causality
patterns and the related testing schemes proposed by Hsiao (1982). Hsiaos causality
patterns build on the standard concept of Granger-causality (Granger 1969). Assume we
have a tripartite partition of a vector of variables yt = (y1;t; y2;t; y3;t)0 where the yi;t can
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also represent subvectors of variables. A variable y1;t is said to Granger cause a variable
y2;t if past realisations of y1;t help predict y2;t one step ahead conditional on the set of
available information t. In the case of a standard VAR the conditioning information
set only includes lags of the endogenous variables t = Yt = fyi;s : s < t; i = 1; 2; 3g.
For ease of exposition I drop the time subindex from now on. Let 2(y2jY ) denote
the mean square error of the minimum mean square linear prediction error of y2 condi-
tional on Y , and Y   Yi is dened as the set of elements in Y without the elements in
Yi = Yi;t = fyi;s : s < tg. Hsiao denes the following causality patterns:
Denition 1 (Direct Causality). If 2(y2jY ) < 2(y2jY  Y1), then we say y1 causes
y2 directly relative to Y , denoted by y1 ) y2.
Denition 2 (Direct Feedback). If y1 ) y2 and y2 ) y1, then we say that direct
feedback occurs between y1 and y2, denoted by y1 , y2.
Denition 3 (Indirect Causality). If 2(y2jY ) = 2(y2jY   Y1) < 2(y2jY   Y3) <
2(y2jY   Y1   Y3) and 2(y3jY ) < 2(y3jY   Y1), 2(y3jY1 + Y3) < 2(y3jY3), then we
say that y1 causes y2 indirectly, denoted by y1 ! y2.
Denition 4 (No Causality). y1 does not cause y2 when either (i) 2(y2jY ) =
2(y2jY   Y1   Y3) or (ii) 2(y2jY ) = 2(y2jY   Y1) and 2(y3jY ) = 2(y3jY   Y1),
denoted by y1 9 y2.
Denition 5 (Spurious Causality). When condition (ii) of no causality holds, but
2(y2jY ) = 2(y2jY   Y1) < 2(y2jY   Y3) < 2(y2jY   Y1   Y3) and 2(y1jY ) <
2(y1jY   Y3), 2(y1jY1 + Y3) < 2(y1jY1), we say spurious causality from y1 to y2
occurs.
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All these conditions can be tested as standard zero restrictions on the VAR coe¢ -
cients aij;l. For instance, in the case of a three-dimensional VAR with y = (y1; y2; y3)0,
direct causality y1 ) y2 (Denition 1) involves testing the null hypothesis: H0 : a21;l = 0;
l = 1; :::; p. Direct non-causality y1 ; y2 rules out the predictive power of y1 for y2 one-
step-ahead. However, y1 can still predict y2 indirectly (y1 ! y2, Denition 3) at horizons
beyond one-step-ahead if y1 contains direct predictive power for y3, for instance, which
in turn may be directly causal for y2 (y1 ) y3 ) y2). Both Denitions 3 and 5 covering
the cases of indirect versus spurious causality state that past y1 will not help predict
present y2 when past y3 are used, but will help predict present y2 when past y3 are not
used. However, in the case of indirect causality y1 drives y3 which in turn causes y2. In
contrast, spurious causality assumes that y3 is the primary driving force for both y1 and
y2. Past y1 only serves as a proxy for the missing y3.
In a rather high-dimensional VAR like my benchmark model, many such direct and
indirect transmission channels may exist, and may either reinforce or compensate each
other. While the IRFs estimate the total or net e¤ects of all these di¤erent channels,
I now assess which direct and/or indirect causality patterns may be behind the strong
overall predictive power of the CISS within the benchmark VAR.11 The test statistics
reported in Table 3.2 identify patterns of direct (Granger-)causality only. Precisely, the
F -tests test for each equation separately the statistical signicance of zero restrictions
on all included lags of one variable in the reduced-form model equation of another
variable.12 The p-values are derived from a parametric bootstrapping procedure to
11However, Dufour and Tessier (1993) point out that the duality of non-causality restrictions on the
coe¢ cients of the autoregressive and the moving-average representation of a VAR does not hold in
multivariate systems. Even if y1 does not cause y2 in the sense of Granger, the innovations of y1 may
account for a sizeable proportion of the variance of y2. Conversely, even if the latter proportion is zero,
it is quite possible that y1 is found to Granger-cause y2.
12I prefer to report the exclusion F -tests based on the reduced-form model and thus to limit attention
to the analysis of Granger causality rather than mingling it with assumptions about instantaneous
causality between the variables as reported in equation 3, since the latter depends on the structural
identication scheme. Exclusion F -tests based on the structural VAR form could be obtained by adding
to each equation the contemporaneous values of those variables which precede the variable at hand in
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Table 3.2: Testing for direct causality in the benchmark VAR
equation i exclusion of variable j
P GDP CISS MRO BS SP
P 173.73 6.27 2.42 1.61 1.62 1.17
(0.000) (0.001) (0.070) (0.233) (0.207) (0.363)
GDP 4.73 225.32 2.76 4.59 1.14 2.95
(0.002) (0.000) (0.044) (0.004) (0.376) (0.031)
CISS 1.00 1.45 114.63 1.22 2.02 0.66
(0.453) (0.263) (0.000) (0.383) (0.122) (0.637)
MRO 2.73 2.36 2.31 1294.68 1.81 3.51
(0.044) (0.079) (0.074) (0.000) (0.156) (0.016)
BS 2.67 1.21 3.62 1.24 184.80 1.95
(0.049) (0.352) (0.012) (0.351) (0.000) (0.131)
SP 0.41 2.93 1.13 2.50 1.06 67.64
(0.818) (0.035) (0.384) (0.064) (0.416) (0.000)
Notes: Entries are the F -test statistic of the joint zero restriction on all lags of variable j
(column-wise) in the equation of variable i (row-wise): H0: aij;l = 0 for all l = 1; :::; 4 with
bootstrapped (10,000 draws) p-values below in brackets, based on the benchmark VAR.
ensure better small sample properties of the test. However, in general, the bootstrapped
p-values turn out to be only slightly more conservative than their analytical counterparts.
The bold printed entries in Table 3.2 are statistically signicant at the 5%-level.
I nd a total of ten relationships which qualify as direct causality according to the
5% signicance level. Four among them establish direct feedback relationships between
real GDP growth and ination (GDP , P ) and between real GDP growth and the
EONIA-MRO rate spread (GDP , SP ). The remaining cases of direct causality are:
P )MRO, P ) BS, CISS ) GDP , CISS ) BS,MRO ) GDP and SP )MRO.
Hence, the CISS emerges as directly causal for real GDP growth and the growth rate of
the ECB balance sheet. As one would expect, economic growth tends to slow down and
the ECB balance sheet tends to expand in response to higher nancial stress.
the order of the vector of endogeneous variables.
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From a monetary policy perspective, the identied direct causality patterns suggest
two potential routes of indirect causality between the CISS and the MRO rate, both op-
erating through the CISSs direct causality for real GDP growth: (i) CISS ) GDP )
P ) MRO, and (ii) CISS ) GDP ) SP ) MRO. The rst route may work
through the impact of changes in aggregate demand on ination which, in turn, tends
to trigger a response in the policy rate. The second route may progress via changes in
expected monetary policy as reected in changes in the EONIA-MRO rate spread (in-
dicating tighter or looser central bank liquidity conditions) which tend to be conrmed,
on average, by subsequent actual MRO rate moves.
Since Denition 3 requires a partition of the vector of variables into three non-empty
subsets, I cannot test these two indirect causality relationships separately within the
benchmark VAR. What I do instead is test for indirect causality CISS ! MRO via
the remaining four variables P;GDP;BS and SP jointly as a block. Table 3.3 reports
the test statistics and the associated p-values of the four conditions establishing indirect
causality according to Denition 3. The rst one, row (1), requires the absence of direct
causality between the CISS and the MRO rate; the corresponding null hypothesis cannot
be rejected at the 5% signicance level, a result already established in Table 3.2. The
second condition in row (2) demands a signicant loss in the predictive power when
dropping all other variables (collected in vector y3) apart from the CISS and own lags of
the MRO rate. The null of equal predictive power can be rejected at a 1% signicance
level. The third condition, row (3), requires direct predictive power of the CISS for
the MRO rate when excluding all other variables from the MRO rate equation. A p-
value of 0.014 suggests that this condition also holds true. The last condition stated in
row (4) requires signicant predictive power of the CISS for the block of variables in
vector y3. The corresponding 16 zero-restrictions can be clearly rejected even at the 1%
signicance level. Hence, all conditions for indirect causality of the CISS for the MRO
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Table 3.3: Testing for indirect causality of the CISS for the MRO rate
benchmark VAR
test condition (1) (2)
from Denition 3 test-statistic p-value
(1) 2(y2jY ) = 2(y2jY   Y1) F (4; 139) = 2:31 0:061
(2) 2(y2jY ) < 2(y2jY   Y3) F (16; 139) = 2:19 0:008
(3) 2(y2jY   Y3) < 2(y2jY   Y1   Y3) F (4; 155) = 3:21 0:014
(4) 2(y3jY ) < 2(y3jY   Y1) F (16; 139) = 2:28 0:005
Notes: The table provides the test statistics for the separate tests of the four conditions
establishing indirect causality CISS !MRO as dened in Denition 3. The variables
are dened as: y1= CISS; y2= MRO, y3= (P;GDP;BS; SP )for the benchmark VAR.
rate are fullled.
The same set of tests also suggests indirect causality between the CISS and the
spread (CISS ! SP ) via variables P;GDP;MRO and BS (with p-values of (1) 0.346,
(2) 0.064, (3) 0.008 and (4) 0.000 for the four conditions set out in Table 3.3). In
contrast, indirect causality between the CISS and ination (CISS ! P ) cannot be
fully established. First, the null hypothesis of direct causality can only be marginally
rejected at a 5% level with a p-value of 0.052. Second, while conditions (2) and (4) can
be conrmed with a p-value of 0.004 in both cases, condition (3), which requires Granger
causality of the CISS for ination in a bivariate VAR setting, is clearly violated with a
p-value of 0.376.
Summing up, tests for direct and indirect causality conrm the substantial predictive
power of the CISS within the benchmark VAR as suggested by the IRFs and the FEVD.
The CISS is found to be directly causal for real GDP growth and the ECB balance sheet
growth rate. Indirect causality of the CISS can be established for the MRO rate and
the EONIA-MRO rate spread. The evidence for the CISSs role as a driver of ination
is somewhat mixed and thus not fully clear.
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On the other hand, no other variable helps directly predict developments in the
CISS; the ECB balance sheet growth rate comes closest to statistical signcance with a
p-level of 12% (see Table 3.2).13 Capturing direct and indirect e¤ects, the IRFs and the
FEVD suggest that, if at all, only the MRO rate may possess some predictive power for
nancial stress; the remaining variables produce no discernible net e¤ects on the CISS
whatsoever.
3.4.3 Robustness, or looking for spurious e¤ects
As the nal piece of evidence presented in this section, I assess the robustness of the
CISSs predictive power to the inclusion, one at a time, of a broad set of real and
nancial variables with established or presumed predictive power for macroeconomic
developments. In order to strengthen the case, I only consider the explanatory power
with respect to the core model variables, i.e. ination, real GDP growth and the mon-
etary policy interest rate. The robustness tests are performed on the basis of a VARX
model as described in general terms in Equation 3.1. The vector of endogenous vari-
ables now only contains ination, real GDP growth and the MRO rate (n = 3). The
CISS and one of the control variables constitute, in that order, the vector of exogenous
variables (m = 2). Within this framework, the explanatory power of the CISS for the
core model variables can be assessed on the basis of standard block exogeneity tests.
In the present case, the block exogeneity test has, as its null hypothesis, that the lags
of the CISS do not enter the block of equations for the endogenous variables.14 This
13A block exogeneity test of the CISS with respect to the remaining variables delivers a p-value of
0.10. Interpreting this result as evidence against one-step ahead predictability would imply that the
CISS is Granger causally prior to the other model variables, which in turn implies that the other model
variables do not help predict the CISS even beyond the one-step-ahead forecast horizon (see Doan and
Todd 2010, and Jarocinski and Mackowiak 2013).
14Hence, the null hypothesis states that the three endogenous variables as a block are exogenous with
respect to the CISS.
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can be expressed as zero restrictions on the coe¢ cient matrices Bl: H0 : bi1;l = 0 for all
i = 1; 2; 3 and l = 1; :::; p with p = 4.15 The Likelihood Ratio test statistic is computed
as: (T   mc)(ln j
rj   ln j
uj), where T denotes the number of observations, mc is a
small-sample correction suggested by Sims (1980)16, 
r is the variance-covariance ma-
trix from the restricted regression and 
u the one from the unrestricted regression. This
likelihood ratio is asymptotically distributed as 2(12) with degrees of freedom equal to
the number of restrictions (n  p).
Table 3.4 reports the results for two sets of block exogeneity tests. The rst set
(columns 1 and 2) tests for block exogeneity of the core variables with respect to the CISS
for the case when no control variable is included (row 1), and for the cases when a certain
control is added (rows 2 to 14). The second set of block exogeneity tests (columns 3 and
4) reverses the question, asking whether a certain control variable helps to predict the
core model variables conditional on the inclusion of the CISS as a competing exogeneous
variable (rows 2 to 14). This second set of tests provides evidence on the strength, i.e.
the predictive power, of each control variable. A data description of the control variables
can be found in Appendix A.
The results from the block exogeneity tests with respect to the CISS can be gen-
eralised as follows: The CISS displays a strong robustness to the inclusion of a broad
range of forecasting variables from the real and nancial sphere. For instance, when
including signicant short-term predictors of economic developments like surveys on ex-
pected ination and the business climate, the CISS retains its strong joint predictive
power for consumer price ination, real GDP growth and the MRO rate (see rows 3, 5
and 6). In addition, an index measuring policy uncertainty in EU countries emerges as
15The number of lags (p) for the endogenous and exogenous variables is set to four, the same number
of lags as used for the benchmark VAR.
16Sims (1980) suggests using a correction equal to the number of regressors in each unrestricted
equation in the system. In the present case, the correction equals (n+m)p = 20.
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Table 3.4: Robustness tests for the predictive power of the CISS
testing for block exogeneity w.r.t.
CISS control variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
control variable 2(12) p-value 2(12) p-value
(1)  30.46 0.00 n.a. n.a.
(2) commodity price index 31.96 0.00 57.11 0.00
(3) Consensus ination forecast 29.19 0.00 29.68 0.00
(4) unemployment rate 26.10 0.01 12.23 0.43
(5) Consensus real GDP forecast 26.41 0.01 12.75 0.39
(6) business climate index 23.83 0.02 24.92 0.02
(7) policy uncertainty index 20.52 0.06 25.50 0.01
(8) bank loans 33.74 0.00 32.77 0.00
(9) e¤ective euro exchange rate 34.92 0.00 15.44 0.22
(10) 10-year government bond yield 29.09 0.00 5.42 0.94
(11) term spread 29.40 0.00 6.96 0.86
(12) BBB corporate bond spread 21.68 0.04 27.26 0.01
(13) high yield corporate bond spread 27.61 0.01 27.40 0.01
(14) option-implied stock volatility 16.72 0.16 19.93 0.07
a signicant predictor, but it reduces the explanatory power the CISS only marginally
(row 7). Regarding nancial variables, growth in bank loans to the non-nancial sector,
corporate bond spreads, and implied stock market volatility (VSTOXX) are also found
to have a strong marginal predictive power which, again, does not a¤ect the power of
the CISS substantially (see rows 8, 12, 13 and 14).17 No independent predictive power
for our core model variables is found for the unemployment rate, Consensus real GDP
growth forecasts, the euro e¤ective exchange rate, the 10-year government bond yield
and the term spread (rows 4, 5, 9, 10 and 11), which all leave the predictive power of
the CISS basically una¤ected.
17The case of the VSTOXX may appear di¤erent, though, since the p-value of the block exogeneity
test with respect to the CISS increases to 16%. However, within the full benchmark VAR, the CISS
clearly retains its predictive power when including the VSTOXX with a p-value of the block exogeneity
test of 0.001. In addition, when testing for block exogeneity of the core variables with respect to the
VSTOXX without including the CISS, the VSTOXX turns out to be statistically insignicant even at
the 10% level. Its predictive power seems to depend on the presence of the CISS. In general, the fact
that the block exogeneity zero restrictions cannot be rejected for both variables when the VSTOXX is
included along with the CISS, may also point at problems of multicollinearity.
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Performing the same exercise for the full benchmark VAR model, i.e. adding the
ECB balance sheet growth rate and the EONIA-MRO rate spread to the set of core
model variables, reveals an even more robust predictive power of the CISS. In that case,
all block exogeneity tests of these ve variables with respect to the CISS, and conditional
on a specic control variable, can be rejected even at the 1% signicance level.
The two sets of block exogeneity tests reported in Table 3.4 can be interpreted as
tests of two conditions for spurious causality as dened in Defnition 5. Assume that
y1 is still the CISS, y2 is now a three-dimensional vector including P, GDP and MRO,
and y3 represents a control variable. Recall the rst condition stated in Denition 5:
2(y2jY ) = 2(y2jY   Y1) < 2(y2jY   Y3) < 2(y2jY   Y1   Y3). The entry in row (1)
and column (1) in Table 3.4 conrms that the latter part of this condition is fullled,
namely that the CISS has signicant predictive power for the core model variables when
no control variable is used (the information set is restricted to Y   Y3). However, the
rst part of the condition is clearly violated for all control variables (individually) since
the CISS retains its predictive power for the core variables when adding lags of one
control variable at a time to the list of regressors, i.e. when expanding the information
set from Y  Y3 to Y . We obtain 2(y2jY ) < 2(y2jY  Y1), which says that the CISS is
found to be directly causal for the block of core variables conditional on the expanded
information set. Hence, we can rule out spurious causality of the CISS relative to this
specic set of control variables without having to test further restrictions implied in
Denition 5.
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3.5 Results II: Monetary policy and nancial instability
The literature distinguishes between systematic and unsystematic monetary policy. The
former describes that part of the variation in a monetary policy instrument which re-
ects policy makerssystematic responses to variations in the state of the economy. This
systematic component is typically formalised with the concept of a feedback rule, or re-
action function. In general such a rule associates the policy instrument St in a systematic
way, i.e. via a general function f(:), with certain data collected in the information set t
which shall represent policy makersknowledge about the past, current and future state
of the economy available to them when setting the policy instrument at time t. But not
all variations in central bank policy can be accounted for as a systematic reaction to
the state of the economy. The unaccounted variation is formalised with the notion of an
exogenous monetary policy shock ust .
18 Such a shock arises, rst, when a change in the
policy instrument is either under or overestimated on the basis of available information
or, second, when the instrument is not changed although data updates on the state of
the economy would have called for a policy action according to the policy rule f(t).
In each period of time, the policy instrument can now be expressed as the sum of its
systematic and unsystematic components (Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans 1999):
St = f(t) + u
s
t :
In the present case, St can be either the MRO rate, the ECBs main conventional or
standard monetary policy instrument, or the growth rate in total assets of the ECBs
balance sheet which is meant to capture the ECBs unconventional or non-standard
18For an economic interpretation of such shocks see Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999) who
describe possible sources of exogenous variations in monetary policy, such as (i) exogenous shocks to the
preferences of the monetary authority (for instance due to stochastic shifts in the relative weight given
to certain data which, in turn, could reect shocks to the preferences of the members of the decision-
making body), or to the weights by which their views are aggregated; (ii) strategic considerations with
respect to the policy expectations held by private economic agents; and (iii) technical factors, e.g.
measurement errors in the preliminary data available to policy makers at the time they make their
decisions, a point raised by Bernanke and Mihov (1998).
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monetary policy stance. Within the benchmark structural VAR framework, the reaction
function f(t) is a linear projection of the policy instruments on p lags of all endogenous
variables as well as according to the structural identication as summarised in Equation
3.3 on the time t realisations of ination, real GDP growth and the CISS.19
It is important to note that in the present context such estimated policy rules or
reaction functions are mere descriptions of how the policy instruments are set in response
to economic variables. They are not to be interpreted as rules in a prescriptive, normative
sense (Taylor 1999). Accordingly, what I do in the remainder of this section is to describe
whether and how the ECB reacted in a systematic fashion with its conventional and
unconventional monetary policy instruments to changes in the state of the economy,
with a particular focus on the state of nancial (in)stability as measured by the CISS
indicator. I also assess the estimated e¤ects of the two di¤erent types of monetary
policy shocks, but I do not aim to draw normative conclusions as to whether the ECBs
monetary policy over the sample perdiod has been optimal or not in any particular sense.
3.5.1 Conventional monetary policy
The ECBs framework to implement monetary policy aims to steer very short-term
market interest rates in line with the Governing Councils preferences as revealed, among
other things, in the setting of its main policy rates. In the pre-crisis period, up to
October 2008, the ECB geared its main renancing operations (MRO) towards neutral
liquidity conditions so that the EONIA rate stayed relatively close to the MROminimum
bid rate.20 The marginal lending facility rate and the deposit facility rate provide the
19For the balance sheet instrument the contemporaneous MRO rate is also treated as predetermined.
20The weekly MROs were based on a variable rate tender until October 2008, with a minimum bid
rate equal to the interest rate below which the Eurosystem would not accept any bids. Thereafter, a
xed rate tender procedure was introduced and the minimum bid rate became the rate at which all
bids were alloted (ECB 2014).
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Figure 3.3: Key ECB policy rates and the overnight interbank rate
upper and lower bounds, respectively, of an e¤ective interest rate corridor which limits
uctuations of the EONIA. Since the meltdown of the global nancial system in October
2008, the ECB moved to tender operations with xed rate full allotments, creating
conditions of excess liquidity such that the EONIA was no longer steered towards the
MRO rate but, instead, moved closer to the ECBs deposit facility rate (see Figure 3.3).
But the MRO rate still represents a key policy rate not least because it continues to
determine the cost at which banks usually obtain central bank liquidity from the ECB.
As alluded to above, the fourth equation of the reduced-form benchmark VAR may
be interpreted as a backward-looking variant of the ECBs reaction function, in the
sense that it is implicitly assumed that the MRO rate is determined only on the basis
of past information about the VAR variables. The direct causality tests reported in
Table 3.2 suggest that this standard policy tool reacts directly to past real GDP growth
and the lagged EONIA-MRO rate spread (apart from own lags) according to the 5%
signicance level; at a 10% level, responses to lagged ination and past realisations of
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the CISS would also become signicant. Furthermore, the outcome of the structural
identication indicated that the MRO rate reacts directly to contemporaneous ination
and output growth (see the fourth row of the A-matrix in Equation 3.3).21 However,
we have also shown that the MRO rate reacts indirectly to nancial stress via changes
in the economic outlook which, in turn, are further transmitted to the monetary policy
rate through their impact on ination and money market interest rate conditions.22
The net e¤ects of all direct and indirect transmission channels are again summarised
in the IRFs and the FEVD pertaining to the MRO rate. Overall, the outcome from
these exercises conrm the results of the partial analysis of the policy rate reaction
function. The panels in the fourth row of Figure 3.1 and the variance decomposition
for the MRO rate as shown in Table 3.1 suggest that shocks in all variables except
the ECB balance sheet exert a sizeable impact on the policy rate. For instance, in
response to a positive aggregate supply shock, the policy rate is rst kept stable for a
couple of months before it is gradually reduced in parallel with the onsetting decline
in economic activity. Aggregate demand shocks, in contrast, seem to trigger quicker
policy responses than supply shocks as revealed in the much stronger contribution to
the forecast error variance of the MRO rate at a one-year horizon. As highlighted in the
previous section, unexplained increases in nancial stress lead to a gradually stronger
easing of conventional monetary policy down the road. Eventually, CISS innovations add
14% to the forecast error variance of the MRO rate 24-month-ahead, which is basically
identical to the contributions from aggregate supply and demand shocks. Only own
shocks (23%) and shocks in the EONIA-MRO rate spread (27%) obtain a larger share
over this horizon. The persistent hump-shaped response pattern to own shocks may
21In the present context contemporaneousinformation ignores the issue of publication lags in order
to simplify the analysis.
22The absence of direct causality may suggest that the CISS is unlikely to emerge as a signicant ex-
planatory variable in estimated augmented (dynamic) Taylor rules if endogeneity issues are not properly
dealt with.
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indicate a preference for interest rate smoothing on the side of the ECB in line with the
empirical ndings from the general literature on Taylor-like interest rate rules. The MRO
rate responds very strongly to shocks in its spread against the EONIA rate, with positive
spread innovations giving rise to gradual increases in the policy rate. This response
pattern is likely to reect market participantsanticipatory behaviour concerning future
developments in monetary policy rates as mirrored in tighter current interbank liquidity
conditions.
Given that own shocks explain less than one forth of the medium-term forecast error
variance of the MRO rate, and given that the explanatory power and the direction
of the impact of the other endogenous variables on the MRO rate are signicant and
in line with theoretical predictions, one may argue that the few endogenous variables
included in the benchmark VAR already capture reasonably well the information about
the state of the economy and the nancial system to which the Governing Council of
the ECB reacted on average with its interest rate policy. In particular, monetary policy
makers did not only take into account latest developments in ination and output, as
well as market anticipations about future policy, when deciding about the path of its
policy rates, but they also seemed to react in a systematic fashion, though indirectly,
to nancial stress conditions. This indirect lagged policy reaction seems to reect some
genuine information contained in the CISS about the expected course of the economy, i.e.
information which is not reected in the concurrent dynamics of typical macroeconomic
state variables like ination, output and some of the control variables. In addition, in
times of severe nancial stress such as it ocurred in the context of the U.S. terrorist
attacks in September 2001 and in the aftermath of the Lehman debacle in September
2008 the ECB like other central banks may have eased its interest rate policy beyond
what would have been commanded by the immediate outlook for output and ination23;
23See Baxa, Horvath and Vasicek (2013).
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it may have done so in order to preserve nancial stability and thus to fend o¤ tail risks
to price stability over the medium term.
Such adjustments of monetary policy rates to emerging nancial disruptions are a
common nding in the literature. For instance, Bekaert and Hoerova (2014) decompose
the VIX index, an equity-implied volatility measure, into a risk and an uncertainty
component. In principle, both components capture certain symptoms of nancial stress,
but they nd that standard Taylor-rule residuals are particularly strongly correlated
with the uncertainty component. Adrian, Moench and Shin (2010) estimate a macro
risk premium by combining certain spreads from xed income securities (term spread,
credit spreads) that perform well in predicting real economic activity. They show that
this risk premium is closely associated with the balance sheet growth of broker dealers
and shadow banks in particular, which are therefore interpreted as measures of nancial
intermediary risk appetite. They nally document within a VAR framework that the
degree of risk appetite measured this way helps predict real GDP growth, but also the
federal funds target rate, and that the funds target rate, in turn, partly determines the
future level of risk appetite. This interdependency might o¤er an interesting channel for
preemptive monetary policy geared towards achieving both macroeconomic and nancial
stability. Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012) measure strains in the U.S. nancial system
by the excess bond premium which is derived from a decomposition of a corporate
credit spread index and which likely captures variations in the average price of bearing
corporate credit risk. They nd that adverse shocks in this measure of nancial stress
cause substantial negative consequences for future economic activity, and that the federal
funds rate declines signicantly in response to such shocks as well. It is argued that the
excess bond premium provides a timely gauge of the e¤ective risk aversion of the nancial
sector, and that increases in risk aversion lead to a decline in asset prices, a contraction
in the general supply of credit and, consequentially, to a slowdown in economic activity
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and lower ination. In Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2011), the authors demonstrate that
a central bank that augments a standard Taylor rule with a credit spread dampens
the negative consequences of nancial disruptions on real economic activity without
materially compromsing on its ination objective, a nding similar to that of Curdia
and Woodford (2010).
The cumulated policy rate shocks provide an estimate of the overall policy stance
prevailing over certain periods.24 Figure 3.4 plots the sum of the structural MRO rate
shocks from the benchmark VAR (the grey shaded area around the zero line) together
with the MRO rate over the entire sample period. I o¤er the following cautious interpre-
tation of these facts.25 With the swift and strong reduction of the MRO rate (to a then
new low of 1%) in response to the fallout from the Lehman default, the ECB was able
to maintain a roughly neutral policy stance until about mid-2010. Subsequently, and
despite the fact that policy rates were held constant, the improvement in the economic
outlook and the lower levels of stress produced a relatively easy monetary policy stance
(i.e. negative shock sums) which the ECB partly corrected with its two rate hikes in
April and July 2011. In response to the intensication of the sovereign debt crisis in
the summer of 2011 and the ensuing deterioration in economic activity and declining
ination, the ECB gradually lowered the MRO rate to a mere 0.25% by December 2013.
This notwithstanding, the overall easing stance gradually vanished and remained at a
neutral level throughout 2013. Apparently, the ECBs conventional monetary policy
24This interpretation assumes that the MRO rate predicted by the lagged endogenous variables ap-
proximates a short-term equilibrium rate. Positive or negative deviations of the actual MRO rate from
that short-term neutral rate therefore determine whether the policy stance is contractionary or expan-
sionary, respectively. A long-run natural interest rate could be computed from the steady-state solution
of the VAR model.
25This interpretation is subject to several caveats. For instance, the regression format restricts the
overall sum of shocks to be equal to zero. Hence, the procedure implicitly assumes that on average the
policy stance is neutral. In addition, whether the cumulated policy shocks can represent the prevailing
overall policy stance also depends on the appropriate choice of the starting date of the cumulation.
Since the cumulated shock series starts at a value of zero, the starting date should coincide with a
period in which the policy stance can be considered as neutral. In the present case, I let the summation
start at the earliest possible date.
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Figure 3.4: Measuring the stance of conventional monetary policy
became constrained by the zero lower bound towards the end of the sample period.
I also compute structural MRO rate shocks from a VAR augmented by three control
variables which prove signicant when being added to the MRO rate equation, namely
the annual log change in the e¤ective euro exchange rate, the BBB non-nancial cor-
porate bond spread and the business climate index. The series of the resulting shock
cumulant is plotted as the black solid line in Figure 3.4. In general, the sums of shocks
from the benchmark and the augmented VAR are rather similar. This notwithstand-
ing, the cumulated shocks from the benchmark VAR would suggest a more pronounced
easing stance in the years immediately preceding the outbreak of the nancial crisis in
August 2007. In contrast, since the height of the crisis in late 2008, the two series paint
a rather similar picture of the monetary policy stance.
Finally, I ask which e¤ects are brought about by the ECBs conventional monetary
policy. This question can be addressed by looking at the dynamic responses of the
benchmark VAR variables to structural MRO rate shocks plotted in the fourth column
of Figure 3.1. A one-standard deviation shock in the MRO rate (about 8 basis points)
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rst moderately increases real GDP growth before the e¤ect turns negative after about
a year. There is no signicant impact on ination over a two-year horizon, and the
dynamic e¤ects on the ECBs balance sheet growth rate and the EONIA-MRO rate
spread are likewise negligible. However, policy rate shocks exert rather signicant e¤ects
on nancial stress. For instance, when the ECB lowers the MRO rate by surprise,the
CISS also declines, indicating that policy easing in times of heightened nancial stress
helps to reduce these very strains. Over a two-year horizon, shocks in the policy rate
contribute about 20% to the prediction error variance of the CISS.
3.5.2 Unconventional monetary policy
During the various stages of the nancial crisis, the ECB like many other major central
banks implemented several non-standard policy measures with the ultimate aim of
mitigating the risk of further adverse consequences of the crisis on the macroeconomy
and its policy objectives. The non-standard measures deployed to achieve this goal
di¤ered across economic areas, though, since they generally served di¤erent specic
purposes tailored to the specic circumstances prevailing in the respective economies at
each point in time.
The measures adopted by the ECB were generally designed to support the mone-
tary policy transmission process in a context of dysfunctional markets. The ECB has
thus interpreted its non-standard measures as complements to its standard interest rate
policy, complements which are necessary to ensure that standard policy can have its
intended e¤ects. Several measures were designed to address a crisis phenomenon which
was specic to the euro area, namely the emergence of nancial fragmentation along na-
tional borders (Curé 2013). The fragmention of nancial markets inhibited a smooth
and uniform transmission of conventional monetary policy impulses across the di¤erent
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member states which further aggravated arising divergences between the cost of funding
for banks, sovereigns and, ultimately, also private rms and households across di¤erent
euro area countries.26
In order to counter impairments of the transmission process which were rooted in
the money market, the ECB decided in October 2008 to conduct all liquidity-providing
operations through a xed rate tender procedure with full allotment. This measure
insured that banksliquidity needs were fully accommodated subject to the availability of
su¢ cient eligible collateral. The de facto endogenous determination of banksrenancing
at a given policy rate resulted in a rst marked expansion of the ECB balance sheet
(see Figure 3.5). Later on, the ECB also lengthened the maturity of its long-term
renancing operations (LTROs) rst to six months (February 2009), then to one year
(June 2009), and nally, to three years (December 2011), which helped to stabilise the
ECBs total assets at higher levels. In order to address market fragmention in securities
markets, the ECB also started purchasing bank bonds within two covered bonds purchase
programmes (CBPP and CBPP2), and certain government bonds under the Securities
Markets Programme (SMP). Last but not least, in September 2012 the ECB announced
the modalities of its Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme, which was
likewise geared towards reducing the wide dispersion in government bond yields and,
thus, in overall credit conditions across member states. The OMT, however, has not let
to an expansion of the ECB balance sheet since there has been no need to activate the
programme. Apparently, its announcement shortly after the well-known whatever it
takesspeech by the ECBs president in which he expressed the Eurosystems resolve to
cope with the sovereign debt crisis (Draghi 2012) su¢ ced to bring about much of the
desired e¤ects (see Altavilla, Giannone and Lenza 2014).27
26In Ho¤mann, Kremer and Zaharia (2015), we propose a price-based composite indicator of nancial
integration in the euro area (FINTEC) that documents a strong price dispersion across euro area
countries which took hold of all major market segments during the crisis.
27This list of unconventional monetary policy measures by the ECB is not exhaustive. See various
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Figure 3.5: Measuring the stance of unconventional monetary policy
In contrast, most of the other non-standard policy measures had in common that
they contributed to an expansion of the ECB balance sheet when being implemented. It
may thus make sense to assess the overall stance of the ECBs unconventional monetary
policy on the basis of the size of its balance sheet as measured by total assets, an idea
also pursued in Gambacorta, Hofmann and Peersman (2014) and Boeckx, Dossche and
Peersman (2014). Indeed, throughout the crisis, total asset growth and nancial stress
as measured by the CISS displayed a close correlation (see Figure 3.6).28
This correlation between the CISS and the ECBs balance sheet growth also holds
up in the benchmark VAR as already demonstrated in Section 3.4. The exclusion F -
tests established strong evidence in favour of direct causality of the CISS for ECB total
assets. In addition, this predictive power of the CISS is robust to the inclusion of my
set of control variables. Apart from the CISS, only ination and own lags emerged
as signicant direct drivers of changes in the size of the ECBs balance sheet. The
structural shock identication further suggests that balance sheet growth also adjusts
issues of the ECB Monthly Bulletin for complete references.
28The correlation coe¢ cient between the (square root of the) CISS and annual growth in ECB total
assets is about 75% when computed for the sample August 2007 to December 2013. The correlation
over the entire sample period drops to 55%.
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Figure 3.6: ECB balance sheet growth and the CISS
to contemporaneous news on nancial stress, and unpredicted changes in the MRO
rate (see the fth row of the A-matrix in Equation 3.3). When incorporating indirect
e¤ects, we see that innovations in ination and real GDP growth also impact on ECB
total assets (see the panels in the fth row of Figure 3.1). This is not surprising, since
one would expect, at least in the long run, the central banks balance sheet to grow
in tandem with nominal economic activity. According to the FEVD, aggregate supply
shocks contribute 9%, aggregate demand shocks 19%, the CISS 33%, and own shocks
30%, to the 24-month-ahead prediction error in the annual growth of the ECB balance
sheet (see Table 3.1).
These results may allow the following interpretion. Under normal circumstances, the
ECB balance sheet breathes in sync with nominal economic activity. In times of more
severe nancial stress, however, it is more appropriate to think of the balance sheet in
terms of a behavioral policy reaction function with the ECB systematically and directly
responding to changing states of nancial instability.
The strong direct response of ECB balance sheet growth in conjunction with the
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indirect reaction of the MRO rate to variations in nancial stress may be viewed as
principally consistent with the ECBs declared intention throughout the crisis to keep
separate the motivations behind its standard and non-standard monetary policy mea-
sures (separation principle). While the interest rate policy shall be determined so as
to maintain price stability in the medium term, the non-standard policy measures aim to
ensure that dysfunctions in some nancial market segments do not disrupt the monetary
policy transmission process and, thus, do not counteract the standard monetary policy
measures (Constâncio 2011; Bordes and Clerc 2012). Accordingly, the policy rate may
generally not be expected to respond to changes in nancial stress per se, but only to
the anticipated consequences of nancial instability for the real economy. In contrast,
unconventional monetary policy can be expected to directly react to systemic nancial
stress as long as it signals certain impairements of the monetary transmission process.
However, as argued before, a direct response of monetary policy rates to observed nan-
cial stress may also, in principle, be justied on the grounds of identied material tail
risks to the medium-term price stability objective.
The stance of unconventional monetary policy can likewise be gauged by the cu-
mulated structural balance sheet shocks estimated from the benchmark VAR. Figure
3.5 plots this sum of shocks (the grey shaded area around the zero line) together with
actual growth in ECB total assets; for better readability the gure only covers the crisis
years.29 This gure may suggest that during the crisis period, ECB balance sheet shocks
were mostly expansionary (positive), consistent with the intentions of the implemented
non-standard measures. In 2011, however, the stance of non-standard monetary policy
turned signicantly negative, reecting to a large extent the lower levels of outstanding
LTROs which were not compensated by alternative non-standard measures.
29The idea for this chart is borrowed from Boeckx, Dossche and Peersman (2014) who, furthermore,
o¤er a detailed account of events related to ECB non-standard measures.
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The IRFs as plotted in the fth column of Figure 3.1 provide a yardstick to assess the
macroeconomic e¤ects of the ECBs balance sheet expansion. A positive one-standard
deviation shock in the rate of growth of total assets (around 4 percentage points) precedes
a mild immediate decline in ination. The e¤ects on real GDP are zero in the short-term,
but become signicantly positive after about a year. Over a two-year horizon, balance
sheet shocks contribute 11% to the forecast error variance of real GDP growth. The
overall impact on the CISS is negative, but not statistically signicant at conventional
levels. Boeckx, Dossche and Peersman (2014), who estimate a similar VAR model, nd
a hump-shaped response pattern for the log level of real GDP to a shock in total ECB
assets, which becomes strongest (and statistically signicant) after somewhat less than
a year.30 Interestingly, they nd that the CISS declines instantaneously in response to
an expansionary balance sheet shocks.
All in all, the empirical results seem to suggest that the ECBs unconventional mea-
sures only had moderate e¤ects on the real economy. It has to be taken into account,
however, that the reduced-form modeling approach of the transmission of unconven-
tional policy may omit essential factors that inuence the transmission process and the
environment in which specic interventions take place. For instance, Miles and Schanz
(2014) argue that the e¤ects of non-standard measures may hinge on the fact that they
are implemented in times of dysfunctional markets, stressing the episodical nature of
such interventions which may require the adoption of certain non-linear techniques such
as regime-switching models. In a similar vein, the estimation of the e¤ects of unconven-
tional policies within a linear VAR framework may su¤er from the fact that the true
counterfactual i.e. the state of the world which would have materialised in case a cer-
tain non-standard measure would not have been deployed might be far away from the
implied model dynamics under such a scenario due to the uniqueness of the non-standard
30Their VAR is estimated with Bayesian methods for a shorter sample that only covers the crisis and
the post-crisis years. They use sign restrictions to identify the structural innovations.
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measures, and the economic conditions in which they were implemented (Kapetanios,
Mumtaz, Stevens and Theodoridis 2012).
3.6 Caveats
Some general reservations have to be expressed concerning the empirical approach taken
in this paper. First, composite nancial stress indicators despite of all their merits
serve to represent a stylised, reduced-form approach to integrate nancial instability in
empirical macro-nancial models. It is desirable that such approaches are complemented
by a structural modeling of the main transmission channels through which systemic stress
may a¤ect macroeconomic dynamics (see, e.g., Boissay, Collard and Smets 2016). In
a similar vein, this paper also takes a highly stylised approach to estimate the e¤ects
of non-standard monetary policy measures by exclusively focusing on their impact on
the size of the ECBs balance sheet, and how the balance sheet correlates with a set of
macro variables, including nancial stress. Such an analysis may be subject to omitted
variables biases, among other things, and should therefore be likewise complemented by
studies analysing, in greater detail, the conditions in the particular markets in which
the interventions occured, to get an idea about their immediate impacts in the chain of
transmission (see, e.g., Beirne et al. 2012, and Eser and Schwaab 2016, on the ECBs
asset purchase programmes). This necessarily requires studying the e¤ects of changes
in the composition of the ECBs balance sheet, rather than its overall size.
Second, for the purpose of this paper, I assume that the dynamic interrelationships
between nancial stress and the macroeconomy can be meaningfully approximated by a
standard linear VAR, thereby ignoring potential non-linearities in the common dynamics
of our variables of interest, which may emerge, in particular, during states of nancial
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instability. For instance, Holló, Kremer and Lo Duca (2012) nd evidence for regime-
switching in the parameters of a bivariate threshold VAR estimated for the CISS and
industrial production growth in the euro area (see also Chapter 2 of this dissertation).
When the CISS surpasses its identied threshold or crisis level, the dynamic impact of
CISS shocks on output growth is found to be much stronger and statistically signicant
than in the alternative low-stress regime. In VAR models where the switches between
di¤erent coe¢ cient and/or variance regimes are governed by latent Markov processes,
similar state-dependent e¤ects of nancial stress on economic growth and other macro-
economic variables are found, inter alia, by Davig and Hakkio (2010) and Hubrich and
Tetlow (2015) for the United States, and by Hartmann, Hubrich, Kremer and Tetlow
(2015) (which is also Chapter 4 of this dissertation) for the euro area. Kapetanios,
Mumtaz, Stevens and Theodoridis (2012) estimate the e¤ects of quantitative easing on
the real economy in the UK by gauging the dynamic e¤ects of changes in the term
spread on ination and real GDP within VAR frameworks. They nd stronger e¤ects in
VARs which allow for coe¢ cient changes a Markov-switching VAR and a time-varying
parameter VAR compared to a linear VAR. Against this background, the absolute -
nancial stress e¤ects estimated from the full-sample linear VAR presented in this paper
may therefore serve as a lower bound of the e¤ects that one can expect to hold during
periods of severe nancial stress, and as an upper bound in normal times.
3.7 Conclusions
Financial crises are strongly disruptive events which implicate severe losses in economic
welfare if not contained by quick, resolute and often unconventional policy measures
imposed by public authorities, including central banks. In this paper, variations in the
state of nancial (in-)stability are measured by the CISS, a specic nancial stress in-
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dex which focuses on the systemic dimension of nancial strains. The empirical analysis
conrms a strong and robust role of the CISS as a key driver of macroeconomic devel-
opments in the euro area. It also suggests that the ECB reacted in a systematic way to
several bouts of nancial stress during the recent crisis by implementing standard and
non-standard monetary policy measures. Taken together, it seems that these comple-
mentary policy measures helped calm nancial stress, and thereby limit the real adverse
consequences of the crisis.
The empirical evidence available for other countries also nds, in general, a signi-
cant explanatory power of nancial stress indices for macroeconomic developments. It
may therefore represent a robust, though not yet widely known stylised fact in the empir-
ical macro-nancial literature. This notwithstanding, the literature is still inconclusive
about how best to cope with potential structural instabilities and/or non-linearities in
the macro-nancial linkages induced by emerging nancial frictions and market dysfunc-
tionalities during crisis times. A systematic comparison of the performance of alternative
methods such as regime-switching or time-varying parameter models vis-à-vis simple
linear frameworks therefore appears to be a valuable topic for future research.
98
CHAPTER 4
MELTING DOWN: SYSTEMIC FINANCIAL INSTABILITY AND THE
MACROECONOMY
Abstract: We investigate the role of systemic nancial instability in an
empirical macro-nancial model for the euro area, employing a richly speci-
ed Markov-Switching Vector Autoregression model to capture the dynamic
relationships between a set of core macroeconomic variables and a novel indi-
cator of systemic nancial stress. We nd that at times of systemic nancial
instability the macroeconomy functions fundamentally di¤erently from tran-
quil times. Not only the variances of the shocks, but also the parameters that
capture the transmission of shocks change regime, especially around times of
high systemic stress in the nancial system. In particular, nancial shocks
are larger and their e¤ects on real activity propagate much more strongly
during regimes of high systemic stress than during tranquil times. We nd
an economically important role of bank lending in the propagation of nan-
cial stress to the macroeconomy. We also show that prospects for detecting
high systemic stress episodes appear promising, although we argue that more
research is required. We conclude that macroprudential policy makers may
benet from taking these non-linearities into account.x
xThis chapter is based on joint work with Philipp Hartmann (ECB), Kirstin Hubrich and Robert J.
Tetlow (both Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System). We thank Geert Bekaert, Kristo¤er
Nimark, Harald Uhlig and participants at the O¢ ce of Financial Research/Financial Stability Over-
sight Council conference The Macroprudential Toolkit, Deutsche Bundesbank/Institute for Monetary
and Financial Stability/SUERF conference The ESRB at 1, a meeting of the ESCB Macroprudential
Research (MaRs) network, European Economic Association Meetings 2012, Bank of Canada seminar,
German Economic Association Conference 2013, Conference Systemic Risk, Financial Markets and
the Post-Crisis Economy in Nottingham 2013, Central Bank of Mexico Conference 2013, Erasmus
University Rotterdam Conference 2013, Stanford University Seminar 2013, ECB 2014 workshop, the
Financial Intermediation, Risk and Liquidity Workshop and the Time Series Analysis in Macroeco-
nomics and Finance Workshop at the Barcelona GSE Summer Forum 2014, ESCB Macroprudential
Research Network 2014 Conference, the 6th IFABS 2014 conference, the International Association of
Applied Econometrics 2014 conference and the NBER Summer Institute 2015 for useful comments.
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4.1 Introduction
Economic history has shown that nancial crises are regular, if infrequent, occurrences,
observed over extended periods of time, across a range of countries, encompassing a
variety of economic systems (Kindleberger, 1978; Reinhart and Rogo¤, 2009). Systemic
nancial crises crises that impair the overall functioning of nancial systems can have
particularly serious implications for economic growth and welfare; the recent nancial
crisis and the resulting great recession is just the latest example. In a systemic crisis, an
initial adverse shock a¤ects market functioning in broad classes of nancial institutions
and markets, so that it is propagated and amplied in a manner atypical of ordinary
business cycles.1 In particular, when nancial instability becomes widespread that is,
when it a¤ects many di¤erent nancial institutions and capital markets the nancial
and the real sector may enter into a pernicious feedback loop, aggravating systemic
stress. The resulting non-linearities and the professions still limited understanding of
the underlying forces pose signicant challenges for macroeconomic modeling, and for
crisis detection, at both the theoretical and empirical level. It is this notion of systemic
stress that underlines our thinking in this paper.
The theoretical literature has made progress recently in incorporating within macro
models, nancial instability and associated non-linearities. One strand of the literature
has investigated the origins and mechanisms that can lead to the extraordinary am-
plication and propagation of shocks through the economy; examples include He and
Krishnamurthy (2014) and Archaya et al. (2010) who analyse systemic risk with a focus
on nancial intermediaries.2
Vesela Ivanova and Cristina Manea provided excellent research assistance. The views expressed are
only the authorsand should not be associated with o¢ cial views of the European Central Bank, the
Eurosystem or the Federal Reserve Board.
1Bekaert, Engstrom and Xing (2009) describe how reassessments of the vulnerability of market
segments can be one source of nancial fragility.
2See also, e.g., Bianchi (2011), Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014), Martinez-Miera and Suarez
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Empirical contributions to modelling nancial instability and associated non-linearities
in the interaction with the macroeconomy have been scarce to date. The aim of the
present paper is to provide empirical evidence on the dynamic interaction of systemic
nancial instability and the macroeconomy in the euro area. To this end, we propose an
empirical framework that is designed to capture state-dependent changes in the joint dy-
namics of a core set of macroeconomic variables and a broad-based measure of systemic
nancial instability.
A feature of what we do is make use of the Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress
(CISS), recently developed at the European Central Bank by Holló, Kremer and Lo
Duca (2012) (see also Chapter 2 of this dissertation) as a measure of the state of sys-
temic nancial instability in the euro area. The CISS is particularly well suited for our
purposes. It captures the systemic dimension of nancial instability, rst, by encompass-
ing the main classes of nancial markets and intermediaries in a systematic fashion and,
second, by capturing time-varying dependence of stress between these major segments
of the nancial system.3 Of note is the inclusion within the CISS of nancial intermedia-
tion, which is likely to be important because of the more bank-centered nancial system
in the euro area, as compared to the United States where capital markets have a more
prominent role.
We embed the CISS together with a selection of macroeconomic variables in a
richly specied Markov-switching Vector Autoregression (MS-VAR) model. Our spec-
ication allows for independent regime shifts in the coe¢ cients of the model, and in
the variances of the model shocks. With this framework we explore ve central issues.
(2012), Boissay, Smets and Collard (2015), Adrian and Boyarchenko (2013), Goodhart et al. (2012)
and He and Krishnamurthy (2011). The article by de Bandt and Hartmann (2000) reviews the topic
of systemic risk, while de Bandt, Hartmann and Peydro (2010) updates the earlier article, but with a
focus on banking.
3See Illing and Liu (2006) and Kliesen, Owyang and Vermann (2012) for overviews of the construction
of nancial stress indexes as applied, in these cases, to the United States.
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First we uncover whether switching, as a driver of episodes of systemic stress, is conned
to the variances of shocks, or whether something more fundamental takes place, namely
switching in model coe¢ cients and thus the transmission of shocks. The answer to
this question is important for policy purposes, among other things, because it speaks to
whether or not policy interventions should be directed toward apprehending the source
of exogenous shocks, or whether inducing changes in the transmission mechanism need
to be considered. Second, we analyze whether any statistically signicant non-linearities
we nd are also economically important. Third, we explore the origins of our results; in
particular, we investigate whether certain features of our systemic stress indicator stand
out as important for our results, which then casts light on whether particular channels
in the nancial system are critical for spread of systemic distress. Fourth, we delve into
the critical role of bank lending as either the source of, or the propogation mechanism
for, uctuations in output. And fth, we assess whether our model could prove to be
useful for tracking systemic stress episodes in real time.4
We summarise our conclusions regarding these ve central issues as follows. First,
the macroeconomy functions fundamentally di¤erently in what we refer to as periods
of high systemic stress, as compared to more tranquil times. Both the coe¢ cients
and the variances of the identied shocks exhibit switching phenomena. It follows
from this observation that the standard, constant-coe¢ cient constant-variance model
would likely yield misleading results in these situations. Second, this regime switching is
economically important: the e¤ects of nancial stress shocks on output are much larger,
more persistent, and more consequential for the real economy in regimes of high systemic
stress than during tranquil times. Third, as part of an investigation of the contribution
of the CISS, we nd that alternative measures of nancial stress, in particular stock
4MS-VAR models have been used to assess structural changes in US monetary policy by Sims and
Zha (2006), and to examine the e¤ectiveness of monetary policy in periods of high nancial stress by
Hubrich and Tetlow (2015). See also Baele et al. (2012) and F. Bianchi (2014).
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market volatility and corporate bond spreads, produce regimes that do not track known
systemic stress episodes as well, and render dynamic properties that are less plausible
than our baseline results. We also show that the inclusion of cross-market correlations
and the nancial intermediation sector in the CISS are important. We conclude that
these ndings show the value added of several of the features of our measure of systemic
nancial stress. Fourth, we show that bank lending has an independent role for real
activity during episodes of high systemic stress. In particular, during such periods,
exogenous identied shocks to loan growth have important consequences for the rest
of the economy, whereas in tranquil times they do not. We argue that this result
likely reects binding credit constraints during high-stress periods. Fifth, as an initial
test of the e¢ cacy of the CISS as a possible aid to macroprudential policy, we also
compute the state probabilities for the regimes in real time, and nd few false positives.
This suggests to us that the model has at least some potential for nowcasting systemic
instability although further investigation using real-time data would be welcome.
This paper is related to the empirical literature on the real e¤ects of nancial distress
and crises. Early contributions on the Great Depression and the 1990s US credit crunch
include Bernanke (1983) and Bernanke and Lown (1991), respectively. More recently,
Barkbu, Eichengreen and Mody (2012), and Schularick and Taylor (2014) measure,
among other things, the output cost of crises for a set of countries, taking a longer-term
historical perspective. These previous contributions employ linear models, in contrast to
the non-linear model framework that we use here. Studies that investigate the predictive
power of systemic stress measures for economic activity, also using linear models, include
Allen, Bali and Tang (2012), and Giglio et al. (2012). Dovern and van Roye (2014) use
a nancial stress index to examine some of the same issues as we do here, but conne
themselves to linear vector autogressive models. Apart from the non-linear framework
that we employ here, we also investigate the role of bank lending in the connection
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between nancial shocks and real activity.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the econometric
methodology behind our model and details the main features of the systemic stress
indicator as well as the macroeconomic variables used. Section 3 presents the empirical
results, including the smoothed probabilities of states in shock variances and coe¢ cients,
impulse responses to a nancial stress shock, counterfactual analyses, explorations of the
role of bank lending in the episodes of systemic stress, and the estimated real-time state
probabilities. Section 4 compares our main results with those obtained with alternative
measures of nancial stress such as aggregate stock market volatility and corporate
spreads, as well as results using di¤erent variants of the CISS. Section 5 o¤ers some
summary remarks as well as our conclusions.
4.2 The model and data
Several choices have to be taken at the initial stage of model specication. First, we
need a exible econometric model framework that can accommodate systemic stress
episodes and allow for discrete shifts in economic dynamics. Second, we need a measure
of systemic nancial instability that ably captures the spreading of nancial stress across
markets and institutions. Third, the variables that ll out the rest of the model have to
be representative of macroeconomic dynamics in general and interactions between the
macro economy and nancial stability in particular. And fourth, the model needs to be
identied. We discuss each of these topics, in turn, in the next four subsections.
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4.2.1 Non-linear multivariate model framework
An important feature of our analysis is the application of an econometric framework that
allows to investigate empirically whether the macroeconomy fundamentally changes its
functioning when systemic nancial stress emerges or disappears. In particular, we ask
whether specic non-linearities, in the form of regime switches in the dynamics of and
the relationships between key macroeconomic variables, can be empirically identied.
For this purpose we apply a richly specied Markov-switching VAR model that can
estimate discrete changes in the economic dynamics. Our specic MS-VAR framework
distinguishes between two independent sources of regime switching, namely, shifts in the
variances of shocks and shifts in the economic structure that transmits those shocks.
There are alternatives to using an MS-VAR model; the two that come immediately
to mind are time-varying parameter (TVP) models and threshold models. TVP mod-
els, like MS-VAR models, allow for time variation in parameters or shocks, or both, but
typically model that variation as drifting coe¢ cients. Our use of the MS-VAR modeling
framework reects our understanding of the nature of systemic nancial stress and its ef-
fects on macroeconomic dynamics; systemic nancial stress, almost by denition, tends
to involve discretely non-linear or non-Gaussian e¤ects, either in the nancial sector
itself, or in their macroeconomic consequences, or both.5 As such, the MS-VAR frame-
work seems like a natural choice. Threshold models, like MS-VAR models, can allow
for discrete shifts in parameters (or in the distributions of shocks), but the researcher
is obliged to prespecify a threshold variable. Given the wide range of stories that have
been advanced concerning the origins and propagation of nancial events, it seems rea-
sonable to us to avoid such prespecication. Our modeling choices notwithstanding, we
would not argue that there are no insights to be gleaned from TVP or threshold models
5Sims, Waggoner and Zha (2008) note that by expanding the number of Markov states in coe¢ cients
the MS-VAR model can approximate, at least in principle, a TVP model.
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in this context, although the particular questions under study might di¤er in some ways.
Estimation of and statistical inference from the MS-VAR model rests on recently
developed Bayesian methods that have made feasible the estimation and inference for
richly parameterised models; see Sims and Zha (2006) and Sims, Waggoner and Zha
(2008). Some details on the relevant techniques are provided in the Appendix B.
We consider (possibly) non-linear vector stochastic processes of the following form:
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where yt is an n  1 vector of endogenous variables; smt ; m = v; c are unobservable
(latent) state variables, associated with di¤erent regimes for error variances, v, and for
intercepts and slope coe¢ cients, c. l is the VARs lag length. zt is a matrix of exogenous
variables, which we are setting to a column vector of constants 1n, i.e. one intercept
per equation. A0(sct) is an n  n matrix of parameters6 describing contemporaneous
relationships between the elements of yt, C(sct) is an 1  n vector of parameters of the
exogenous variables and Aj(sct) is a n n matrix of parameters of the endogenous vari-
ables and T is the sample size. "t is the n1 vector of the random shocks. The diagonal
n n matrix  1(svt ) contains the standard deviations of "t. "0t 1(svt ) represents the
structural shocks. The values of smt are elements of f1; 2; :::hmg and evolve according to
a rst-order Markov process with the following state probabilities:
Pr(smt = ijsmt 1 = k) = pmik; i; k = 1; 2; :::hm:
Let us designate Yt = fy0; y1; :::ytg as the vector y stacked in the time dimension. We
assume that "t is conditionally standard normal:
p("tjYt 1; St; Aj)  N(0n1; In):
6Note that we impose identifying restrictions such that A0 is triangular.
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The variance-covariance matrix (smt ) of the correlated reduced-form regression errors
can be recovered as follows:7
(smt ) = (A0(s
c
t)
2(svt )A
0
0(s
c
t))
 1: (4.2)
Since the matrix A0 varies across coe¢ cient regimes sct , the number of regimes of the
correlated shocks obtains as a multiple of the number of variance regimes of the structural
shocks svt since coe¢ cients and variances are assumed to switch independently of each
other.
4.2.2 Systemic stress indicator
To be suitable, a systemic stress indicator must have several attributes. First, as the
word stress suggests, it needs to capture not just activity or even disruption in the -
nancial sector, but stresses that might be of concern to market participants and policy
makers. Second, as the word systemic indicates, it should ideally distinguish between
stress that is germane to a single or small subset of markets and thus not of concern
to the system as a whole or its regulators and stress that has the potential to spread
through the entire system. It is presumably when stress is widespread that it has im-
plications for the broader macroeconomy. Indeed, a conventional denition of systemic
risk is that it is (...) the risk that nancial instability becomes so widespread that it
impairs the functioning of a nancial system to the point where economic growth and
welfare su¤er materially (ECB 2010). Third, as the word indicator suggests, the can-
didate measure of systemic stress needs to be timely in the marking of stress episodes,
reliably identifying events of potential concern to market participants and policy makers,
preferably in real time.
7See Sims, Waggoner and Zha (2008), p. 265.
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We will argue that the Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress (CISS) developed
by Holló, Kremer and Lo Duca (2012) ably fullls the roles of a good systemic stress
indicator, as just described. Our discussion of the CISS will be brief by necessity; readers
interested in more details are invited to consult Holló, Kremer and Lo Duca (2012) or
Chapter 2 of this dissertation.
First of all, the scope of the CISS is broad, comprising ve aggregate market segments
covering the main channels by which the funds of savers are reallocated to borrowers,
whether those funds are channeled directly through capital markets or indirectly through
nancial intermediaries. These segments include: (1) nancial intermediaries; (2) money
markets; (3) bond markets; (4) equity markets; and (5) foreign exchange markets. Each
of the ve market segments is populated with three representative stress indicators that
are generally recognised as excellent proxies of fundamental risks and market disruptions,
such as spreads, volatilities and market return correlations (see Table 2.1 for a precise
description of the data). Aggregation of each set of three constituent stress measures
after appropriate transformation to harmonise their scale and variances results in ve
segment-specic subindexes of nancial stress.
The way the subindexes are aggregated into a composite indicator is the main in-
novative feature of the CISS. In the same way that portfolio risk is computed from
individual asset risks, the subindexes are aggregated by taking into account the time-
varying (rank)-correlations between them. This time variation in the correlations means
that relatively more weight is applied to components during periods in which stress
prevails in several market segments at the same time. Thus, the CISS is designed to
capture what might be called the epidemiology of risk, meaning the way in which in-
stability in one market infects other markets, leading to widespread and possibly severe
nancial instability with systemic implications.
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For a plot of the composite indicator, as constructed from euro area data, see Figure
2.6 in Chapter 2. As can be seen, the largest spikes in the indicator coincide with
well-known nancial stress episodes, such as the 1987 stock market crash, the 1992
crisis of the European exchange rate mechanism, the 1998 Russian debt default and
associated Long Term Capital Management crisis, as well as the nancial stress around
the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001.8 More recently, the nancial crisis stands
out in comparison with previous stress events in terms of both the level reached, in the
wake of the September 2008 bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, and in the duration of
high readings.
4.2.3 Other variables and data sources
Since MS-VAR models allowing for regime changes in all coe¢ cients and shock variances
even with a moderate number of di¤erent regimes require estimation of a large number of
parameters, we opt for a model with ve endogeneous variables. Three of them represent
standard variables in the macro VAR literature, namely industrial production growth as
a measure of economic activity, consumer price ination and a short-term interest rate,
where the latter may capture short-term funding costs in the economy but also proxies
for conventional monetary policy. These variables form the backbone of any stylised
empirical representation of standard macroeconomic models (for an overview see, e.g.,
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans 1999).
The set of endogenous variables is completed by adding the CISS and the growth
rate in nominal bank loans to the private sector. The latter choice can be generally
motivated by the strong role that bank lending played in the most severe nancial crises
8See Hollo, Kremer and Lo Duca (2012) for a more extensive coverage of historical stress events
which coincide with peaks in the CISS. The review article by de Bandt and Hartmann (2000) describes
methods for measuring systemic risk.
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in history; e.g. Schularick and Taylor (2012). It can also be justied by the relatively
large share of bank loans in the overall nancing of the euro area economy.
The data sample runs from January 1987 to December 2010. Industrial production
(IP), consumer price ination (based on the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices,
HICP; P ) and nominal bank loans to the private sector (Ln) are expressed in year-
on-year percentage log changes of seasonally-adjusted monthly data for the euro area
as a whole. The short-term interest rate (R) is represented by the three-month Euribor
(Euro InterBank O¤ered Rate) and measured as monthly averages of daily data. All
four series are taken from ECB data bases. The CISS data (S) are monthly averages of
weekly data and are taken from Holló, Kremer and Lo Duca (2012).
4.2.4 Structural model identication
The contemporaneous relationships between the endogenous variables as reected in
the Matrix A0 are identied on the basis of a triangular representation analogue to the
well-known Cholesky decomposition often used in structural VAR applications.9
The conventional ordering in the macro VAR literature places the short-term interest
rate last, implicitly assuming that monetary policy may react simultaneously to shocks
in the other variables while no other variable is allowed to respond contemporaneously
to monetary policy shocks.10 In our structural identication setup, we maintain this
basic assumption and place the short-term interest rate right after industrial production
growth and ination. However, we order the short-term rate before loan growth assum-
ing that banks can adjust their lending activity quickly to monetary policy innovations.
9In triangular identication schemes the ordering of the variables determines the contemporane-
ous causality structure. For instance, the variable ordered rst is assumed to be contemporaneously
uncorrelated to all other variables.
10See e.g. Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999).
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Finally, we order the CISS last such that output, ination, interest rate and loan shocks
can all have contemporaneous e¤ects on nancial stress, while systemic nancial insta-
bility (CISS) shocks are restricted to a¤ect the rest of the economy only with a lag. This
ordering reects the conventional practice in the recent VAR literature of allowing as-
set price variables to respond instantaneously to shocks in usually more sluggish macro
variables such as output and ination. The variables thus enter the model in the fol-
lowing order: output growth (IP ), ination (P ), interest rate (R), loans (Ln) and
the CISS (S). Our main results turn out to be qualitatively robust to di¤erent variable
orderings, however.11 In what follows we thus present results only for the above ordering
which constitutes the most conservative estimates for the issue we are most interested
in, namely the link between systemic nancial instability and the real economy.12
4.3 Systemic stress, regimes and nancial crises
4.3.1 Model estimation and evaluation
The ve-variable structural MS-VARmodel in Equation (4.1) is estimated with Bayesian
methods using three lags.13 We employ a blockwise optimisation algorithm to estimate
11In particular, when placing the CISS rst in the order (followed by interest rates, output growth,
ination and loan growth) such that all shocks in nancial stress become exogenous to the contempo-
raneous shocks in the other model variables (assuming, e.g., that output and monetary policy can react
simultaneously to surging nancial stress), the impulse response functions still convey the same basic
messages. The same robustness result holds true when switching the order between bank loan growth
and the interest rate (allowing short-term rates to react immediately to lending innovations).
12We also carried out several other sensitivity analyses, which again turned out immaterial for our
main ndings. For instance, we replaced the three-month Euribor by the monthly average EONIA
(Euro OverNight Index Average) rate, where the latter substitution takes account of the fact that
banks liquidity and counterparty risk considerations drove a large wedge between both rates during
certain episodes of the recent crisis. Results not displayed in the paper are available from the authors
upon request.
13A model with a lag length of 12 provides similar results in terms of the real e¤ects of a nancial
stress shock reported later.
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the posterior mode. In a rst step, parameters are divided into blocks and the resulting
initial guesses for the parameters are used in a hill-climbing quasi-Newton routine. At
candidate maximum points, we subject the estimator to random perturbations thus
generating starting values from which the optimisation process is restarted in order to
assure that the estimated posterior mode we obtain is indeed the most likely estimate.14
Our modeling framework allows for two independent Markov chains, one govern-
ing the structural error variances, and the other determining the dynamic interactions
between the model variables as reected in the model parameters. To determine our pre-
ferred specication, we employ a mixture of criteria, two statistical and one economic.
Our rst and most important statistical criteria is goodness of t as determined by com-
parison of the logarithm of marginal data densities (MDDs) of candidate specications.
This is the method usually employed for ranking models in Bayesian econometrics.15
In addition, however, we use another recently developed statistical criteria, the regime
classication measure (RCM) pioneered by Ang and Bekaert (2002) and subsequently
extended by Baele (2005). This metric evaluates the relative performance of the models
according to their ability to sharply distinguish one regime from another. We partic-
ularly focus on the RCM for the coe¢ cient regimes since those are most central to
our investigation; in e¤ect, the RCM penalises the addition of variance regimes that
do not lead to a sharper regime distinction for the coe¢ cient regimes than the more
parsimonious specications. Finally, we also assess our candidate models on economic
criteria: models should make sense in terms of the dates of regime switches, the duration
of regimes, and their model properties. As we show below, the ranking of the models
based on these three criteria are mostly pointing in the same direction.
14To ensure that solutions are robust, and likely to be global, candidate solutions are perturbed using
5 large random perturbations and 5 random perturbations in the neighbourhood of each of the resulting
peaks.
15The Bayesian counterpart to frequentist hypothesis testing is to compare MDDs, or equivalently,
to assess Bayes factors, across models.
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The standard modied harmonic mean (MHM) method for computing MDDs of
Gelfand and Dey (1994) has been found to be unreliable when the posterior distributions
are very non-Gaussian as is likely to be the case here. To overcome numerical problems
that arise in this context, and to better approximate the posterior density function, we
are using an elliptical distribution as a weighting function to calculate MDDs (Waggoner
and Zha 2012, Appendix B).16
We employ two sets of priors for estimating our model, one for the VAR parameters,
the other for the transition matrix. Following Sims, Waggoner and Zha (2008) we use
standard Minnesota priors for the VAR parameters; for the transition matrix, we use
the Dirichlet prior.17
4.3.2 Determining and interpreting regimes
Model selection
Before turning to the results, a few words on notation are useful in order to interpret
the table to follow. In table headings and elsewhere, a v indicates the Markov chain
associated with switching in shock variances, while a c refers to the chain governing
model coe¢ cients. A number preceding either v or c indicates the number of regimes
allowed in the Markov chain governing shock variances or coe¢ cients, as applicable. So,
for example, 3v2c indicates a specication that allows for three regimes in the variances
of shocks and two regimes in coe¢ cients.
Table 4.1 presents the log MDDs for several combinations of the two types of regimes.
16In the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm we use 100000 proposal draws and 5 million
posterior draws with a thinning factor of 10, so retaining 500000 posterior draws. The burn-in period
is 10%.
17For more details on the priors, see Appendix B.
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Table 4.1: Goodness-of-t statistics, selected model regime specications
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Regime combination 1v1c 2v1c 3v1c 2v2c 3v2c 4v2c
log(MDD) -6.05 92.4 131.9 126.1 147.4 170.7
- di¤erence. from 1v1c 0 98.4 138.0 132.1 153.4 177.2
RCM n.a. 20.9 12.4 14.8 6.0 7.5
Notes: Log MDDs are calculated as in Sims, Waggoner and Zha (2008);
figvfjgc where i = no. of variance and j = no. of coe¢ cient regimes; RCM
is the Regime Classication Measure (Ang and Bekaert, 2002, Baele 2005).
For ease in interpretation, the log MDDs are shown both in absolute terms in the rst row
of numbers and relative to a standard constant-coe¢ cient Gaussian VAR model that
is, the 1v1c specication as a benchmark, in the second row.
According to Je¤reys (1961), di¤erences in log MDDs of 10 or more can be taken
as strong evidence that one model is more likely than the other. As can be seen,
the results provide strong evidence against a constant-coe¢ cient (1v1c) model. The
di¤erence between the constant-coe¢ cient model, column [1], and any of the models
with regime switching is at least 98 in terms of log MDDs, and in most cases much
above 100. Restricting the number of coe¢ cient regimes to one, and allowing for two or
three regimes in shock variances, as in columns [2] and [3], shows that the models with
several regimes in shock variances outperform the constant coe¢ cient model: the 3v1c
specication is the preferred one among the three specications that allow only switching
in variances. Consider, however, starting with two regimes in shock variances that is,
the 2v1c specication whether the addition of a third variance state (3v1c) or a second
coe¢ cient state (2v2c) improves the model t. Columns [3] and [4] suggest that there is
no strong reason to prefer one of these models over the other. Lastly, the specication
with three variance regimes and two coe¢ cient regimes 3v2c, column [5] is shown to
outperform the other, simpler models.18 Indeed, on the basis of log MDD comparison,
18Marginal data densities penalise non-parsimony of models. Kass and Raftery (1995) show that the
Schwarz criterion (or BIC) gives a rough approximation to the logarithm of the Bayes factor.
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a model allowing even more states in shock variances, the 4v2c model in column [6], is
favored.19 However, these more elaborate models might not be very di¤erent from each
other. The RCM evaluates the abililty of the di¤erent models to sharply distinguish one
regime from another. Lower readings of the RCM indicate sharper regime classication.
Regarding the distinction between the 2v2c; the 3v2c and the 4v2c;the RCM e¤ectively
penalises the addition of variance regimes that do not lead to a sharper regime distinction
for the coe¢ cient regimes than the more parsimonious specications. According to the
RCM the 3v2c specication is preferred. Finally, our review of the economic properties
of the 3v2c specication of the model suggests to us that this specication is at least as
good as the alternative candidates, based on the criterion of economic plausibility.20 On
this basis, we select the 3v2c specication as our preferred model.
Economic characterisation of regimes
We now turn to an economic characterisation of the di¤erent regimes identied in our
preferred model specication. Table 4.2 shows the estimated standard deviations of the
structural shocks across the three identied variance regimes, normalised such that the
volatilities of the rst regime are unity. For reasons that will only become clear a bit later
on, we will call our three variance regimes low (vL), medium (vM), and high
(vH) regimes; similarly, we will refer to the two regimes for VAR-equation coe¢ cients
as cL and cH: Several noteworthy conclusions arise from the table. First, switching in
shock variances is consequential, at least statistically, as can be seen by the substantial
di¤erences in the (normalised) standard deviations from regime to regime. Second, there
exists no uniform pattern in the ranking of standard deviations across all variables in
19Models with additional coe¢ cient regimes could not be estimated given the high number of para-
meters.
20Our results, in particular the smoothed probabilities and impulse responses for the di¤erent models,
show that the extra variance regime of the 4v2c specication captures only a few outliers at the beginning
of the sample. Details are available from the authors, on request.
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Table 4.2: Relative standard deviations of structural shocks by regime
IP P R Ln S
Low-variance regime (vL) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Medium-variance regime (vM) 0.91 1.53 0.29 0.74 0.62
High-variance regime (vH) 0.85 1.99 0.65 0.56 2.98
Notes: Entries are normalised for each variable to unity for the rst regime.
that the standard deviations of shocks do not rise or fall uniformly from regime to regime.
Third, for the shock of principal interest for this paper, namely the CISS (S) shock, the
variance of the shock in vH state clearly stands out. Finally, while the S shock and
also the ination shock, (P ); rises substantially, in vH relative to vL, the pattern
is the opposite for shocks to loans, (Ln); and the interest rate (R), while there is
little di¤erence across states in the variances of shocks to industrial production, (IP ).
Precisely what to make of the lack of uniformity in shock variances across regimes is
not entirely clear from these particular statistics, but it does suggest that shocks to
nancial stress play a more important role in driving dynamics in vH than do shocks to
loan growth and real activity, operating independently of nancial stress. In short, the
suggestion is that in the vH regime, it is stress shocks that dominate.
Table 4.3, which shows descriptive statistics for endogenous variables conditional on
each of the six possible combinations of our independent variance and coe¢ cient regimes,
sheds some light on the economic characterisation of regimes from the viewpoint of
nancial stability.21 For ease of comparison, the regimes are ordered such that regimes
with v = vL and c varying from cL to cH are presented in the rst two rows of the
table, while regimes with v = vM and v = vH are displayed in the subsequent four
rows with the respective coe¢ cient regimes. Several interesting observations arise with
regard to the interpretation of these data. First, and most obviously, as one moves
21These summary statistics compute the moments, conditional on regime, for each variable over
all months in which a given regime dominates. The dominant regime is the one with the highest
smoothed regime probability in the respective month. As we show below in the analysis of the smoothed
probabilities in Section 3.2.3, regime dominance is rarely ambigious in our model.
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Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics, by regime
Line regime specication conditional means shares
# label characterisation IP P R Ln S (%)
[1] vLcL tranquil 0.54 2.26 5.85 5.97 0.071 16.1
[2] vLcH tranquil 3.39 3.01 6.13 8.43 0.092 17.8
[3] vMcL tranquil 2.78 1.96 3.22 6.33 0.081 35.3
[4] vMcH elevated stress 1.16 2.83 5.85 6.11 0.110 18.9
[5] vHcL systemic fragility 3.96 2.43 4.18 9.66 0.260 5.2
[6] vHcH systemic crisis -11.3 1.57 2.88 4.66 0.520 6.6
Notes: vfig var. regime, i = L;M;H: cfjg coe¤. regime, j = L;H ; the union
of [4] (vMcH) and [6] (vHcH) is referred to as regimes of high systemic stress.
down the rows of Table 4.3 from row [1] to [3] and [5], or from row [2] to [4] and [6], the
regime-dependent means of the CISS rise.22 It would appear, therefore, that at least a
portion of elevated levels of stress, when applicable, stem from stress shocks themselves.
Second, as demonstrated by lines [5] and [6], the vHcL regime and the vHcH regime
are periods of extremely high levels of nancial stress at least twice as high as in other
states but are relatively rare, as judged by their sample shares of 5 and 7 percent,
respectively. Third, while growth in loans, Ln, and growth in real activity, IP , rise
as one goes from vL to vH when c = cL, they both fall sharply and montonically with v
when c = cH. Evidently, periods of nancial stress also feature reduced lending activity
and deterioration in real economic performance. And clearly, shifts from regime cL to
cH are economically consequential, although in precisely what way depends a great deal
on the prevailing variance regime as we will explore in more detail in section 4.3.2.
For ease of presentation, it is useful to give names to our identied regimes, as well
as to certain combinations of those regimes. These names are summarised in the third
22There is an element of arbitariness in designating a variance regime as highor something else. In
the present case, our assignment of labels reects how the regimes coincide with the level, on average,
of nancial stress as measured by the CISS, shown in the table. So, for example, the vL regimes shown
in rows [1] and [2] of the table have the lowest levels of S, as noted in the column second from the
right, and the vM states in rows [3] and [4] have larger average levels of S than their counterparts in
vL states, and so on.
Similar logic follows for cL and cH where for any state for v it can be seen that the average level of S
is higher in what we call cH than it is in cL.
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column from the left in Table 4.3, as well as in one of the notes to the table. The vLcL,
vLcH and vMcL regimes are associated with periods of relatively low levels of nancial
stress. Inasmuch as these three regimes collectively prevail in about 70 percent of the
sample period and they are periods where the economy behaved in a manner that could
be regarded as normal,we will refer to as tranquil times. Even so, these normal periods
do include episodes of occasional, short-lived spikes in nancial stress. One way to think
about this collection of regimes is that they feature either shocks of modest magnitude
(the vLcL and vLcH regimes) or weak propagation of shocks as will be demonstrated
below is the case when c = cL (vMcL), or both (vLcL). The vMcH regime, shown on
line [4] of the table, might be labelled elevated stress in part because, as we show below,
it occurs during the rst two years of the bursting of the dot-com bubble during which,
according to the CISS, nancial stress persisted at an elevated, though not extremely
high level and it occurs over the roughly half a year immediately after the failure of
Lehman Brothers in August 2008 (see Figure 2.6).
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 showed that, in general, no uniform ranking exists in terms of
regime-dependent shock volatilities or conditional means; nevertheless, all of the series
exhibit their worstreadings in terms of conditional means in the vHcH regime, shown
in row [6] of Table 4.3. That is, these were the periods where stress levels were at their
highest, and were also associated with negative growth in industrial production and the
lowest levels in each of loan growth, ination and interest rates. Consequently, we label
this regime the systemic crisis regime. Lastly, as shown in row [5], the vHcL regime,
which involves a substantial degree of shock-driven volatility, but as we demonstrate
below, little propagation of those shocks, is labelled the systemic fragility regime.
Regime probabilities Time series of the (smoothed) probabilities are presented in
Figure 4.1. In general, the regime probabilities are either very close to one or very close
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Figure 4.1: CISS and probabilities for variance and coe¢ cient regimes
to zero, indicating that the model classies regimes rather sharply. The ve panels in
the gure show the periods that contribute to estimates of the parameters of the variance
and coe¢ cient regimes. As can be seen, the estimation of the two coe¢ cient regimes is
supported by data spanning several elongated periods. It follows that these periods are
comfortably su¢ cient for estimating the parameters of the coe¢ cient regimes.23
23The small number of parameters associated with each variance regime ve in our base-case
specication is simpler to estimate.
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In the next subsection we demonstrate that the coe¢ cient regime cH features much
stronger transmission of nancial stress to the broader economy than does coe¢ cient
regime cL. Building on this assertion, Figure 4.2 shows the probability of two regimes
in which the propagation of shocks is strong and shocks are either medium (the elevated
stress regime vMcH) or large (systemic crisis regime vHcH). These regimes pick up,
as we already noted, periods in which absolute the level of the CISS, (S), is rather
high. These two regimes are also periods in economic history that are associated with
demonstrable nancial turmoil, as can be seen by comparing panels of Figure 4.1 with
the events shown in Figure 2.6. Episodes captured by these regimes include the aftermath
of the 1987 stock market crash; the Gulf war in 1990; the run-up to the crisis in the
European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in the early 1990s; the bursting of the
dot-com bubble in the early 2000s; the US terrorist attacks in September 2001; the
global nancial crisis of 2008 and the associated meltdown of the euro area economy;
and nally a time period in 2009 when the nancial crisis was moderating until the euro
area sovereign debt crisis emerged in early 2010.24 As line [6] of Table 4.3 notes, there
were only two periods that are associated with vH regimes: a short episode immediately
following the US terrorist attacks in September 2001, and the culmination of the global
nancial crisis, including the large decline in output growth, the meltdownas it were,
of the euro area economy. Interestingly, the initial stages of the recent global nancial
crisis are associated with a systemic fragility regime, vHcL. While not itself a state of
high systemic stress, this regime might be considered a precursor to such states; it shares
the large shocks of the systemic crisis regime but lacks the strong propagation of those
shocks. Thus, according to the model, the initial stages of the subprime crisis had not
yet reached the point of being systemic stress and thus did not immediately bring about
24We note that the level of the CISS index itself was not elevated in 1991-92, a period when the
Eurosystem came under stress following German reunication. And yet Figure 4.2 indicates that this
was a period of systemic stress. This observation demonstrates the fact that the (unobservable) regimes
representing systemic stress are functions of all the variables in the system, and cannot be inferred solely
by the values of the systemic stress index.
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Figure 4.2: Smoothed state probabilities for two high-stress transmission regimes
large-scale output losses. The full, systemic crisis emerged according to our model a
few months prior to the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers.
Transmission of nancial shocks
We now explore the properties of the various regimes through comparisons of their
regime-specic impulse response functions (IRFs).25 While the three shock-variance
regimes di¤er in the magnitude of one-standard-deviation shocks, but their propagation
will di¤er only to the extent that the coe¢ cient regime di¤ers. Because the main purpose
of our paper is to study state dependencies in the transmission of systemic nancial
instability to the real sector, we focus on the IRFs describing the dynamic e¤ects of
structural shocks to the CISS. Figure 4.3 plots the impulse responses to shocks in the
CISS (S) for two starkly di¤erent regimes, the vHcH regime (solid red lines) and the
vLcL regime (blue dashed lines). To aid in the interpretation, the gure also includes
25Note that the impulse responses presented here are computed at the posterior mode.
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the IRFs for a constant-coe¢ cient Gaussian VAR model (the 1v1c specication).26
The di¤erences in IRFs between systemic crisis and tranquil times are striking. In
the vLcL regime, industrial production growth (as well as all other variables) displays
hardly any response at all to a CISS shock. It thus appears that nancial stress shocks
are e¤ectively irrelevant in tranquil periods, an observation that accords well with the
fact that the CISS aims to measure systemic stress and not general nancing condi-
tions. By contrast, in the vHcH regime, a positive shock in nancial stress leads to
a quick, severe and protracted contraction in economic activity. On this evidence, we
conclude that the cL coe¢ cient regime implies weak nancial-real linkages which is to
say, weak propagation of nancial stress shocks while the cH coe¢ cient regime implies
very strong ones. These ndings ratify our designation of the vHcH regime, featuring
the largest CISS shocks and the strongest nancial-real linkages, as a regime of systemic
crisis.27
The lower-right panel of Figure 4.3 shows a relatively strong, gradual and persistent
e¤ect of a CISS shock on loan growth in the systemic crisis regime. This suggests that
bank lending may also play a role in amplifying the transmission of nancial stress to
the real economy in times of nancial turbulence. The gradual decline in loan growth
in response to an adverse CISS shock may reect rmsability to draw down existing
credit lines at the early stages of a nancial crisis, mitigating the overall constraints on
bank loan supply in the short term.28 At the same time, this fact is also in line with a
lagged reaction of lending following the strong and immediate decline in output growth.
26The IRFs are calculated for a positive one-standard-deviation shock to the CISS for the two most
di¤erent regimes, the systemic crisis regime (vHcH) and in the tranquil regime (vLcL). Up to a scaling
factor, similar conclusions arise for comparisons of the systemic crisis regime (vHcH) to the systemic
fragility regime (vHcL).
27Note that if we normalise the shock in tranquil times to be the same as in the systemic crisis regime,
the impulse response in the tranquil regime is only slightly larger and has the same shape as for the
shock size based on the tranquil episode as displayed in the gure.
28See Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) for evidence on the relevance of this point for the case of the
United States.
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Figure 4.3: Regime-dependent impulse responses to nancial stress shocks
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Figure 4.3 also illustrates that the IRFs estimated for a constant-parameter Gaussian
VAR model (the black dotted lines) would clearly underestimate the e¤ects of nancial
stress shocks on economic activity in certain states of the world, as well as on the other
macro aggregates. We conclude that policy guidance from our non-linear VAR may be
more realistic under circumstances of elevated nancial stress.
4.3.3 Counterfactual analyses
In this section we carry out counterfactual simulations in order to illustrate the di¤er-
ential e¤ects of nancial shocks during systemic crises and in tranquil times. Counter-
factual analysis provides much the same information as impulse response functions do,
but also provide some historical context. We also investigate the importance of bank
lending for the real activity in our framework.
The role of systemic stress
To explore the fundamental change in economic dynamics during crisis episodes, we
consider a counterfactual scenario in which tranquil times are assumed to have persisted
from October 2008 to February 2009, instead of incurring the switch to systemic crisis
that our baseline specication says took place.29 Figure 4.4 demonstrates that in this
scenario the level of systemic stress would have been substantially lower, by almost 0.2,
and that impact of this switch on output growth was substantial. The gure shows
that growth in industrial production would have declined at only 6 percent annual
rate, instead of melting down at a rate of 21 percent per annum; loan growth and
29This counterfactual employs the estimated coe¢ cients and the parameters of the shock variances of
the counterfactual regime to compute the counterfactual path of the variables during the counterfactual
period. See also Sims and Zha (2006) for a similar counterfactual experiment in a di¤erent context.
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ination would have remained more or less stable at the rates observed at the outset
of the exercise, instead of being 2.5 percentage points and 3 percentage points lower,
respectively. Monetary policy would have been less accommodative with short-term
interest rates dropping by only 1 percentage point instead of the 3 percentage points
that was observed. Additional counterfactual experiments comparing the e¤ects of a
di¤erent path of nancial stress in systemic crisis versus tranquil times are presented in
Appendix C. They show that an increase in systemic nancial stress has little e¤ect in
tranquil times, but substantial e¤ects in episodes of systemic crisis.
The role of lending
In this Section we investigate the role of bank lending for the macroeconomy. In par-
ticular, we are interested whether lending has an impact for the real economy beyond
that which originates from nancial stress. To this end, we conduct a counterfactual
experiment that assesses the real e¤ects of a reduction in the growth in bank lending to
zero percent as opposed to growth of about 6 percent in the baseline between Octo-
ber 2001 and March 2002. Our model characterises the counterfactual period as one of
elevated stress, vMcH.30 In order to isolate the e¤ects of loan growth independent of
the e¤ect operating through uctuations in nancial stress we hold the path for nancial
stress constant at its average level over this period. The situation is one such that credit
growth during the burst of the dot-com bubble would have declined as much as it actu-
ally did during the 2008-09 nancial crisis.31 We nd that if loan growth had been at
30 Note that we also carried out the opposite experiment for the systemic crisis episode starting in
October 2008, namely we kept lending constant over the counterfactual period instead of the actual
decline. The results point in the same direction, that lending plays a relevant role.
31This simulation (as well as another counterfactual shown in an appendix) involves computing the
sequence of shocks to the relevant variable that is necessary to produce the counterfactual path for that
variable, with all other variables being allowed to follow whatever path is implied by the sequence of
shocks, except where otherwise indicated. For a discussion of how counterfactual experiments work in
a linear framework, see Waggoner and Zha (1999). The experiments are designed to be smallin the
sense that the sequence of shocks is within an empirically plausible set.
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Figure 4.4: Counterfactual simulation: tranquil times (vLcL) instead of systemic crisis
regime (cHcH), Oct. 2008 to Feb. 2009
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Figure 4.5: Counterfactual simulation: zero loan growth with stable CISS over counter-
factual period, Oct. 2001 to Mar. 2002
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during the counterfactual period, output growth would have been about 5 percentage
points lower, as displayed in Figure 4.5. Ination and the interest rate would have also
been substantially lower, specically by about 2 percentage points, compared to history.
The lower interest rate would have probably reected a monetary policy reaction to the
output losses and the contraction in loan growth. These results suggest that bank loans
may play a material role for the macroeconomic dynamics during regimes of systemic
stress that imply a strong shock propagation, bearing in mind that the estimated e¤ects
of lower loan growth are derived under the assumption that nancial stress remains
unchanged over the counterfactual period.32 To further illustrate the implications of
disturbances to bank lending, we also present the impulse responses to lending shocks
for two regimes with di¤erent coe¢ cient regimes but the same variance regime, where
the size of the lending shock is comparable across regimes.
These impulse responses, shown in Figure 4.6, demonstrate that in response to an
exogenous shock to bank lending, output growth is not declining in time of systemic
fragility (vHcL), where large shocks a¤ect the economy, but there is no strong shock
propagation. However, in systemic crisis episodes (vHcH) output growth is declining
since in those periods credit supply constraints may become binding. Since this is an
identied shock and output growth is initially being held constant, this shock is properly
interpreted as a loan supply shock. Moreover, the negative, though small, reaction in
nancial stress can be explained by a loosening of montary policy in response to the
loan reduction, which more than o¤sets the increase in nancial stress.33
32Note that if unrestricted, nancial stress would go down. This might be explained by a looser
montary policy stance in response to the loan reduction, which alleviates the increase in nancial stress
that might have otherwise been generated.
33This interpretation is in line with the evidence of a credit supply reduction during the global
nancial crisis based on credit register data for Portugal, e.g. Iyer, Lopes, Peydro and Schoar (2014).
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Figure 4.6: Regime-dependent impulse responses to lending shocks
4.3.4 Macroprudential Surveillance and Real-time Probabili-
ties
A necessary condition for this model to be useful as a macroprudential surveillance tool
would be to demonstrate the reliability of the model for real-time nowcasting of switches
in regime. As a modest step in this direction, we estimate the state probabilities in
pseudo real time based on a monthly expanding data window, holding the VAR model
coe¢ cients xed at their full-sample estimates. These probabilities may provide advance
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real-time information (early warnings) as to whether the economy is likely to have
entered a state of increased vulnerability to systemic shocks.
The results are shown in Figure 4.7. While the blue colored lines represent the full
sample estimates of the smoothed state probabilities of the vMcH and vHcH regimes,
the gray lines are the estimates based on the recursively expanding samples. If the
model is successful, it should provide relatively few false signals of a change in regime,
meaning that the gray lines should be small and not terribly frequent. Indeed, as can
be seen, the recursively estimated regime probabilities appear to provide quite robust
information. The model only rarely indicates a regime switch (indicated by a real-time
regime probability that is larger than 0.5, i.e. 50%) that would not be conrmed by
the full-sample estimate ex post. As one may expect, at the beginning of the sample
period when information from the data is scarce the pseudo-real-time probabilities
of being in a high systemic stress regime sometimes rise, but they never reach a value
close to 0.5. At the same time, when the full-sample estimates signal the presence of a
high systemic stress regime, the real-time probabilities tend to do so as well. In other
words, there are only a few cases in which the pseudo-real-time probabilities from our
Markov-switching VAR falsely predict a switch to a high-stress regime, or falsely predict
a return to tranquil times.
This exercise, however, can only provide indirect and thus tentative evidence on the
models ability to serve as an e¤ective real-time tool for macroprudential analysis. A
more thorough assessment would require real-time estimates also of model coe¢ cients
and the use of vintage data, for instance.
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Figure 4.7: Real-time regime probabilities
4.4 Alternative Measures of Financial Stress
We have, in this paper, tried to establish the usefulness of the CISS as an e¢ cacious tool
for measuring systemic nancial distress. The CISS is not, however, the only measure
that has been proposed for purposes of this nature. In this section, we take two steps
towards investigating the role of the particular construction of the CISS for our results.
In particular, in one subsection, we explore the replacement of the CISS by two plausible
alternative measures that have been suggested and used in the literature; in another
subsection, we isolate two features of the construction of the CISS.
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4.4.1 Stock market volatility and corporate bond spreads
It is often argued that the VIX or realised stock price volatility are useful indicators
of risk aversion and nancial stress more generally; see e.g. Coudert and Gex (2008)
and Bekaert and Hoerova (2014). As one assessment of the value added of the CISS, in
this section we re-estimate our preferred model replacing the CISS with a measure of
realised stock market volatility. In this instance, we measure realised volatility as the
square root of average daily squared log price returns on the broad EMU equity price
index, as maintained by Thomson Financial Datastream.
Figure 4.8 displays the impulse responses to a one-standard-deviation shock in re-
alised stock market volatility. Comparing the responses of output growth to this shock
with their counterparts from the model using the standard CISS (see Figure 4.3), we nd
that with the model that uses stock market volatility, the output responses are much
smaller and much less persistent. Thus if one were to adopt the prior belief that nancial
stress is an important driver of output uctuations in times of systemic stress, relying ex-
clusively on stock market volatility as a measure of systemic stress might be regarded as
unsatisfactory. This interpretation may appear plausible because stock market volatility
does not capture other, less transitory markers of nancial stress, such as increased risk
premiums. In point of fact, the level of stock market volatility displays notably less per-
sistence that does the CISS, especially during the recent crisis; this observation might
explain, at least in part, the lower estimated persistence of the real e¤ects of a shock to
stock price volatility as compared with a nancial stress shock measured by the CISS.
A di¤erent strand of the literature argues that corporate bond spreads, in particular
for bonds of non-nancial corporations, contain substantial predictive content for the
business cycle and other macroeconomic aggregates. Corporate bond spreads arguably
capture changes in market perceptions of the quality of borrowersbalance sheets and
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Figure 4.8: Impulse responses to shocks in realised stock market volatility
thus their default risk; these measures tend to lead the business cycle, as documented by
Gertler and Lown (1999) and Gilchrist and Zakrajek (2012). Corporate bond spreads
also move when the price of risk changes, and spreads can capture general disruptions
in the nancial system either through declines in the value of such bonds as collateral or
via decreases in second market trading and thus in liquidity premiums. To explore the
adequacy of the corporate bond spreads as a measure of systemic nancial stress or
almost equivalently, to explore how much the documented success of the CISS is because
it contains corporate bond spreads we re-estimate our base case model, substituting
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in place of the CISS the spread between German non-nancial corporate bonds and the
average yield of all German government bonds, as published by the Bundesbank.
The regime identication based on this model variant appears plausible in general.
While the estimated regime probabilities suggest that the global nancial crisis started
in September 2008, they also indicate a relatively quick termination of the worst state
of systemic stress, in the beginning of 2009. This is in contrast with our base case model
with the CISS which dates the end of the global nancial crisis in October 2009, after
the release of the U.S. bank stress test results in May of that year. In broad terms, the
two models identify approximately the same date ranges as being periods of systemic
stress. However, the impulse responses to the nancial shock identied in this model
are economically implausible. We conclude that the corporate bond spread is a useful
indicator of systemic stress and that it probably is a major contributor to the applicacy
of the CISS.
Overall, our assessment is that a broad-based systemic nancial stress indicator is
arguably better able to uncover the nature of the interactions between nancial instabil-
ities and the macroeconomy than is a single-market single-indicator measure of nancial
stress. Even so, our analysis with corporate bond spreads suggests that more work in
this area is called for.
4.4.2 Exploring the composition and construction of the CISS
Two important elements characterise the construction of the CISS as a measure of sys-
temic stress: rst, that the CISS encompasses ve di¤erent, broad-based nancial market
segments; and second, that the time-variation in the dependence between these nancial
market segments is taken into account in its construction. With respect to the former
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feature, the role of nancial intermediaries is of special importance for a bank-centered
nancial system as in the euro area. To investigate the importance of these features, we
carry out two di¤erent experiments. Our rst experiment explores the importance of
the banking sector within the construction of the CISS, by rerunning our preferred 3v2c
model, along with some of the associated model assessment exercises, using a version of
the CISS that excludes the banking sector.34 Some of the recent theoretical literature
has emphasised the role of disruption in nancial intermediation as an important mech-
anism driving large output uctuations; see, for example, He and Krishnamurthy (2014)
and Boissay, Collard and Smets (2016). To succinctly summarise our results, we nd
that excluding nancial intermediaries from the CISS leads to estimated durations of
states that are too short lived to be regarded as plausible, and to model properties that
are di¢ cult to explain. In particular, we nd implausibly small and not very persistent
responses in output growth to nancial stress shocks in periods of systemic crises.
Our second experiment examines the systemic dimension of the CISS. The base case
construction of the CISS encompasses the notion of cross-market correlations of systemic
stress on an aggregate level by allowing time variation in the weights of the indexs ve
components.35 We explore the importance of this feature of the CISS by replacing the
time-varying correlations between the di¤erent subindexes with a simple (time-invariant)
equally-weighted average. Then we once again re-estimate our preferred model and an-
alyze its properties.36 Our results show that not all regimes are identied with this
34Arguably, this part of the analysis complements the counterfactual experiments demonstrating the
role of lending to the private sector, which also highlight the importance of nancial intermediation for
the transmission of nancial shocks to the macroeconomy, conditional on the Markov state.
35Allen, Bali and Tang (2012) similarly argue that their macromeasure of systemic risk complements
microlevel systemic risk measures.
36The relevance of the systemic dimension of nancial stress has been emphasized in the literature
on systemic risk. The comovement of the nancial rms assets with the aggregate nancial sector
in a crisis has been argued to be an important component of systemic stress. Acharya et al. (2010)
have proposed an economic and statistical approach to measure the systemic risk of nancial rms.
Correlation-based measures of connectedness, including systemic risk, are discussed, for instance, in
Diebold and Yilmaz (2014) who propose another way of measuring the connectedness of nancial rms.
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modied CISS. And this version of the model exhibits impulse response functions with
economically implausible features. We take these results as demonstrative of the im-
portance of taking the systemic aspect of nancial stress into account by incorporating
time-varying cross-correlation between di¤erent nancial markets.
We conclude that for an economy like the euro area, where the banking sector plays a
more important role than is for instance the case in the United States, a systemic nan-
cial stress index like the CISS that covers all major segments of a nancial system and
emphasises the contagion of nancial instability from market to market, is well suited for
capturing the interaction between systemic nancial instability and the macroeconomy.
4.5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we introduced a representation of systemic nancial instability in a
Markov-switching vector-autogressive model for the euro area. Our principal goal was to
examine the initiation and non-linear propagation and amplication of nancial shocks
through the macroeconomy and to uncover whether such shocks are state contingent.
Toward this end, we employed a new Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress (CISS),
recently developed at the European Central Bank, together with conventional macro-
economic and monetary variables, and estimated the model with recently developed
Bayesian methods.
We found evidence that the Euro area economy is subject to occasional switches
into what we called periods of high systemic stress. We further found that switching
behavior manifested itself in both the variances of model shocks and in the structural
characteristics of the model; that is, in the parameters that propagate those shocks
throughout the economy. Our results show that this switching behavior is economically
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important. In particular, the e¤ects of nancial stress stress shocks on output are
much larger, more persistent, and more consequential for the real economy in regimes of
high systemic stress than during tranquil times, and bank lending plays an independent
role for the determination of real activity during episodes of high systemic stress, with
exogenous identied shocks to loan growth having important consequences for the rest
of the economy, whereas in tranquil times they do not. It follows from this that a single-
regime, constant-variance characterization of the economy will miss these features and
is therefore likely to provide misleading answers to questions of this nature.
We found that the CISS has two particularly useful features for capturing the nature
of the interaction between nancial instabilities and the macroeconomy. The rst of these
is the inclusion of measures of instability in nancial intermediation, a feature that is
particularly relevant for economies that have bank-centered nancial systems as does the
Euro area. The second is the taking into account of the systemic dimension of nancial
stress through the use of time-varying, cross-market correlations of the components of
the CISS, which appears to us to capture credit constraints that are binding during high-
stress periods. Finally, the quasi-real-time state probabilities of the estimated regimes
from our base-case model suggest at least some prospects for the models use as a tool
for macroprudential surveillance, although more research, preferably using vintage data
would be in order before drawing denitive conclusions on this score.
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CHAPTER 5
POLICY CONCLUSIONS
Which policy conclusions can we draw from the ndings of the three studies presented
in this dissertation? To recap, all three papers are mainly about an indicator that
measures the current state of nancial (in)stability in the euro area, and about how
this indicator can be used to assess empirically the real e¤ects associated with nancial
stress, and how thus measured nancial stability interacts with the ECBs conventional
and unconventional monetary policy making. Since these issues mainly concern stability
conditions in the nancial system and the economy as a whole, I distinguish between the
two policy areas mainly tasked with monitoring and safeguarding nancial stability from
a macroeconomic or, better, systemic risk perspective, namely monetary and macro-
prudential policy.
To set the stage for a discussion of the, by nature, relatively narrow policy implica-
tions of my research, I start with putting it into a broader policy context derived from
the relevant general lessons of the Great Recession. As an organising principle of my re-
marks, I refer to three main lessons of the crisis distilled from a central bank perspective
(see Liang 2014 and Smets 2015).
1. Price stability is not su¢ cient for nancial stability. The crisis ex-
posed the obvious deciency of the ruling pre-crisis monetary policy paradigm that the
primary focus on price (and economic) stability is not su¢ cient to ensure nancial sta-
bility, and that nancial instability can have much larger negative feedback e¤ects on
macroeconomic stability than what was widely considered possible. To be sure, the
interdependency between the two objectives of price stability and nancial stability has
always been acknowledged by the profession, including the conditional nature of this
interdependcy in the sense that both objectives can at times be in harmony, and in
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other times may confront central banks with a conict of interest or trade-o¤. Such dif-
ferent constellations of the macroeconomic environment reect the extent to which the
nancial and the business cycles are aligned or out of sync, respectively. The pre-crisis
consensus view (Jackson Hole consensus) arrived at the conclusion that the precondi-
tions are too weak for monetary policy to lean against the nancial cycle with a view to
contain nancial stability risks. The consensus view was particularly sceptical as to the
ability of central banks to identify bubble-like phenomena ex ante at any su¢ cient level
of certainty. In addition, as a means to address the nancial cycle, adjusting interest
rates in a counter-cyclical fashion was considered as too blunt a tool. For example,
because conventional monetary policy has a broad impact on the economy and nancial
markets, attempts to use it to pop an asset price bubble would likely entail many
unintended side e¤ects. Weighing the associated costs and benets of leaning against
the windmade the consensus view to believe that it is preferable to respond to nancial
stability concerns only to the extent that they a¤ect the outlook for ination and eco-
nomic activity. From this it also follows that cleaning upafter the bubble was viewed
as preferable to shooting in the darkwhere rather uncertain e¤ects on the bubble
dynamics meet quite predictable costs in terms of the e¤ects of an overly restrictive
monetary policy. The consensus view surely received support from the experiences with
the burst of the late 1990s dot-com bubble. The excessive growth in the valuation and
issuance of high-tech stocks was not fueled by increased debt and leverage in the nan-
cial and non-nancial sectors, a fact which contributed to containing the contractionary
macro e¤ects when the bubble burst along with the massive stimulus from monetary
policy easing in particular by the Fed (see Adrian and Liang 2014).
Against this background, the Great Recession changed the consensus view in two
main dimensions: First, the meltdown of the world economy upgraded the perception
of the possible costs of nancial instability, tilting the intertemporal trade-o¤ between
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the costs and benets from central banks leaning against the nancial cycle towards the
latter. This holds true even if nancial stability were not added as a separate, coequal
objective to the central bank mandate, but would instead still be evaluated exclusively
in terms of the expected net e¤ect from short- to long-term risks of macroeconomic
instability. Second, there is general agreement that in order to ensure macroeconomic
and nancial stability under principally all circumstances, a macro-prudential policy
toolkit has to be introduced as a second source of counter-cyclical policies consistent
with the famous Tinbergen-Mundell separation or policy assignment principle (Smets
2015). Macro-prudential policies are supposed to aim primarily at nancial stability by
containing the build-up of nancial imbalances and by improving the resilience of the
nancial system to adverse shocks, and monetary policy continues to be mainly directed
towards macroeconomic stability.
However, while there is broad agreement about these two basic insights, a wide
spectrum of di¤erent opinions exists as to how precisely nancial stability considera-
tions should be taken into account in the redesign of monetary policy strategies. The
menu of proposed options ranges from rather mild amendments to the previous ap-
proach (the modied Jackson Hole consensus) to a rather radical shift in the mon-
etary policy paradigm which postulates that all macro policies (monetary, scal and
macro-prudential policies) have to be closely coordinated in order to achieve the joint
objectives of price/macroeconomic stability and nancial stability.1
The di¤erent approaches mainly contrast in their assessment as to whether the pol-
icy objectives, the policy instruments, and the transmission mechanisms of monetary
1Smets (2015) distinguishes between three new views of monetary policy making, labelled as the
modied Jackson Hole Consensus, leaning against the wind vindicated, and nancial stability is
price stability. The rst view is supported by Bernanke (2015), Collard et al. (2014) and Ajello,
Laubach, Lopez-Salido and Nakata (2015). The third view, that nancial and price stabililty are too
closely intertwined to be separated, is held by Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014). The middle ground
is covered by and Christiano, Ilut, Motto and Rostagno (2010), Adrian and Shin (2009), Gilchrist and
Zakrajsek (2011), Woodford (2012) and Stein (2014).
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and macroprudential policy can easily be separated or not. For instance, the degree of
spillover e¤ects across the di¤erent policy functions decides about the extent to which
policy objectives can be separated and the extent to which achievement of the di¤erent
objectives requires policy coordination. The assessment also critically hinges upon the
size of a trade-o¤ that features in all relevant models which try to integrate nancial
stability consideration into otherwise more or less standard macro frameworks: when
deciding whether to conduct an expansionary monetary policy in order to reap any
potential gains from short-run macroeconomic stabilisation (typically involving the con-
ventional short-run Philipp-curve trade-o¤), a central bank faces the trade-o¤ that the
very same expansionary policy may spur nancial imbalances which in the long-run can
lead to nancial instability and associated output losses and deationary e¤ects. Vice
versa, if a central bank wants to contain long-term risks to nancial stability by raising
interest rates today, thereby leaning against the nancial cycle, it may have to tolerate
a short-term undershooting in its output and/or ination objectives. This intertempo-
ral trade-o¤ depends, rstly, on the quantitative importance of the underlying nancial
frictions which ultimatly produces the trade-o¤ (since nancial stability risks would not
exist in a frictionless nancial system). It also depends, secondly, on the assumed ability
of monetary policy to control the nancial cycle, and about the simultaneous impact of
cyclical nancial conditions on current macroeconomic dynamics and on the build-up of
nancial vulnerabilities. In any case, for leaning against the wind to come out as the
optimal monetary policy, any model has to produce asymmetric (and thus non-linear)
e¤ects of the nancial boom-bust cycle. For instance, the anticipated gain from miti-
gating the tail risk of adverse macroeconomic outcomes caused by the possible burst of
an identied asset price bubble has to exceed the expected losses from subpar output
and ination performance produced by implementing a tighter monetary policy stance
than what would have been optimal in the absence of the bubble.
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Now, how do the ndings of my empirical research t into this discussion about how
to optimally conduct monetary policy after the Great Recession?
First of all, all three of my papers demonstrate for the case of the euro area and
the Great Recession that a systemic crisis inicts large output losses on the a¤ected
economy. In addition, the results from the Threshold-VAR and the Markov-Switching
VAR of Chapters 2 and 4, respectively, seem to also suggest the existence of the above-
mentioned asymmetric relationship between the costs and the benets associated with
the unravelling and the build-up of nancial imbalances. Both regime-switching models
produce much larger output e¤ects of a given shock in the CISS during crisis times
than during normal times. Hence, a sharp and quick increase in the CISS as the result
of several large shocks, pushing the economy into a systemic crisis state, would be
associated with relatively large losses in economic activity; in contrast, the gradual
return of the CISS to its pre-crisis level would generate relatively weak output gains since
the normalisation would likely take place during a non-crisis regime period featuring a
weaker transmission of nancial shocks to the real sector.
Furthermore, if we interpret the short-term interest rate equations of the linear VAR
used in Chapter 3 and the Markov-Switching VAR of Chapter 4 as reduced-form esti-
mates of the ECBs monetary policy reaction function, we can discuss some properties
of the ECBs actual monetary policy making in the years before and during the Great
Recession. Let me start with a discussion of the results from the linear VAR. The CISS
is found to impact on the ECBs interest rate policy only indirectly, mainly through
its preditive power for future economic activity. How can this role of the CISS be in-
terpreted theoretically? I think one realistic interpretation sees the CISS as what it
actually is, namely an indicator of nancial (in)stability conditions which also provides
information about future macroeconomic risks rst and foremost in crisis times. The
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indirect explanatory power of the CISS for the ECB policy rate does not require that the
ECB reacted to the CISS per se since the CISS did not exist before 2010 but prob-
ably rather to the common information component included in the CISSs ingredients
which are mostly well-known nancial indicators. This interpretation would assign to
the CISS the role of a non-standard business cycle leading indicator, and it is consistent,
as I claimed before, with the ECBs declared separation principle.
An alternative interpretation receives support from the strong direct impact of the
CISS on short-term interest rates in the systemic crisis regime identied by the MS-
VAR model. This interpretation suggests that the ECB reacted to large shocks in the
CISS as a means of crisis managment. During the peak times of the crisis, the ECB
lowered interest rates rather quickly in resonse to the observed stresses in the nancial
system, and perhaps beyond what would have been called for by the then available
information about the medium-outlook for price stability. In that sense, anticipating
severe but highly uncertain tail risks to price stability associated with unfamiliar levels
of nancial stress, the ECB might have bought insurance against this tail risk by easing
its policy. This view presupposes that the CISS did not only proxy the information
from omitted variables like survey- or market-based ination expectations. While this in
principle would make sense since our VARs do not contain any forward-looking indicators
apart from the CISS, the tests for spurious causality in Chapter 3 suggest that the
explanatory power of the CISS is a robust feature. As a side e¤ect, low interest rates
also contributed to restore health in the banking sector due its generally positive impact
on bank protability. The CISS therefore could have also picked up the ECBs desire to
introduce elements of crisis resolution into its standard monetary policy stance.
However, all the theoretical discussions above about the need for a revised monetary
policy strategy that takes into account nancial stability considerations was about the
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role of crisis prevention in the policy strategy. While there is no obvious way to associate
the CISSs role in the VAR dynamics with any potential historical e¤orts of the ECB to
counter nancial excesses, one could conceive of future possible uses of the CISS for such
purposes, perhaps as part of an enhanced second pillar of the ECBs monetary policy
strategy that explicity aims at quantifying tail risk for nancial stability. For instance,
the CISS as a coincident crisis indicator can be used to construct the dependent variable
of an early warning model, one that tries to predict crisis events at least one or two
years ahead based on conventional vulnerability indicators such as bank leverage or
credit growth or other measures of excess credit (see Lo Duca and Peltonen 2013 for a
similar application). If the best predictors of systemic stress would indicate a material
probability of a systemic event to happen say two years hence, monetary policy may
consider counteracting this risk by raising interest rates in the near term. Relatedly,
an alternative approach could try to endogenise the regime probabilites in the Markov-
switching VARmodel of Chapter 4, perhaps using lagged bank leverage or asset valuation
indicators as potential triggers of regime shifts towards crisis states.
It has to be considered, though, that reduced-form regression estimates of a monetary
policy reaction function must be very cautiously interpreted. For instance, the estimated
impact of the CISS on policy interest rates probably averages over historical policy
actions which were guided by rather di¤erent motives, reacting to the particular policy
challenges posed by the specic economic environment at the time. A solution to this
problem requires a structural model that links the di¤erent policy objectives with the
policy instrument(s) and the macroeconomy in a theoretically consistent way, a point
long made in the literature (see, e.g., Woodford 1994).
2. Traditional tools of monetary policy are inadequate for e¤ective crisis
management. The conventional pre-crisis toolkit of monetary policy proved insu¢ -
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cient to manage the manifold challenges posed during the various stages of the systemic
crisis. This deciency has been reected in the vast array of non-standard or unconven-
tional monetary policy measures designed and implemented in a mostly ad hoc fashion
during the recent crisis by basically all major central banks around the globe (for an
overview see Rogers, Scotti and Wright 2014).
In Chapter 3, I estimate a VAR model that includes the growth rate of the ECB
balance sheet as a catch-all measure of the various unconventional measures undertaken
by the ECB in the course of the Great Recession and the ensuing sovereign crisis in the
Eurozone. The fact that this variable is strongly directly inuenced by the CISS, and by
not much else, is consistent with the view that the ECBs crisis management focused on
the implementation of non-standard policy measures with the aim to alleviate various
stress phenomena which plagued the euro area nancial system during the di¤erent
stages of the crisis. As I mentioned in the previous section, the fact that also short-term
interest rates responded directly to the CISS in the systemic crisis regime identied by
the MS-VAR model, may be interpreted as an exceptional move (escape clause) to
fend o¤ tail risks of nancial stability and a worst state of the economy.
Hence, in the context of monetary policy crisis management, the CISS may be a
useful indicator to monitor the overall current state of nancial instability in real time.
In addition, it might also be informative to watch the CISS during a gradual period
of crisis resolution, as it not only indicates the current level of systemic stress, but
one might also infer the fragility of the nancial system during such a period by the
sensitivity of the CISS to smaller adverse shocks which may interrupt the recovery
occasionally. On the other hand, nancial stress indices like the CISS might also be
used to assess the impact of one-o¤ policy measures which mainly work through their
e¤ects on market expectations, condence and risk aversion. A prime example of such
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a case is the ECBs announcement of the OMT which never had to be activated thus
far and its anticipating London speech by President Draghi. It is widely acknowledged
that the OMT announcement contributed to a massive reduction of risk premia and
market volatility (see Altavilla, Giannone and Lenza 2014 for the OMTs impact on
sovereign bond yields in the euro area) as reected in the strong decline of the CISS
after the events. The stress-reducing e¤ects of the OMT announcement are also captured
by the ECB balance sheet equation of my VAR, which establishes a strong positive
conditional correlation between balance sheet growth and the CISS. However, in this
particular case, this positive correlation cannot be interpreted in the sense of a non-
standard monetary policy reaction function. The announcement of the possibility to
purchase sovereign bonds of crisis-stricken countries fostered a rapid deceleration of the
growth rate in ECB total assets. Due to much reduced uncertainty and fear in nancial
markets, banks started repaying liquidity borrowed in the ECBs 3-year LTROs at a
gradually higher speed which dampened the growth rate of ECB total assets (see Figure
3.5). The simultaneous declines in the CISS and ECB balance sheet growth after the
OMT announcement therefore does not reect a causal relationship between the two
but rather the impact of the policy announcement as the omitted third variable driving
both series.
3. Pre-crisis nancial regulatory and supervisory framework insu¢ cient
to maintain nancial stability. As already mentioned in the context of the rst
lesson, the crisis accelerated the introduction of a new policy domain called macro-
prudential policy. This was based on the realisation that ensuring the soundness and
safety of individual nancial institutions is not enough to guarantee the stability of the
nancial system as a whole. Due to the apparent neglect of systemic risks in the nan-
cial regulatory and supervisory framework, the pre-crisis framework not only failed to
ensure nancial stability, but it even promoted the gradual build-up of nancial imbal-
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ances at the macro and micro level by providing incentives for widespread endogenous
and strongly correlated risk-taking. The design of the new regulatory framework is
very much inspired by the idea to contain systemic risks in the various segments of the
nancial system. To this end, the new framework also brought about institutional inno-
vations which conferred new macro-prudential policy powers to either newly established
or existing authorities (e.g., the European Systemic Risk Board and the ECB/Single
Supervisory Mechanism).
A major task of macro-prudential policy consists of the continuous monitoring of
the nancial system in order to track the current levels of strains in the system and,
even more important, to identify systemic risks early on. For these purposes, macro-
prudential authorities around the globe have been active in building up an appropriate
data and analytical infrastructure, among which so-called nancial stability indicators
play an important role.
Financial stress indexes like the CISS have become an integral part of nancial sta-
bility indicator toolboxes, complementing standard single indicators traditionally used
for the monitoring of current stress levels in individual market segments. As I docu-
mented in the introductory Chapter 1 (see Footnote 6), the CISS has meanwhile become
a well-established macro-prudential surveillance indicator applied by the ECB and other
central banks, an indicator that summarises the coincident state of nancial stability in
the nancial system as a whole.
In addition, as I outlined before, the CISS can also help improve empirical early
warning models which aim to anticipate risks of widespread nancial strains su¢ ciently
in advance for macro-prudential, but also monetary policy authorities to consider coun-
tervailing measures (Lo Duca and Peltonen 2013). For instance, in conventional early
warning models the dependent variable exists of binary dummy variables which only
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distinguish between crisis and non-crisis events. The CISS, in contrast, can di¤erentiate
between nancial crisis events of di¤erent intensity since it can assume values anywhere
between zero and one; hence, the CISS may be used to identify nancial crisis events in
a more granular and systematic fashion. As an example of a multi-layered early warning
system that is based on a nancial stress index similar to the CISS, see Oet, Bianco,
Gramlich and Ong (2013). Their model, which is implemented at the Federal Reserve
Bank of Cleveland, illustrates how conventional macro variables capturing aggregate
nancial vulnerabilities and proprietary and public micro-supervisory data capturing
institutional vulnerabilities, can be combined into an encompassing early warning sys-
tem that aims to detect risks of a systemic banking crisis in the US.
In sum, despite some scepticism on the side of some academics about the usefulness
of composite indicators of nancial conditions (see Leeper and Nason 2014). I strongly
believe that the ndings presented in this dissertation make a good case for taking
nancial stress indices like the CISS seriously. They o¤er the basis of a promising,
broad and rich research agenda which is very likely to produce tangible results feeding
into the practice of monetary and macro-prudential policy making.
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APPENDIX A
DESCRIPTION OF CONTROL VARIABLES
This appendix describes the control variables used in the block exogeneity tests
reported in Table 3.4.
Commodity price index: Annual change of the log HWWI commodity price index;
Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI) index for the euro area based
on prices in euros; weights for individual commodities are based on their share in total
euro area raw material imports between 1999 and 2001 (in 2000 prices); monthly data.
Source: Haver Analytics.
Consensus ination forecast: Mean forecast of the one-year ahead percentage
change of the euro area HICP, computed as the pro rata average of the mean forecast of
the percentage year-on-year change of the index for the current year and the subsequent
year; in percent per annum; monthly data. Sources: Own calculations and Consensus
Forecasts by Consensus Economics.
Unemployment rate: Average euro area harmonised unemployment rate, season-
ally adjusted; in percent; monthly data. Source: Haver Analytics.
Consensus real GDP forecast: Mean forecast of the one-year ahead percentage
change of the euro area real GDP, computed as the pro rata average of the mean forecast
of the percentage change of the index for the current year and the subsequent year on
the respective previous calendar year; in percent per annum; monthly data. Sources:
Own calculations and Consensus Forecasts by Consensus Economics.
Business climate index: European Commission business climate indicator for the
euro area in standard deviation points, seasonally adjusted; monthly data. Source: Haver
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Analytics.
Policy uncertainty index: The News-based Policy Uncertainty Index quanties
newspaper coverage of policy-related economic uncertainty. The index is based on news
articles from two papers from each of the ve largest European economies (Germany,
the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Spain). The papers include El Pais, El Mundo,
Corriere della Sera, La Repubblica, Le Monde, Le Figaro, the Financial Times, The
Times of London, Handelsblatt and FAZ. The primary measure for this index is the
number of news articles containing the terms uncertainor uncertainty,economic
or economy, as well as policy relevant terms (scaled by the smoothed number of
articles containing today). Policy relevant terms include: policy,tax,spending,
regulation,central bank,budget,and decit.All news searches are done in the
native language of the paper in question. Each paper-specic series is normalised to
standard deviation 1 prior to 2011 and then summed. The series is normalised to mean
100 prior to 2011; monthly data. Source: PolicyUncertainty.com/Haver Analytics.
Bank loans: Annual change of the log of euro area MFI loans to the private non-
nancial sector; monthly data. Source: ECB.
E¤ective euro exchange rate: The nominal euro e¤ective exchange rate is dened
as a geometric weighted average of the bilateral exchange rates of the euro against the
currencies of the EER-12 group of partner countries which includes Australia, Canada,
Denmark, Hong Kong, Japan, Norway, Singapore, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland,
the United Kingdom and the United States. The bilateral exchange rates used in the
calculation are the o¢ cial ECB daily reference rates. Weights are based on trade in
manufactured goods with the trading partners in the period 1999-2001 and are calculated
to account for third-market e¤ects; monthly data. Source: Haver Analytics.
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10-year government bond yield: Average yield to maturity of government bonds
with maturity of ten years (or the closest available maturity) of euro area member states,
weighted by the relative amounts of relevant bonds outstanding; in percent per annum;
monthly average of daily data. Source: ECB.
Term spread: Di¤erence between the euro area average 10-year government bond
yield and the three-month Euribor; in percent per annum; monthly average of daily
data. Source: ECB.
BBB corporate bond spread: Yield spread between BBB-rated bonds of non-
nancial corporations and AAA-rated government bonds with ve to seven years of
maturity based on Bank of America Merrill Lynch bond indices for the euro area; in
percent per annum; monthly average of daily data. Source: Datastream.
High yield corporate bond spread: Yield spread between non-investment grade
bonds of non-nancial corporations of all maturities and AAA-rated government bonds
with three to ve years of maturity based on Bank of America Merrill Lynch bond
indices for the euro area; in percent per annum; monthly average of daily data. Source:
Datastream.
Option-implied stock volatility: Measured by the main EURO STOXX 50 Volatil-
ity Index (VSTOXX). The VSTOXX does not measure implied volatilities of at-the-
money EURO STOXX 50 options, but the square root of the implied variance across
all options of a given time to expiry. The main index is designed as a rolling index at a
xed 30 days to expiry that is achieved through linear interpolation of the two nearest
available sub-indices; in percent per annum; monthly average of daily data. Source:
Datastream.
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APPENDIX B
PRIORS FOR THE MS-BVAR ESTIMATION
This appendix describes the priors applied in the estimation of the Markov-switching
BVAR model presented in Chapter 4. Two sets of priors are relevant for our model, one
on the reduced-form parameters of the VAR conditional on a state, s, and the other on
the transition matrix. The priors on the reduced-form VAR are the standard Minnesota
prior on the lag decay dampening the inuence of long lags. In other words, this prior
shrinks the model towards a random walk. 1controls the overall tightness and the prior
of A0. 2 controls the tightness of the random walk prior on the lagged coe¢ cients.
The prior for constant terms is zero and the prior standard deviation is 3:The priors
that further play a role are 4 that controls the tightness of the prior that dampens the
erratic sampling e¤ects on lag coe¢ cients (lag decay). 5 and 6 are the priors that
express beliefs about unit roots and cointegration.
Let
A0+ = [A1(k)
0; A2(k)
0
; :::Ap(k)
0
; C(k)
0
] and x
0
t = [y
0
t 1; :::y
0
t p; z
0
t];
then the model in Equation (1) can be written as
y0tA0(s
c
t) = x
0
tA+(s
c
t) + "
0
t
 1(svt ); t = 1; 2:::T: (B.1)
A0(st) and A+(st) could, in principle, be estimated straightforwardly, using the method
of Chib (1996) for example, but as n or h grows, the curse of dimensionality quickly sets
in. The matrix A+can be rewritten as
A+(st) = D(st) + S^ A0(st) where S^ =

In 0(m n)n

(B.2)
which means that a mean-zero prior can be placed on D which centers the prior on the
usual reduced-form random-walk model that forms the baseline prior for most Bayesian
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VAR models; see Sims and Zha (1998) for details on this particular prior set-up. The
relationship contained in (B.2) means that a prior on D tightens or loosens the prior on
a random walk for the reduced-form parameter matrix B.
The fact that the latent state, s;is discrete and that the transition probabilities of
states must sum to unity lends itself toward the priors of the Dirichlet form. Dirichlet
priors also have the advantageous property of being conjugate. Letting ij be a hyper-
parameter indexing the expected duration of regime i before switching to regime k 6= i,
the prior on P can be written:
p(P ) = 
k2H

 (
P
i2H ik)
i2H  (ik)

 
i2H
pik)
ik 1 (B.3)
where  (:) is the gamma distribution. The Dirichlet prior enables a exible framework
for a variety of time variation including, for example, once-and-for-all shifts and, by
letting h become arbitrarily large, di¤usion processes. In the application presented in
this paper we allow for switching in shock variances determined by a separate process
from the one controlling shifts in coe¢ cients.
For our baseline specication, we use priors that are well-suited for a monthly model.
In particular, we specify k k = f1; 2; :::6g = f0:57; 0:13; 0:1; 1:2; 10; 10g. With the val-
ues of k we employ what Sims and Zha (1998) and Sims, Waggoner and Zha (2008)
suggest for monthly data. The Dirichlet priors we use are looser than what would be
usually used for monthly data. They imply an 87 and 83 percent prior probability for
the variances and coe¢ cients, respectively, that the economy will, in the next period,
continue in the same state as it is in the current period. These probabilities imply a
shorter duration of regimes than the priors used in Sims, Waggoner and Zha (2008)
use for the macroeconomic application based on quarterly data, consistent with the no-
tion that in our study jumps in nancial markets play an important role in driving the
regime shifts. We found that the data move the posterior away from the prior in the
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sense that coe¢ cient regimes turn out to be more persistent than the variance regimes.
Interestingly, our results are relatively robust to some variation in the Dirichlet prior.
For instance, if we impose a 74 and 85 percent probability, implying a more persistent
coe¢ cient regime than variance regime, we get similar impulse responses and regime
durations of variance and coe¢ cient regimes from the resulting model than from our
model.
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APPENDIX C
COUNTERFACTUALS ON THE ROLE OF SYSTEMIC FINANCIAL
STRESS IN THE MS-BVAR MODEL
This appendix presents the results on two additional counterfactual experiments
conducted on the basis of the Markov-switching BVAR model presented in Chaper 4.
The rst simulation sets the CISS by an amount of 0.25 above its historical level, starting
in March 1995 (see the bottom-left panel of Figure C.1). According to the estimated
regime probabilities, this period is one of tranquil times (vLcL). The e¤ect on output
growth (as shown in the upper-left panel of Figure C.1) would be very small given the
magnitude of the change in the level of systemic stress; output growth drops by at most
0.5 percentage points below its historical path. In contrast, a similar increase in the level
of the CISS implemented as from October 2008 i.e., during the systemic crisis regime
leads to a massive decline in output growth by about 7 percentage points, relative to
its historical path (see Figure C.2). Moreover, ination and loan growth decline by 0.5
percentage points, which is 1 percentage point below their actual path. The short-term
interest rate also falls more strongly by about 1 percentage point vis-à-vis its actual path,
probably reecting a systematic easing of conventional monetary policy in response to
the deteriorating nancial and macroeconomic environment.
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Figure C.1: Counterfactual simulation: tranquil times (vLcL) with CISS increased by
0.25 as of Mar. 1995
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Figure C.2: Counterfactual simulation: systemic crisis period (vHcH) with CISS in-
creased by 0.25 as of Oct. 2008
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